Stocks are simple. All you do is buy shares in a great business for less than the business is intrinsically worth, with management of the highest integrity and ability. Then you own those shares forever. I will tell you how to become rich. Close the doors. Be fearful when others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.

October 30, 2010

分析一个企业的前景,并且在价位合适的时候购买他的骨牌,并长期持有

http://news.imeigu.com/a/1287367441168.html

我们看到很多原本我们想象都不可能倒闭的一些公司,你比如说雷曼兄弟,比如说AIG等等,他们最终倒闭了,但是我们看到这两位不倒翁如今非常健康,而且还洋溢着青春的光芒,你们不倒的秘密到底是什么?

沃伦•巴菲特:

我有一个伟大的老师,大约60年前,他交给我一个重要的原则,从那以后我就一直在实践这个原则。我很幸运,在投资方面我对情绪有很好的掌控力,但是我并没有所谓的投资秘诀。我仔细地考察那些企业,试图弄清楚哪些企业是我了解的,哪些是我不了解的。如果不了解,我就放弃。我需要分析一个企业的前景,并且在价位合适的时候购买他的骨牌,并长期持有,实际就是这么简单。

主持人陈伟鸿:

你刚才提到的这位老师应该是很多人都知道的格林厄姆,也是把你招进哥伦比亚大学的那位老师,但是他到底给你教了什么样的一个投资理念,让你至今都觉得受用到了现在?

沃伦•巴菲特:

他教会了我首要的就是不要把股票看成是一个不停上下浮动的东西,不能轻信一些谣言,不能根据谣言判断一只股票真实的价值。买一只股票就意味着投资于一家企业,而自己就相当于是这个企业长期的伙伴,而且你投资的企业应该在他的领域具有优势,从而能够保证企业在一定时期内维持较好的利润。而且他交给我说不要过分地关注你的投资,如果你遵从格林厄姆先生的教导,然后你会发现你的投资几乎是很难赔钱的。短期来看可能有些人比你赚的钱要多,但是只要你不赔钱,你的回报是持续且合理的,所以我听从我老师的教导,查理•芒格也是这样。
主持人陈伟鸿:

那您老师的这些投资原则,在金融危机当中是不是也经过的检验,是不是它依然是一个灵验的投资方法和投资理念?

沃伦•巴菲特:

我老师的理念是正确的,说到金融危机,它的确是一场实实在在的危机,而当金融危机发生的时候,某些股票的价格就会走低,这对我们很有吸引力,因为你就可以以更低的价格买进股票。我们的贷款不多,所以我们有足够的实力来应对危机。我们相信整个体系是不会崩溃的,我从来没有怀疑过这一点,所以当机会出现的时候,我们就开张支票把合适的股票买下来。所以行情的好坏从来不会成为我们的困扰,我只是按照老师的教导在合适的价位上买入。

主持人陈伟鸿:

很多的书上都说老师曾经给你归纳了三大投资原则,或者是五大投资原则,你今天是不是也在现场给我们来归纳一下?

沃伦•巴菲特:

操作股票的第一大原则就是你要把股票当成一个生意来看,而不要把它仅仅看成是一种上下浮动的有价证券。第二个就是边际效益安全的理念。如果你认为一只股票值十块钱,那么九块五或者是九块七毛五都不要买,你要等价格比你的心理价格低很多的时候再买入。如果一座桥他的载重量是一万吨,那你就不要驾驶一辆 9800吨的卡车从上面经过,但是你可以驶过一座承重量两万吨的桥,这就是一个格林厄姆一个基本的理念。

查理•芒格:

巴菲特所提到的边际效益安全里面是非常有创新性的,如果不是人生中犯过很多的错误,遇到了很多误会,也不会产生这样的理念。我们的生意做的很成功,我们在国有商业方面的投资可能是美国最好的国有商业。我们的意外险或者财险可能是世界上最好的财险公司,而我们投资的伯灵顿铁路是世界说最好的铁路投资,比亚迪是一个年轻的公司,也是世界上最好的投资之一。眼光保持准确并不是一件很困难的事情,这就是我这些年最大的心得,因为你是跟那些很优秀的人合作,让我感到有意思的是一些卓越的人将公司经营得很成功,而我们买他的股票,这为我们赚到了财富,虽然我们自己用不了那么多。但是我们与很多自己钦佩的人成为的朋友,这是一个非常幸运的人生。而一个股票投机者的生活是非常糟糕的,因为他们总是关注价格波动,但是我们不是这样,所以我们生活得非常快乐,能交很多朋友,不仅让我们生活愉悦,而且这种投资模式非常奏效。

比尔•盖茨:

巴菲特最擅长于投资的就是他自己很了解的行业和企业,但是像我们微软这样的IT类的股票,恐怕并不是合适他的类型。我觉得重要的是一个人如果要购买 IT行业的股票,那么他一定要了解这个行业的特性,因为IT股是波动比较大的。因为我本人在微软工作,所以我的情况会有把握一些。说的简单一点,巴菲特其实一般都是不碰高科技类的企业的。

主持人陈伟鸿:

你刚才说不懂的行业你不碰,比尔•盖茨先生也说高科技一些行业可能你也是不碰,但是你注意看一下,坐在比尔•盖茨身旁的就是王传福先生,他们的比亚迪同样是高科技这个领域,而且电动汽车的未来在很多人的眼中可能也是一个具有不确定性的一个发展行业,那么为什么你不投微软,你愿意投比亚迪,你看清楚了他们的未来,你懂这个行业吗?

沃伦•巴菲特:

我非常理解这个行业,芒格甚至比我了解的更为透彻一些,因为首先是芒格让我关注到比亚迪这一只股票,几年前他就说你应该关注比亚迪,因为当我们看比亚迪的历史记录。其实我对汽车行业还是比较了解的,其实在一般意义上我对汽车行业是比较了解的,王传福用了仅仅15年,甚至是7年短短的时间就在汽车行业做出了了不起的成就,王传福先生还有他的比亚迪公司我觉得是非常有能力的,当然你说在汽车行业未来5年、10年会演变成什么样子,谁也不能说清楚,比如说在太阳能汽车或者是能量储存这方面很难预测。但是在我看来王传福是个很聪明的人,所以我们购买了他股票的10%。我相信未来比亚迪股票的回报率将会被证实是非常可观的。对此查理应该也有话要讲。

查理•芒格:

比亚迪是我一生当中碰到的最重要的投资机会之一,我们与其他投资者不同的一点是我们并不是太被股票的上上下下波动所左右,作为投资者买卖证券的交易成本是比较高的,所以我们选择长期持有一只股票。我们很高兴地看到自己庞大的资金投资在有限的几只优秀的股票上。我向你们所有人推荐这种投资模式,你只需要进入有限的几个卓越的行业领域,而不是去买卖上百只股票,否则巴菲特会因此而致富,但是你不会,这就是我的建议。

沃伦•巴菲特:

芒格和我一直在观察汽车这个行业,我们观察了50年,从这种持续的观察中,我们知道一个汽车公司怎样才能获得成功,又会因为什么走向失败,像比亚迪这样的一家企业其实在汽车行业是不多见的,一些IT或者高科技的股票可能一度非常成功,但是我们却做不到持续有地去检测他们。比如说苹果(AAPL,300.98,-1.40%)公司很成功,但是我们并不是很懂这家公司,或者在这个领域中的其他公司。但是可口可乐我就看得懂,我知道像可口可乐这样的公司在未来很多年它都不可能出现什么问题,它明年卖的产品肯定比今年还多,在全球也不会有价格战,也不会缺原材料,所以在世界上人们总是要喝饮料的,饮料总是一种必需品,所以我们看得懂可口可乐的未来,我们就要购买他的股票。而对于比亚迪,我想我们也很确定。
我想请问巴菲特先生,就说你在收购喜诗糖果对你的启示当中,你后面投资的可口可乐、吉利等等,这些启示是什么,能不能跟我们一起分享一下。

主持人陈伟鸿:

包括箭牌口香糖,它们当中到底有什么样的明星基因?

沃伦•巴菲特:

他们的共同点都是他们都是生产消费品的企业,而且大家都非常喜欢吃特点的产品,喜诗糖果的市场当然规模上比可口可乐要小得多,它不像可口可乐那样风靡全世界,人们对糖果味道的喜好是比较稳定化的,但是对于软饮料来说,各个国家的人的口味差不多。所以喜诗糖果其实是一个中小型的企业,但是它很优秀,它的盈利能力很强,从它那里赚来的钱,可以去收购其他的公司。我收购喜诗糖果是在1972年,当时芒格先生帮了很大的忙,幸运的是我也了解糖果这个行业。

我看这个火车是离不开铁路的,我就选铁路,伯灵顿铁路,我注意到巴菲特先生刚刚完成一项重要的并购案,300亿美元收购了伯灵顿铁路,我觉得这是不是标志着、意味着巴菲特先生的投资将从高增长的领域向稳增长的领域过渡。有评论说,巴菲特先生的这项收购价格并不便宜,那么这样大规模的收购,对巴菲特先生这列火车高速运行的速度会不会带来影响。那么为什么说收购的这个资产在未来一百年还会是优良的资产。

沃伦•巴菲特:

是的,我们花了340亿,这是很大的一笔钱,我们觉得这个价钱很公平,没有什么讨价还价的余地了,如果是在美国的竞争市场上的话,340亿美元购买伯灵顿铁路股票是值得的,因为按照公里数来衡量的话,伯灵顿铁路他的运载量占到的美国的11%,在美国有三亿一千万的人口,有11%的跨城市货运是沿着伯灵顿铁路来运输的,在20年、50年之后,美国人口会增加货物运量也会增加,而铁路是非常高效的货物运输渠道。在美国修建新的铁路的可能性不大,所以我们想扩大铁路投资的份额,但是这个投资是一种比较温和的投资,它不可能很快增长三倍,但是它很确定,我们很了解这个行业,基本上美国如果想维持繁荣,没有伯灵顿铁路是不可想象的,所以我希望从中能够获得一份利益。

Learn to be a great investor - reading a lot

A QUESTION Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are often asked is: how do you learn to be a great investor?
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“First of all,” says Charlie Munger, “you have to understand your own nature. Each person has to play the game given his own marginal utility considerations and in a way that takes into account his own psychology. If losses are going to make you miserable — and some losses are inevitable — you might be wise to utilise a very conservative pattern of investment and saving all your life. So you have to adapt your strategy to your own nature and your own talents. I don’t think there’s a one-size-fits-all investment strategy that I can give you."
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“Next”, says Munger, “you have to gather information. I think both Warren and I learn more from the great business magazines than we do anywhere else. It’s such an easy, shorthand way of getting a vast variety of business experience just to rifle through issue after issue covering a great variety of businesses. And if you get into the mental habit of relating what you’re reading to the basic structure of the underlying ideas being demonstrated, you gradually accumulate some wisdom about investing. I don’t think you can get to be a really good broad-range investor without doing a massive amount of reading. I don’t think any one book will do it for you."
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Nor should reading be random: “… you have to have some idea of why you’re looking for the information. Don’t read annual reports the way Francis Bacon said you do science — which, by the way, is not the way to do science — where you just collect endless data and then only later do you try to make sense of it. You have to start with some ideas about reality. And then you have to look to see whether what you’re seeing fits in with proven basic concepts.
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“Frequently, you’ll look at a business having fabulous results. And the question is, ‘How long can this continue?’ Well, there’s only one way I know to answer that. And that’s to think about why the results are occurring now — and then to figure out what could cause those results to stop occurring."
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“On the other hand,” says Charlie, “if it weren’t a little difficult, everybody would be rich."
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(from Buffett’s 1965 letter to Partners)
Diversification

Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: "(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”

This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, "7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment."

We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorrelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.

It doesn't work that way.

We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?" This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight.” It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.

The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn't. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.

There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can't reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.

Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don't care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)

Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn't prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.

The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.

I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.

October 11, 2010

Buffet: quite clear stocks are cheaper than bonds, believe me, it will come back over time

my comments: let's just hold and wait until "it come back".
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Warren Buffett says it is "quite clear stocks are cheaper than bonds" right now, but notes that relationship will change eventually when confidence in the economy is inevitably restored.

In an appearance earlier today (Tuesday) at the Fortune Most Powerful Women Conference in Washington, Buffett said he "can't imagine" choosing bonds over stocks at current prices, but concedes that's what many investors have been doing because of a "lack of confidence" in the economy's future. "They're making a mistake, the ones that are buying the bonds" at record low yields.

In this video clip, he tells Fortune's Carol Loomis:

"It's quite clear that stocks are cheaper than bonds. I can't imagine anybody having bonds in their portfolio when they can own equities, a diversified group of equities. But people do because they, the lack of confidence. But that's what makes for the attractive prices. If they had their confidence back, they wouldn't be selling at these prices. And believe me, it will come back over time."

It's not a new opinion for Buffett. Back in early 2009, he was writing about an "extraordinary" U.S. Treasury bond "bubble."

Fortune's Street Sweep blog points out that the 10-year Treasury yield has dropped to under 2.5 percent from 4 percent over the past six months.

October 07, 2010

你不需要很聪明就可以明白比亚迪是个优秀的公司

我从不预测股价,也不看短期的股价波动,我不在乎我投资的公司下一个星期、下一个月、下一个季度利润好不好、股价高不高,我不看短期,只看长期。我投的是这个企业,而不是股票,这是两个概念。我们寻找投资机会时,要看一个企业的市场潜力,比如比亚迪,不管是它所从事的汽车行业还是新能源行业,以后都会发生巨大变化,市场需求巨大,有很多需求尚未得到满足;再看这个企业的竞争优势,比亚迪在这些市场有着显著的竞争优势,技术创新能力很强,你不需要很聪明就可以明白比亚迪是个优秀的公司,它过往的业绩摆在那儿;再看这个企业的领导者,王传福先生十分优秀,年富力强,有的是干劲和激情,他的目标是到2025年成为世界第一大汽车生产商,我觉得这个目标很可能提前几年就可实现了。总之,比亚迪具备一个成功企业的所有要素,只要能够保持前十年的发展势头,不成功是小概率事件。

这和两个公司的相对规模有关。做投资,说到底,就是现在付一笔钱,放到一个你认为很有潜力的企业去,希望这个企业随着时间的推移能够释放实现它的潜力,将来给你带来可观的回报。 Charlie跟我解释了比亚迪的情况后,我觉得这个企业潜力巨大,而且有实现潜力、创造价值的能力,值得投资。如果当时你有钱,我也会建议你投比亚迪,而不是微软;别说是微软,我都不建议你投我们的公司Berkshire Hathway。



兄弟情深,相敬如宾

巴菲特和芒格半个多世纪的友谊一直是投资界的美谈,此次老哥俩携手来华访问,让我们近距离感受到了巴芒相敬如宾的兄弟深情。

比芒格小六岁的巴菲特处处照顾着芒哥,芒格视力听力不好,但说话滔滔不绝,每次坐在主席台上发言往往忘了翻译的存在,巴菲特会拉拉他的衣袖,然后指着翻译站的方向,提醒芒哥注意停顿给翻译时间翻译,几次之后,芒格形成了条件反射,只要巴爷一碰他,他就马上闭嘴,很听话的样子。而巴菲特对于翻译特别重视,开场白就说:“一般我在中国会用中文发言,不过考虑到翻译小姐的就业问题,我还是改用中文吧。”全场大笑。

听众提给巴菲特的问题,巴菲特总是找各种理由转给自称爱说教的芒格,给芒格表演的机会,特别是第一个问题和最后一个问题。和比亚迪员工对话时,第一个问题问巴爷对于新能源发展前景的看法,巴爷回答说,“这个问题还是让Charlie回答吧,尽管他只比我大六岁,但是他的智慧比我高深很多,特别是讲到新能源,我就更不是他的对手了。” 最后一个问题是关于再生能源,盖茨回答后,芒格补充了几句,提问者再问巴菲特的观点,巴爷说,“一般一个问题Charlie回答后就盖棺定论了,我没有补充了。” 说完,三人在台上相视而笑。在对话节目中,巴菲特甚至说芒格是我的秘密恋人,对于芒哥的崇敬珍惜溢于言表。精神上如此契合的朋友确实应该比珍惜恋人更珍惜。

芒格对于巴菲特也是十分尊重,有人问芒格,“您和巴菲特半个世纪的友谊是不是巴菲特成功的重要因素,尽管巴菲特经常抛头露面,而您十分低调,还是有人认为您比巴菲特更重要,对此您怎么看?” 芒格正言道:“完全不是这样!Warren才是最重要的,他比我重要得多,他是一把手,我是二把手,我只能说我在他的事业发展中起到了一定的作用而已。他在幕前我在幕后,这不是有意的安排,是自然而然形成的局面,我觉得这样很好;我没有他那么显赫重要,对此我没有一点点遗憾,我其实比较喜欢这样在幕后。 Warren能力强、人品好,德才兼备,又是个很有趣的人,我很幸运有这样的朋友。在中国关注我的人比在美国多,我觉得主要的原因可能是我的价值观比较接近孔夫子,重原则、重家庭、重教育,强调活到老学到老,学习是一种道德义务,life-long learning as a moral duty,主张用智慧改善人类生存条件,use your wisdom to make your family and the world better, 务实,不偏执,我没有传统意义上的宗教信仰。但是如果没有巴菲特,我不会得到这么多的关注。” 有时记者会问巴菲特暗藏机关的问题,芒格担心巴菲特落入陷阱,会挺身出来掩护。在长沙站,国外媒体Bloomberg问:“巴菲特先生,您对于人民币汇率问题怎么看?这几天我跟着你们从深圳到北京到长沙,所见所闻都是很积极向上的,中美民间往来还是很友好互惠的。但是美国国会日前通过了一个强迫人民币升值的法案,您是否认为国会通过这样的法案是脱离实际,不识时务?” 芒格代巴菲特回答:“我们只能代表公司说话,我们没有代表政府发言的权利和兴趣,汇率问题是中美两国政府的事,我们不便置喙。我们希望美国政府能够妥善处理好这个问题。” 有时他也会打趣巴菲特,比如,主持人问完巴菲特一个问题,再问芒格怎么看,芒格就说:“我完全同意巴菲特主席的意见(巴菲特是伯克希尔哈斯威的董事局主席,芒格是副主席)。”装出一副跟班小弟的样子。和比亚迪员工对话时,有人问巴菲特,中国有很多优秀的年轻人都以您为榜样,希望能成为“中国的巴菲特”,您觉得他们有机会成为您吗?巴菲特立马把这个问题转给芒格,芒格说:“这个问题得你自己回答了,他们是问能不能成为中国的巴菲特,而不是中国的芒格,我不能代劳。”

半个多世纪的情谊,创造了500多亿的财富,激励了成千上百万年轻人,一个86岁的老哥,一个80岁的小弟,兄弟情深,令人感动!

王传福高,比亚迪强

此次巴菲特携芒格、盖茨来访,目的何在,众说纷纭。减持说是其中的一个。有人怀疑巴菲特此次拜访比亚迪就像当年拜访中石油一样,是吻别,最后的亲密。众所周知,巴菲特的性格是属于十分不愿意得罪人的那种,他很害怕被人讨厌,一辈子都在很努力地获得大家的好感,所以减持比亚迪之前先来抚慰一下也不是没有可能。但是巴芒在各种场合的言行都彻底粉碎了减持说。

在和比亚迪员工对话时,到下半场,终于有人提出了一个萦绕大家心头的尖锐问题,“请问巴菲特先生,您认为比亚迪的股价可以涨到多高?您准备持有多久?” 巴爷不慌不忙地回答:“我从不预测股价,也不看短期的股价波动,我不在乎我投资的公司下一个星期、下一个月、下一个季度利润好不好、股价高不高,我不看短期,只看长期。我投的是这个企业,而不是股票,这是两个概念。我们寻找投资机会时,要看一个企业的市场潜力,比如比亚迪,不管是它所从事的汽车行业还是新能源行业,以后都会发生巨大变化,市场需求巨大,有很多需求尚未得到满足;再看这个企业的竞争优势,比亚迪在这些市场有着显著的竞争优势,技术创新能力很强,你不需要很聪明就可以明白比亚迪是个优秀的公司,它过往的业绩摆在那儿;再看这个企业的领导者,王传福先生十分优秀,年富力强,有的是干劲和激情,他的目标是到2025年成为世界第一大汽车生产商,我觉得这个目标很可能提前几年就可实现了。总之,比亚迪具备一个成功企业的所有要素,只要能够保持前十年的发展势头,不成功是小概率事件。

有的记者比较直接,“您会减持比亚迪的股票吗?”巴菲特直摇头:“当然不会! 我估计在我葬礼上,大家还会说,他还拿着比亚迪的股票呢。” 芒格更是字字铿锵:“到死也不会!” 记者又问了:“既然你们这么看好比亚迪,是否会考虑增持?” 芒格回答:“增持不是我们能说了算了,我们得获得管理层的批准许可,比亚迪并不需要资金以获得更大的成功。”

巴菲特还多次讲到他当时决定投资比亚迪的故事:“我和Charlie相处51年,他一共给过我三个推荐投资的电话,前面两次也都很不错,第三次就是建议投资比亚迪,我一开始没有马上采取行动,他就打电话来说,如果你不投王传福,就错过第二个亨利福特了,我不为所动;他又打电话来,说,你不投就错过第二个爱迪生了,我还是不为所动;第三次他打电话来,说,你再不投就错过第二个比尔盖茨啦,我一听立马就投了。”说完俏皮地看一眼旁边的比尔盖茨,在全场欢笑中,盖茨也露出了稍带羞涩的笑容。

有人追问巴菲特:“您和盖茨先生是好朋友,现在和王传福先生也是好朋友,同样是好朋友,为什么王先生的企业您投了,盖茨先生的企业您就没投呢?” 盖茨和芒格都笑眯眯地侧头看着巴菲特,看他怎么回答。这个难不倒巴菲特,只见他呵呵呵笑了几声,开始快速给出他万变不离其中的回答:“这和两个公司的相对规模有关。做投资,说到底,就是现在付一笔钱,放到一个你认为很有潜力的企业去,希望这个企业随着时间的推移能够释放实现它的潜力,将来给你带来可观的回报。 Charlie跟我解释了比亚迪的情况后,我觉得这个企业潜力巨大,而且有实现潜力、创造价值的能力,值得投资。如果当时你有钱,我也会建议你投比亚迪,而不是微软;别说是微软,我都不建议你投我们的公司Berkshire Hathway。” 这样的自嘲抹去了可能会给盖茨带来的尴尬不悦,巴菲特不愧是卡耐基的信徒。

巴菲特2008年9月投资比亚迪,这是第一次实地考察,也是第三次来华访问。他说,他是抱着很高的期望来考察的,他对于这次考察所见所闻十分满意,比亚迪的技术、产品、管理团队、员工队伍、和政府的关系等各方面让他感到十分满意,他对比亚迪充满了信心。在比亚迪经销商大会上,巴菲特也一再强调,“我选择比亚迪,是明智的;你们选择比亚迪,也是明智的。”

如果说巴菲特的表达还算比较含蓄的话,那么芒格的表达就十分热情了,生性挑剔、怀疑一切的芒格对于中国、对于比亚迪、对于王传福有着如此纯粹、强烈的好感,让很多人感到困惑惊讶。当比亚迪员工问到芒格,他觉得比亚迪有什么欠缺的地方,他有什么建议时,芒格的回答几乎让中国人感动得掉泪:“我们是来向你们学习的,不是来说教传经的,你们的事业十分伟大,你们的技术领先世界,你们的抱负无人能比,你们的人民勤劳智慧,精诚合作,所以成功是必然的,就像比亚迪一样!”

芒格还将王传福比作爱迪生与韦尔奇的结合体,可能是他这辈子对一个人的最高评价了,当然除了他的老弟巴菲特。芒格认为王传福有着崇高的理想、惊人的毅力以及团结鼓舞人们的魅力。王传福慷慨大方地将股权分给高管和员工,不安插一个亲戚进公司,这是很难能可贵的。王传福能带领大家创新开拓,日以继夜地搞科研开发,不断学习,不断试验,不断进取。芒格对于那些投机取巧、豪赌爆发的有钱人十分不屑,强调,有钱人不一定是高尚的人,生财要有道。当被问到他认为什么样的人算高尚的有钱人呢,他毫不犹豫地回答说,像王传福这样的人才是生财有道的高尚的有钱人。他的事业造福人类,泽被子孙,值得大家学习。



这几天,巴菲特和芒格不是穿着打着比亚迪标识的T恤衫,就是打着比亚迪的领带,口口声声比亚迪、王传福,真是成了比亚迪的代言人。当记者问芒格,这种情况常见吗?芒格说,支持所投资的公司当然是正常的,不过像我们这样支持比亚迪当然是不同寻常的,我们一般也不会这样力挺我们旗下投资的公司,上次这样做好像是投See’s糖果的时候,那是好多年以前的事了。像比亚迪这样年轻的公司需要我们的支持以便更快地获得公信力,这样才能发展得更好。我不会说我自己都不相信的话,I don’t say things I don’t believe.我不说言不由衷的话;所以,我对比亚迪的褒奖句句是真心话,你们尽可照单全收。”



当被问到是否会考虑投资于中国其他企业时,巴菲特客气地回答,对于世界各地的投资机会我们都是很关注的,只要符合我们的投资标准,我们都会考虑投资。芒格的回答更明确:“We got so charmed with BYD. 比亚迪让我们太心驰神往了,其他公司和比亚迪比起来总是相形见绌。”



总之,巴芒给我们传达的信息是:王传福是高尚的,比亚迪是强大的。



中国神话,高山仰止

巴菲特十五年前第一次访华,为期十七天,主要是为了追随比尔盖茨夫妇。Buffett’s motivation for this round-the-world jaunt was the Gates. 巴菲特通过朋友K结识盖茨后就一直很喜欢这个商界天才,甚至为了参加盖茨的婚礼而放芒格的鸽子,没有去参加芒格七十大寿典礼,芒格对巴菲特当然很宽厚,反正巴菲特做什么他都会原谅。有人说盖茨成了巴菲特的第三个儿子;也有人说,讲到对盖茨的爱,巴菲特仅次于盖茨的太太Melinda。when it came to being in love with Gates, Buffett ran a close second to Melinda. 总之,巴菲特第一次来中国,不是为了中国,而是为了盖茨。多年之后,留在巴菲特记忆最深处的不是长城、紫禁城、三峡、钓鱼台宴请时盖茨夫妇特地安排为他做的一道又一道汉堡包和炸薯条,而是神农溪的纤夫。 “There could have been another Bill Gates among those men pulling our boat. They were born here, and they were destined to spend their lives tugging those boats the way they did ours. They didn’t have a chance. It was pure luck that we had a shot at the brass ring.” 在神农溪的船上时他就说:“那些拉船的纤夫中可能就有另一个比尔盖茨,但是他出生在这儿,注定一辈子这样辛苦地拉船,没有出人头地的机会。我们有机会获得这样的财富成功,钟鸣鼎食,纯粹是运气。” 这十五年来,富有恻隐之心的巴菲特每每会想起神农溪的纤夫,感慨命运的安排,人生的际遇。



9月29日下午,对话节目邀请了当年纤夫船长来到现场和巴菲特见面。老纤夫出场前,先让巴菲特看了一段节目组寻访老纤夫的录像,老纤夫已经不在神农溪拉船了,全家搬到了县城,住在一幢七层楼的房子里,过着幸福的生活。老纤夫上场,巴菲特和他热烈拥抱,淳朴的老纤夫拍着巴菲特的西装表袋说:“原来你这么有钱啊!” 老纤夫多半不知道在这个有史以来最杰出的投资家、人称股神心目中自己代表的是悲悯、宿命,这十几年他其实过得并不比任何其他人更痛苦,也许只有更开心,毕竟生活水平大大改善了。对于巴菲特来说,这一见面了却了不是心愿的心愿,修复了不是心理创伤的心理创伤,是件释怀快意的乐事。老纤夫的际遇折射了中国经济和社会的大发展,巴菲特深感触动。他在讲到中国发展时,从不吝啬渲染的词汇:“很难想象现在的中国和15年前的中国是同一个中国,城市面貌焕然一新,各项事业蓬勃发展。中央、省、市等各级政府为经济的发展营造了良好的环境,培养了许多像比亚迪这样的优秀企业和像王传福先生这样的优秀企业家,在很短的时间里取得了其他国家一百年也未必能够取得的进步,令人叹为观止!我很荣幸见证了中国过去15年的大发展,我希望我还能见证中国接下来10年20年甚至更长时间的大发展,见证中国成为世界一大强国! ” 当然他时刻不忘为比亚迪争取支持:“我们应该支持像比亚迪这样的公司,因为它的发展不是简单的一家公司的发展,它的技术会给13亿中国人民带来福祉,给 65亿地球人带来福祉,让我们祝愿这项造福人类、泽被子孙的伟大事业获得辉煌成功!



总结此次中国之行时,他这样说到:“这几天的中国之行太神奇精彩了(amazing),比亚迪的发展、各大城市的发展、整个中国的发展都给我们留下了十分深刻的印象,我们回去后会告诉我们的股东、告诉美国民众这里中国人民取得的巨大进步。我十五年前首次访华,三年前又去过大连,这次回来考察比亚迪,看到比亚的的大发展很是高兴激动,希望在不久的将来,我们还会来到中国,见证比亚迪年产电动客车年产50万辆的光辉一刻。 ”



最后一天在长沙答记者问时,巴菲特说:“这次中国之行所见所闻远远超过了我的预期!我当然也在电视等媒体上经常看到有关中国的报导,听到很多数字,比如 GDP的增长率等等,但是眼见为实,亲眼看到后的震撼力还是十分强烈。中国经济充满活力,孕育了大量的优秀企业和企业家。自我第一次来访至今15年间,中国经济取得了突飞猛进的发展,我坚信这个趋势会继续下去,中国经济将来会获得更大的发展。我向中国、中国人民致敬!”



如果说盖茨促成了巴菲特的首次中国行,给了巴菲特了解中国的机会,那么真正让巴菲特对中国产生好感的是芒格。被誉为本世纪最伟大的思想者的芒格很崇尚中国文化;对于很多西方人不能理解接受的一些中国现象,芒格很宽容,认为中国的制度系统“由于历史沿革的原因,有些奇怪,但是行之有效”。 2008年Berkshire Hathway股东年会上,有股民对于中国政府处理西藏问题的方式表示抗议,要求Berkshire Hathway出售可口可乐的股票,因为可口可乐是北京奥运会的赞助商。不愿得罪人、希望所有人都喜欢他的巴菲特碰到这种不涉及利害的冲突争议,一般打马虎眼,息事宁人。芒格则不然,他从不因为怕得罪人而放弃直抒胸臆,而且崇尚理性的他最讨厌用意识形态代替大脑思考。芒格缓缓说到:“西藏问题的是非曲直且不去说,我只问你,中国的民主制度是进步了还是退步了?既然是进步了,我们为什么要打击她呢?你难道是希望它退步吗?再说了,民主是个过程。 1929年美国举办奥运会时美国妇女还都没有选举权呢。 按照你的说法,我们当年就因该阻止美国举办奥运会。” 一番话,说得那股民哑口无言,一天会议从此再无人提中国民主问题。



芒格对中国的好感不知来源何处,可能是因为他很推崇孔子的思想的原因,他和孔子有着很强的认同感。他在北京接受采访解释自己为什么在中国比在美国更受欢迎的原因时说:“我觉得主要的原因可能是我的价值观比较接近孔子,重思考、重原则、重家庭、重教育,强调活到老学到老,学习是一种道德义务,life- long learning as a moral duty,主张用智慧改善自身、家人、同胞乃至整个人类的生存条件,use your wisdom to make your family and the world better, 务实,不偏执,我没有传统意义上的宗教信仰。”



慈善公益,见仁见智

在这次中国之行中,巴菲特表示,把一个企业经营好,特别是像比亚迪这样的企业,为人类造福,本身就是慈善;盖茨认为,在此基础之上,可以以个人或公司的名义进行一些帮助弱势群体、赈灾救难等具体的慈善活动;芒格提到,欧洲包括英国在内,在慈善方面都做得不大,亚洲也不大。他说,“对于Warren和Bill的雄心壮志(笔者:大概就是指劝捐的雄心壮志)我表示同情和理解,不过我不会指示中国人该怎么做慈善,这是他们自己的事情,我可以选择捐我自己的钱,别人的钱捐不捐是他们的事。”



尽管巴菲特三天半行程中只有一个晚上参加盖茨基金的活动,但是那晚的慈善晚宴却吸引了全国乃至全球的目光,“劝捐鸿门宴”引发了国内外对于中国慈善业的激烈讨论。



有数据显示,美国慈善捐赠资金是GDP的1.7%,欧洲是0.7%,而中国是不到0.01%。为什么中国没有所谓捐赠文化?除了经济发展阶段不同、慈善机构治理透明程度不同等原因外,可能还有一个是价值观、人生观、世界观的原因。



巴菲特能捐出99%的财富,这和他价值观中的“娘胎彩票”理论分不开。 他说:“I’ve had it so good in this world, you know. The odds were fifty-to-one against me being born in the United States in 1930. I won the lottery the day emerged from the womb by being in the United States instead of in some other country where my chances would have been way different.”“我很幸运,1930年出生于美国,这个出生时空组合的概率是50比1,我从娘胎里出来的那一刻就好比中了50比1的彩票。如果不是出生在美国,而是其他国家,我的境遇就很不同了。” 他认为,一个社会应该鼓励强者自由翱翔,追求成功,但是成功了一定要帮助由于种种原因而没有成功的人,要回馈社会。 对于那些自以为“I did it all myself”全靠自己、和社会没关系、不愿意回馈社会的所谓成功人士,巴菲特很是反感,说:“你让他去选择,一个是生在孟加拉国,不用付税,另一个是生在美国,看他愿意付出他收入的百分之几以获得生在美国的娘胎彩票!” 巴菲特和盖茨是最早最激烈反对布什总统逐渐撤销遗产税计划的富人。巴菲特义愤填膺地说,我反对世袭相承的王朝,这好比在这一界奥运冠军的孩子中选拔下一界奥运的冠军,还有比这样的制度更背离民主精神的吗?一个少女单身妈妈领些社会福利金,你们富人都要嚷嚷说这样培养了穷人的依赖性,不公平;那你们给子孙后代留了这么多饭票,他们几代人可以完全不劳而获,就因为他们投对了娘胎,这样就公平了吗?!巴菲特对于自己的三个孩子从不纵容惯养,三个孩子上的都是公立学校,衣食住行都很普通,他们并不知道家里很有钱,过着和其他孩子一样的生活。



在巴菲特的思想里,有这么相互关联的两点,一是出生的时空是随机的概率事件,出生时空有利,好比中彩;二是致富发财、获得成功不完全是个人的努力,离不开社会这个大环境。所以中彩的富人捐钱做慈善,帮助没有中彩的其他人,是天经地义的。巴菲特不觉得自己有多了不起,他曾经在多个场合讲过以下相似的话:我是很幸运的,如果我出生在非洲,整天要和老虎狮子赛跑的话,我恐怕早就成了老虎的早餐了,因为实在跑不过别人;我很幸运,在我很小的时候我就知道自己喜欢做的是什么事情,我天生的性格使得我很适合做这个事情,并且在后天又获得了将这个事情做好的知识、技能,这个事情做好后又给我带来了巨大的财富和很高的社会地位。我太幸运了!一个士兵保家卫国,功勋卓著,得到的回报是国家颁发的一枚奖章;一个教师,教书育人,桃李天下,得到的是学生的感谢信;像我这样一个投资者,只是做了我该做的事情,得到的竟然是不可想象的巨额财富。他在北京比亚迪成点亮西藏捐赠仪式活动现场说:“Bill and I are extremely lucky. Efforts rewarded, I just get paid very well. Bill和我是超级幸运的,我们当然也很努力,但是我们的回报超级高。其实我没有什么特别之处,很多人比我更聪明更努力,我只是得到的报酬很好而已。我们有幸获得这么多的财富,简直不可思议。 Extra wealth,但是一个人活这一世,吃穿用度,花不了这么多钱的,剩余的财富应该回馈社会,帮助那些没有我们那么幸运的人,他们可能出生在贫穷的地区,没有接受良好教育的机会,或疾病缠身,或遇天灾人祸,我们应该帮助他们,这是我们应尽的义务!”



有了这样的价值观、人生观,不捐是不可能的事。这和东方文化不一样,东方文化深受佛教影响,人们多多少少相信因果轮回。投胎投得好,不是随机中奖,是上辈子积的德;既然是我上辈子积的德,这辈子的荣华富贵当然我来享受,凭什么要我捐出来帮助别人?谁让他们上辈子没积那么多德?当然,按照因果关系,如果这辈子捐钱积德了,那么下辈子还会有荣华富贵。问题是,下辈子到底有没有谁也不知道,下辈子等下辈子再说吧。所以,按照这个逻辑,不捐是天经地义的。给定巴菲特的思想,捐是默认状态;给定因果轮回思想,不捐是默认状态。如果不捐是默认状态,那么再加上发展阶段、程序方式上的一些障碍,中国几乎没人响应巴比裸捐号召也就很正常了。



除了价值观方面的区别,还有一个区别是立国精神。美国的立国精神是自由、平等、民主,父传子、子传孙的封建意识让崇尚“美国之梦”的巴菲特深恶痛绝;但是他的深恶痛绝倒让大多数中国人不能理解,几千年的封建王朝统治使得封建意识根深蒂固地植入了现代中国人的思想中。有人开玩笑说,美国人是为下一分钟活着,印度人是为下一辈子活着,中国人是为下一代活着。打个不恰当的比方,好比财务年度,美国是一代一结帐,印度是三代一结帐,中国是两代一结帐。既然是为下一代活着,一旦富贵了,把饭票留给下一代以及下一代的下一代,不是很正常吗?别人也没什么好说的,投对娘胎就是最大的本事。所以巴菲特的义愤填膺让马云也一样义愤填膺,马云说一个不把财富留给自己孩子、不照顾自己孩子的人,你怎么能相信他会照顾社会呢?正是这样的思想,才会使得中国权贵资本主义大行天下,而天下还很太平。



睿智的芒格在北京活动现场最后补充的一句话或许提示了我们慈善的另一个侧面:“And you are not allowed to take it to grave. More fun to give it away yourself. 反正也带不进坟墓去,不如自己捐掉,这更有意思。”



中国经济:转型与泡沫

有人问芒格:“中国以前靠劳动力密集型产业发展经济,现在这些行业利润越来越薄,难以为继,而资本密集、技术密集的行业尚未发展起来,而且如果发展资本密集型的行业,那么原来的劳动力到哪儿去找工作呢?您认为中国经济转型的出路在哪里?”芒格回答:“中国还有大量的劳动力没有就业机会,我不觉得劳动力密集型产业就不该发展了;而且,技术密集型、资本密集型行业中国不是已经在发展了吗?很多行业高精尖的技术都在中国啊,中国有很多技术水平领先世界的公司,比如比亚迪。”巴菲特补充:“在人类发展的过程中,一个行业的重要性是会发生变化的,这是规律。比如,1920年,美国1.5亿人中从事农业的人口高占 30%;现在美国3.1亿人口中只有2%的人从事农业。如果1920年的时候你和当时的美国人说,以后只有2%的人从事农业了,他们会很惊讶地问,那么剩下的人不就失业没事做了吗?今天我们知道,其实不是这样。农业在经济中的占比降低了,但是涌现了很多新兴产业,人们不怕没有工作做。比如,八十年代,盖茨他们开创的新行业就给成千上万人提供了就业机会。你们的经济在过去二三十年发展迅猛,我想将来二三十年还会继续发展下去;现在中国的很多工作二三十年前的人是完全想不到的,再过二三十年会有怎样的工作,现在的人们也是同样不可想象的。不用担心以后没有工作,要动态地思考这个问题,只要经济发展,只要你勤奋努力,就不怕没有事做。”



有记者问芒格:“您是否认为中国股市有严重的泡沫?” 芒格马上回答:“当然有严重的泡沫啰!中国人天性好赌,没有泡沫才怪呢!不过这也没有什么,哪个国家的股市没有过泡沫呢? Some Chinese are over-obsessed with gambling有的中国人沉溺于赌博,沉溺于急功近利赚快钱,把股票看成赌场的筹码,这太糟糕了!股票背后是有实实在在的企业的,不是赌场的筹码!我们应该做投资,投资于企业,股票只是一个载体,不能投机赌筹码。如果变成了一个职业赌徒,一生都耗在赌博上,就算赚了钱又如何?这是多么糟糕可怕的一生!terrible terrible life!美国已经犯过这种愚蠢的错误了,结果是整个资本市场变成了一个大赌场,欺诈猖獗,疯狂搏傻,泡沫越赌越大,破裂之后损失巨大,惨不忍睹。前车之鉴,后事之师呀,你们不要犯同样的错误了!”



投资理念,4M制胜

巴菲特说他自己很幸运,很小的时候就知道自己喜欢做什么,并且拥有将这件事情做好的天份以及后天习得的技能。这件事情就是投资。巴菲特认为两件事情很重要,一是赚钱,二是长寿。估计很多人也都这么认为,但是很少有人能都做到。巴爷说,我要赚钱,有钱了我就有了自由,有了自由我就可以做我喜欢做的事情。巧妙的是,他喜欢做的事情还是赚钱,这就形成了一个良性循环。他的财富像雪球一样,从六岁时开始卖口香糖、可口可乐积攒的几分几毛的第一片雪片滚到顶峰时世界首富600亿美金,然后他又将其中的99%捐去做慈善,自己生活十分节俭,至今住着50年前花了31,500美金买的房子,在简陋的办公室办公,穿着很普通甚至可以说很土气的衣服,自己开车上下班,自己搬行李,吃着汉堡和樱桃可乐。我们中国任何一个有点钱的人比他的物质享受都要多不知多少倍,比如,洗头捏脚之类的服务巴菲特估计是没有享受过的。 但是他的生活质量很高,主要是精神思想上的享受。对巴菲特来说,赚钱可以算是一种数字游戏,是智力的较量。他从小喜欢数字,喜欢概率,喜欢收集,喜欢竞争,喜欢伸张正义。他小时候很喜欢跟父母去教堂,大人忙着唱圣歌,他忙着看圣歌作曲者的生卒年份,计算他们的寿命,结果发现这些作曲者并没有因为为上帝谱写赞美诗而比常人多活几年,很是失望。他会坐在街头记录每一辆路过的车的车牌号码,计算每一个数字出现的概率,乐此不疲,因为他相信哪天街角那家银行遭抢劫后,他的记录对警方破案会大有帮助。他小时候喜欢收集小石头、可乐瓶盖、邮票等东西。他把三颗小石头放在浴缸边上,给每一个小石头取好名字,他和姐姐、妹妹各认领一颗,他一摁秒表,三人同时把小石头推进浴缸的水里,看哪一颗小石头最先到达浴缸底部,花了几秒钟。他不厌其烦地天天拉着他姐姐妹妹玩这个游戏,希望小石头天天有进步。这些性格特征的组合十分难得,投资成功正是需要这样的组合。不过,他也完全有可能将这个组合用在其他方面。好在命运没有这样安排,不然我们就见不到有史以来最优秀的投资家了。这要感谢巴菲特的父亲,他在三个孩子十岁时都带他们去进行一趟东部之旅,巴菲特选择去的是华尔街。在证交所的餐厅里,他看到证交所的会员们用完餐后会招呼一个脖子上挂着一个托盘的人,托盘里放着各种烟叶,那人就根据客人挑的烟叶现场卷制雪茄烟。巴菲特看呆了,他意识到这些证交所的人肯定赚了很多很多钱才能在满目苍痍的经济中还过着这样讲究的生活,雪茄都是定制的,这样享受。巴菲特看到卖雪茄烟的人这一天,也是他人生目标明确形成的一天,他暗暗下定决定,一定要赚钱,一定要赚钱!当然,他赚钱不是为了抽雪茄,或者其他的享受,而是为了获得自由,为了不受制于任何人,为自己工作,为自己生活,做自己想做的事情。从那一天开始,他把喜欢数字概率,喜欢收集竞争,喜欢公平正义等性格特征都用到了投资中,慢慢形成了自己独特的一套投资理念和方法,在接下来的70年里创造了巨额财富。



对巴菲特投资理念的形成起了最早最大影响的莫过于本·格莱姆,他是巴菲特在哥伦比亚大学读书时的老师,是巴菲特心目中的英雄。格莱姆的投资公司在20年间平均每年跑赢市场2.5个百分点,这在巴菲特出现之前是很十分了不起的成绩。格莱姆取得这样骄人成绩的主要原因是他分析数字的能力非常了得。在他之前,股票的估值没有什么道理可讲,基本上全是臆想猜测。格莱姆建立了第一套系统全面评估股票价值的方法。不过他只分析公开现有的数据,一般是公司的财务报表,而不愿意去打探非公开现有的信息,他拒绝走访公司,了解管理层,他认为这是作弊,因为他把投资看成纯粹的智力游戏。



巴菲特师从格莱姆,学到了三大道理:一、股票是拥有一个企业的一小部分的凭证,它的价值不是虚无缥缈的,它有内在价值,它的内在价值取决于它所代表的企业的价值;二、投资决策的依据是估算分析,估算分析难免会有误差,所以,为了保证投资结果不被误差寝室殆尽,需要设立一个较大的价格安全边际;三、“市场先生”是你的仆人,不是你的主人,格莱姆将市场比拟为一个人,这位先生喜怒无常,情绪阴晴不定,又恐惧又贪婪,不要让他影响你对价值的判断,他的喜怒好恶不能代表任何问题,他只是你的仆人,给你提供买卖股票的工具场所而已。



这三点让巴菲特受益匪浅,但是一定程度上也束缚了他的投资。因为格莱姆超级冷静的理性导致了沉闷的悲观主义,表现在投资上,就是所谓“烟屁股投资法”。他会很辛苦地寻找市值大大低于资产账面价值的股票,甚至有一段时间只找市值低于流动资金(流动资产减掉流动负债)的股票,这些死了比活着更值钱的企业(清盘资产变卖所得资金高于股票价格)被称为香烟头,意思是它们像被人抽得差不多的扔掉的香烟头,格莱姆会买进大量不同的香烟头,分散风险,总有一些香烟头可以抽到最后一口烟。这样的投资尽管很辛苦,又平淡,回报也不是非常高,但是它的风险很低,相对于承受的风险来说回报是很高的。



巴菲特早年的投资就是这样捡香烟头,接触菲舍的理论和认识芒格之后才有所改变。芒格认为格莱姆的悲观理性主义使得他错误地认为将来充满着风险而不是同样充满着机会,这种不对称的认识阻碍了投资。和格莱姆正相反,芒格喜欢优秀的企业great businesses,管理层能力强,品牌强大,这些别的企业模仿起来都需要很长一段时间;可以自我造血,不需要隔一段时间就要投入资本以维持营运。芒格一旦看准了投资机会,还会去借所有能够借到的钱去投资,充分运用融资杠杆,这在巴菲特也是匪夷所思的。芒格常说,投资要稳准狠,你要认为不好,那你就索性不投;你要认为真的值得投,那为什么不多投一点?任何中间状态在逻辑上都不成立的。 1963-64年间,巴菲特和芒格处于“热恋期”,每天通话不少于三个小时,芒格将巴菲特视为投资之王,但同时也认为自己也很聪明,能在认为自己正确的时候坚持己见。他的名言是:“你会同意我的观点的,Warren,因为我是正确的,而你是聪明的。” 在芒格的影响下,巴菲特慢慢开始将格莱姆的悲观谨慎和芒格的乐观从容结合起来了,其实巴菲特对于美国经济和企业的长期发展是很有信心的,芒格的投资理念也暗合了他的思想,他开始不再捡烟屁股,不再在一堆金子里找金针,最终形成了现在倍受世人推崇的“价值投资法”。为了方便记忆,笔者用4M来解释对“价值投资法”的理解。



第一个M可以理解为市场,或者行业,也就是这个企业所在的行业是一个能够赚钱的行业。有些行业就是不能赚钱,这可以用波特的五力分析模型来分析,即同业竞争、进入壁垒、替代品、供应商的议价能力、买方的议价能力五个方面,在现代经济中,可能还要增加一个互补品这一力量。五力分析模型的精髓是全面性,每一个单独的力量都只是必要非充分条件,缺了任何一个力量,这个行业的获利能力就会受影响。比如,飞机制造业,同业竞争者少、进入壁垒高、替代品少、供应商的议价能力弱,这对这个行业都很有利,但是最后一个力量,买方议价能力很强,这个行业盈利能力就不强。所以,一个行业一个企业的盈利能力高低要综合分析,不是说经济发展了所有行业企业的获利能力都会提高,不是说新兴技术的行业企业肯定能赚钱。 1999年7月,在因特网泡沫鼎盛的时候,巴菲特参加太阳谷的峰会并发言,他旁征博引历史数据委婉地说明他的判断:这是个泡沫!1964年12月31号到 1981年12月31号,这17年间,美国经济总量翻了5倍,财富500强企业总销售收入翻了不止5倍,道琼斯指数在这两个时点的数字分别是874.12 和875.00。他又举了汽车行业的例子,美国曾经有2000家汽车公司,最后幸存下来的只有3家,就这3家,曾经一度市值都低于账面价值。汽车是二十世纪上半叶最伟大的发明之一,给人类带来了巨大的便利,对美国经济具有重大贡献,对于投资者,它的影响也很大,但是是负面的。他还提到了二十世纪上半叶另一个伟大发明,飞机,几年前,对于航空业的股票投资累计回报是为零(笔者:我们知道,现在是负数)。他还开玩笑说,如果当年他在莱特兄弟试飞第一架飞机的现场的话,他希望自己有勇气把那架飞机射下来,“这是我向未来投资者应尽的义务”。他后来还曾说,似乎所有带翅膀的东西都投不得。巴菲特几乎从不投高科技企业,这可能是个原因。诚然,科技造福人类,但是人类不是投资者。



第二个M是管理层,管理层要能干可靠,人是至关重要的,同样的事情,不同的人去做结果会很不同。有的人适合做管理,做得好;有的人不适合做管理,做不好,这是客观规律。芒格对于管理人才的问题是这么看的,“我们不培养他们,我们寻找他们。”



第三个M是护城河(moat),即可持续的竞争优势,比如需求方来讲的品牌效应、供应方来讲的规模经济效应等。



第四个M是安全边际,即购入的价格应该远远低于价值,这样就算分析估算有误差,投资回报也不会荡然无存。



每一个单独的M都只是必要非充分条件,缺了任何一个M,这个企业就不会成功。所以说,成功的企业个个相似,不成功的企业各有各的不成功。如果投资符合这四大条件,那么就是一个理想的投资,它不断地带来很高的投资回报,我们再把它产生的资金配置到回报率同样高的地方去,这就形成了一台滚雪球的机器 (compounding machine),财源滚滚来了。 Berkshire Hathway当年是美国服装衬里最大的生产商,但是这个行业本身不赚钱,最后巴菲特不得不将它转型成他做投资的平台。可口可乐当年的首席执行官 Ivester食品安全问题处理不当、过度压榨瓶装商,没有能力,最后巴菲特不得不请他走人,至于把老婆买浴帘的1500美金发票拿到公司报销的首席执行官那当然更不能用。巴菲特旗下七十多家公司几乎都有由品牌或者规模经济效应等形成的护城河,比如喜诗糖果属于前者,GEICO属于后者。最后一个M,安全边际,这是很容易理解的,前面三个M讲的都是分子,投资回报,这第四个M讲的是分母,投资本钱,企业再好,如果股价已经很高了,再买就危险了,投资回报就不高了。



巴菲特为什么会投资比亚迪呢?众所周知,是因为芒格的强烈推荐。都想把莱特兄弟试飞的第一架飞机射下来的巴菲特没有想炸掉比亚迪出品的世界第一辆纯电动车反而投资占了10%的股份,这的确让很多巴迷百思不得其解。其实,投资比亚迪并不违背巴菲特的4M投资理念,巴芒从来没有说绝对不投高科技,只是说不投不能理解、看不懂的技术,巴菲特此次访比答记者问时也一再强调“我们只投我或者芒格看得懂的企业”,尽管巴爷对电动车、新能源可能不太懂,但是博览群书、对科技一向很感兴趣的芒格对这个领域应该是比较了解的,此次86岁高龄随行访比,足见芒格对自己判断的信心。另外三个M当然更符合了,对于王传福挂帅的比亚迪管理层巴芒是越看越欢喜,在各个场合都给予了最高评价。比亚迪的护城河也很深,铁电池技术独占鳌头,无人能敌;品牌也有一定优势。安全边际更是没有问题,巴菲特的比亚迪投资现在已经翻了7倍。当然,巴菲特力挺比亚迪,也有可能是属于芒格说的“结婚前睁大两只眼,结婚后睁一只眼闭一只眼”的情况,反正在巴菲特近2000亿的投资组合中比亚迪是沧海一粟。但是这是我们中国人唯一的一粟,还是让我们祝福比亚迪一路走好,不辜负巴芒,不辜负国人。



三人行,必有我师

巴菲特、芒格、盖茨此次锵锵三人行,估计是历史上最后一次了。三人的关系很是有趣,巴菲特和芒格是半个世纪故交,巴菲特和盖茨是忘年交,两人相差25岁。芒格和盖茨都是巴菲特的朋友,不过相互之间没有太多的交往,两人都是属于绝顶聪明也意识到自己绝顶聪明很难和不聪明的人打交道很难忍受不聪明人的不聪明的那种聪明人。巴菲特相对比较能和别人相处,尽管他也会不耐烦,但是他会努力掩饰。由于他母亲的关系,他从小缺乏安全感和自信心,所以一辈子都很努力地去讨好别人,希望大家都喜欢他,他还专门去听卡耐基的课,学习和别人团结友爱的方法。他很会激励旗下公司的管理层,用他自己的话说,会“卡耐基”他们。对于身边的工作人员也是一样,他会夸奖翻译说:“你真是翻得太好了!” 怕翻译翻饿了,递一盒打开的巧克力过去说:“你吃块巧克力吧。” 吃到巧克力和边上看到的人都十分感动。



比亚迪的投资是芒格主导的,所以这次访比,可以说是盖茨陪巴菲特陪芒格,这样三人就一串儿都来了,往台上一坐,整整1000亿美金坐在那儿,蔚为壮观。芒格对于中国和比亚迪的推崇完全可以理解,巴菲特看在老哥的面上对于中国和比亚迪的推崇也可以理解,倒是盖茨很不容易,一路从深圳陪到北京,陪到长沙,而且发言时十分谦虚,中国的发展举世瞩目,令人叹为观止,比亚迪创新为本,造福人类,十分了不起,云云。长沙站有记者问盖茨,盖茨先生,您是世界上最优秀的企业家,您对比亚迪有什么建议吗?盖茨回答说:“比亚迪有着最优秀的领导人,做得非常好,不需要我给他们提什么建议吧,他们的创新能力和快速增长倒是值得我们好好学习。如果说微软有什么经验的话,那就是要有长远的目光战略、要注重人才的培养发展、要重视客户基础的打造,但是这几点我觉得比亚迪都已经意识到了,也都做到了,所以芒格先生才会这样推崇比亚迪,告诉Warren一定要投资。我很荣幸这次能够一起来拜访比亚迪,见证比亚迪的成功发展。”



现年55岁的盖茨不再是哈佛辍学创业的毛头小伙了,两鬓斑白,满脸斑纹,但是举手投足还是和往年一样,一种慵懒倦怠百无聊懒的样子,太聪明的人似乎多多少少都这样,不过说起话来就完全不同,声音清晰犀利,很有穿透力,逻辑缜密,用词精当。主持人寒暄中问到盖茨,“听说您是twitter微博的粉丝,是这样吗?”在待人接物、世故人情方面比较冷淡“微薄”的盖茨,说到技术就热情了,说:“微博是个好东西,这几天在中国出访,我随时发微博给我在美国的家人朋友同事,告诉他们我的行程,所见所闻,这样的沟通实时性和现场感很强,太好了!”



在和比亚迪员工对话时,他还详细谈到了未来技术发展的四大趋势。一是输入方式的革新,目前为止,信息输入系统主要靠键盘,以后手写、语音等技术将降低键盘作为信息输入方式的重要性,这是最最大的趋势;二是收看界面,以后人们通过视觉获得信息的界面会统一起来,书、电视、因特网等等都会统一到一个界面上;三是教育的数字化,将来顶级学校的顶级教授的授课世界各地的学生都可以接受到,你可以按照自己的特别度身定制教育的内容,这将大大提高教育的效果和效率;四是机器人的普及将会成为现实,我想比亚迪以后就会开发出机器人,软件和硬件高度结合,这方面微软也许可以和比亚迪合作。



巴菲特带着他这两位同样是几百年也出不了一个的朋友造访中国,造访比亚迪,给比亚迪带来了无限的动力,给巴迷们带来了又一次思想的盛宴,给中国人带来了骄傲和自豪!祝巴芒健康长寿,祝巴比心想事成!
兄弟情深,相敬如宾

巴菲特和芒格半个多世纪的友谊一直是投资界的美谈,此次老哥俩携手来华访问,让我们近距离感受到了巴芒相敬如宾的兄弟深情。

比芒格小六岁的巴菲特处处照顾着芒哥,芒格视力听力不好,但说话滔滔不绝,每次坐在主席台上发言往往忘了翻译的存在,巴菲特会拉拉他的衣袖,然后指着翻译站的方向,提醒芒哥注意停顿给翻译时间翻译,几次之后,芒格形成了条件反射,只要巴爷一碰他,他就马上闭嘴,很听话的样子。而巴菲特对于翻译特别重视,开场白就说:“一般我在中国会用中文发言,不过考虑到翻译小姐的就业问题,我还是改用中文吧。”全场大笑。

听众提给巴菲特的问题,巴菲特总是找各种理由转给自称爱说教的芒格,给芒格表演的机会,特别是第一个问题和最后一个问题。和比亚迪员工对话时,第一个问题问巴爷对于新能源发展前景的看法,巴爷回答说,“这个问题还是让Charlie回答吧,尽管他只比我大六岁,但是他的智慧比我高深很多,特别是讲到新能源,我就更不是他的对手了。” 最后一个问题是关于再生能源,盖茨回答后,芒格补充了几句,提问者再问巴菲特的观点,巴爷说,“一般一个问题Charlie回答后就盖棺定论了,我没有补充了。” 说完,三人在台上相视而笑。在对话节目中,巴菲特甚至说芒格是我的秘密恋人,对于芒哥的崇敬珍惜溢于言表。精神上如此契合的朋友确实应该比珍惜恋人更珍惜。

芒格对于巴菲特也是十分尊重,有人问芒格,“您和巴菲特半个世纪的友谊是不是巴菲特成功的重要因素,尽管巴菲特经常抛头露面,而您十分低调,还是有人认为您比巴菲特更重要,对此您怎么看?” 芒格正言道:“完全不是这样!Warren才是最重要的,他比我重要得多,他是一把手,我是二把手,我只能说我在他的事业发展中起到了一定的作用而已。他在幕前我在幕后,这不是有意的安排,是自然而然形成的局面,我觉得这样很好;我没有他那么显赫重要,对此我没有一点点遗憾,我其实比较喜欢这样在幕后。 Warren能力强、人品好,德才兼备,又是个很有趣的人,我很幸运有这样的朋友。在中国关注我的人比在美国多,我觉得主要的原因可能是我的价值观比较接近孔夫子,重原则、重家庭、重教育,强调活到老学到老,学习是一种道德义务,life-long learning as a moral duty,主张用智慧改善人类生存条件,use your wisdom to make your family and the world better, 务实,不偏执,我没有传统意义上的宗教信仰。但是如果没有巴菲特,我不会得到这么多的关注。” 有时记者会问巴菲特暗藏机关的问题,芒格担心巴菲特落入陷阱,会挺身出来掩护。在长沙站,国外媒体Bloomberg问:“巴菲特先生,您对于人民币汇率问题怎么看?这几天我跟着你们从深圳到北京到长沙,所见所闻都是很积极向上的,中美民间往来还是很友好互惠的。但是美国国会日前通过了一个强迫人民币升值的法案,您是否认为国会通过这样的法案是脱离实际,不识时务?” 芒格代巴菲特回答:“我们只能代表公司说话,我们没有代表政府发言的权利和兴趣,汇率问题是中美两国政府的事,我们不便置喙。我们希望美国政府能够妥善处理好这个问题。” 有时他也会打趣巴菲特,比如,主持人问完巴菲特一个问题,再问芒格怎么看,芒格就说:“我完全同意巴菲特主席的意见(巴菲特是伯克希尔哈斯威的董事局主席,芒格是副主席)。”装出一副跟班小弟的样子。和比亚迪员工对话时,有人问巴菲特,中国有很多优秀的年轻人都以您为榜样,希望能成为“中国的巴菲特”,您觉得他们有机会成为您吗?巴菲特立马把这个问题转给芒格,芒格说:“这个问题得你自己回答了,他们是问能不能成为中国的巴菲特,而不是中国的芒格,我不能代劳。”

半个多世纪的情谊,创造了500多亿的财富,激励了成千上百万年轻人,一个86岁的老哥,一个80岁的小弟,兄弟情深,令人感动!

王传福高,比亚迪强

此次巴菲特携芒格、盖茨来访,目的何在,众说纷纭。减持说是其中的一个。有人怀疑巴菲特此次拜访比亚迪就像当年拜访中石油一样,是吻别,最后的亲密。众所周知,巴菲特的性格是属于十分不愿意得罪人的那种,他很害怕被人讨厌,一辈子都在很努力地获得大家的好感,所以减持比亚迪之前先来抚慰一下也不是没有可能。但是巴芒在各种场合的言行都彻底粉碎了减持说。

在和比亚迪员工对话时,到下半场,终于有人提出了一个萦绕大家心头的尖锐问题,“请问巴菲特先生,您认为比亚迪的股价可以涨到多高?您准备持有多久?” 巴爷不慌不忙地回答:“我从不预测股价,也不看短期的股价波动,我不在乎我投资的公司下一个星期、下一个月、下一个季度利润好不好、股价高不高,我不看短期,只看长期。我投的是这个企业,而不是股票,这是两个概念。我们寻找投资机会时,要看一个企业的市场潜力,比如比亚迪,不管是它所从事的汽车行业还是新能源行业,以后都会发生巨大变化,市场需求巨大,有很多需求尚未得到满足;再看这个企业的竞争优势,比亚迪在这些市场有着显著的竞争优势,技术创新能力很强,你不需要很聪明就可以明白比亚迪是个优秀的公司,它过往的业绩摆在那儿;再看这个企业的领导者,王传福先生十分优秀,年富力强,有的是干劲和激情,他的目标是到2025年成为世界第一大汽车生产商,我觉得这个目标很可能提前几年就可实现了。总之,比亚迪具备一个成功企业的所有要素,只要能够保持前十年的发展势头,不成功是小概率事件。

有的记者比较直接,“您会减持比亚迪的股票吗?”巴菲特直摇头:“当然不会! 我估计在我葬礼上,大家还会说,他还拿着比亚迪的股票呢。” 芒格更是字字铿锵:“到死也不会!” 记者又问了:“既然你们这么看好比亚迪,是否会考虑增持?” 芒格回答:“增持不是我们能说了算了,我们得获得管理层的批准许可,比亚迪并不需要资金以获得更大的成功。”

巴菲特还多次讲到他当时决定投资比亚迪的故事:“我和Charlie相处51年,他一共给过我三个推荐投资的电话,前面两次也都很不错,第三次就是建议投资比亚迪,我一开始没有马上采取行动,他就打电话来说,如果你不投王传福,就错过第二个亨利福特了,我不为所动;他又打电话来,说,你不投就错过第二个爱迪生了,我还是不为所动;第三次他打电话来,说,你再不投就错过第二个比尔盖茨啦,我一听立马就投了。”说完俏皮地看一眼旁边的比尔盖茨,在全场欢笑中,盖茨也露出了稍带羞涩的笑容。

有人追问巴菲特:“您和盖茨先生是好朋友,现在和王传福先生也是好朋友,同样是好朋友,为什么王先生的企业您投了,盖茨先生的企业您就没投呢?” 盖茨和芒格都笑眯眯地侧头看着巴菲特,看他怎么回答。这个难不倒巴菲特,只见他呵呵呵笑了几声,开始快速给出他万变不离其中的回答:“这和两个公司的相对规模有关。做投资,说到底,就是现在付一笔钱,放到一个你认为很有潜力的企业去,希望这个企业随着时间的推移能够释放实现它的潜力,将来给你带来可观的回报。 Charlie跟我解释了比亚迪的情况后,我觉得这个企业潜力巨大,而且有实现潜力、创造价值的能力,值得投资。如果当时你有钱,我也会建议你投比亚迪,而不是微软;别说是微软,我都不建议你投我们的公司Berkshire Hathway。” 这样的自嘲抹去了可能会给盖茨带来的尴尬不悦,巴菲特不愧是卡耐基的信徒。

巴菲特2008年9月投资比亚迪,这是第一次实地考察,也是第三次来华访问。他说,他是抱着很高的期望来考察的,他对于这次考察所见所闻十分满意,比亚迪的技术、产品、管理团队、员工队伍、和政府的关系等各方面让他感到十分满意,他对比亚迪充满了信心。在比亚迪经销商大会上,巴菲特也一再强调,“我选择比亚迪,是明智的;你们选择比亚迪,也是明智的。”

如果说巴菲特的表达还算比较含蓄的话,那么芒格的表达就十分热情了,生性挑剔、怀疑一切的芒格对于中国、对于比亚迪、对于王传福有着如此纯粹、强烈的好感,让很多人感到困惑惊讶。当比亚迪员工问到芒格,他觉得比亚迪有什么欠缺的地方,他有什么建议时,芒格的回答几乎让中国人感动得掉泪:“我们是来向你们学习的,不是来说教传经的,你们的事业十分伟大,你们的技术领先世界,你们的抱负无人能比,你们的人民勤劳智慧,精诚合作,所以成功是必然的,就像比亚迪一样!”



芒格还将王传福比作爱迪生与韦尔奇的结合体,可能是他这辈子对一个人的最高评价了,当然除了他的老弟巴菲特。芒格认为王传福有着崇高的理想、惊人的毅力以及团结鼓舞人们的魅力。王传福慷慨大方地将股权分给高管和员工,不安插一个亲戚进公司,这是很难能可贵的。王传福能带领大家创新开拓,日以继夜地搞科研开发,不断学习,不断试验,不断进取。芒格对于那些投机取巧、豪赌爆发的有钱人十分不屑,强调,有钱人不一定是高尚的人,生财要有道。当被问到他认为什么样的人算高尚的有钱人呢,他毫不犹豫地回答说,像王传福这样的人才是生财有道的高尚的有钱人。他的事业造福人类,泽被子孙,值得大家学习。



这几天,巴菲特和芒格不是穿着打着比亚迪标识的T恤衫,就是打着比亚迪的领带,口口声声比亚迪、王传福,真是成了比亚迪的代言人。当记者问芒格,这种情况常见吗?芒格说,支持所投资的公司当然是正常的,不过像我们这样支持比亚迪当然是不同寻常的,我们一般也不会这样力挺我们旗下投资的公司,上次这样做好像是投See’s糖果的时候,那是好多年以前的事了。像比亚迪这样年轻的公司需要我们的支持以便更快地获得公信力,这样才能发展得更好。我不会说我自己都不相信的话,I don’t say things I don’t believe.我不说言不由衷的话;所以,我对比亚迪的褒奖句句是真心话,你们尽可照单全收。”



当被问到是否会考虑投资于中国其他企业时,巴菲特客气地回答,对于世界各地的投资机会我们都是很关注的,只要符合我们的投资标准,我们都会考虑投资。芒格的回答更明确:“We got so charmed with BYD. 比亚迪让我们太心驰神往了,其他公司和比亚迪比起来总是相形见绌。”



总之,巴芒给我们传达的信息是:王传福是高尚的,比亚迪是强大的。



中国神话,高山仰止

巴菲特十五年前第一次访华,为期十七天,主要是为了追随比尔盖茨夫妇。Buffett’s motivation for this round-the-world jaunt was the Gates. 巴菲特通过朋友K结识盖茨后就一直很喜欢这个商界天才,甚至为了参加盖茨的婚礼而放芒格的鸽子,没有去参加芒格七十大寿典礼,芒格对巴菲特当然很宽厚,反正巴菲特做什么他都会原谅。有人说盖茨成了巴菲特的第三个儿子;也有人说,讲到对盖茨的爱,巴菲特仅次于盖茨的太太Melinda。when it came to being in love with Gates, Buffett ran a close second to Melinda. 总之,巴菲特第一次来中国,不是为了中国,而是为了盖茨。多年之后,留在巴菲特记忆最深处的不是长城、紫禁城、三峡、钓鱼台宴请时盖茨夫妇特地安排为他做的一道又一道汉堡包和炸薯条,而是神农溪的纤夫。 “There could have been another Bill Gates among those men pulling our boat. They were born here, and they were destined to spend their lives tugging those boats the way they did ours. They didn’t have a chance. It was pure luck that we had a shot at the brass ring.” 在神农溪的船上时他就说:“那些拉船的纤夫中可能就有另一个比尔盖茨,但是他出生在这儿,注定一辈子这样辛苦地拉船,没有出人头地的机会。我们有机会获得这样的财富成功,钟鸣鼎食,纯粹是运气。” 这十五年来,富有恻隐之心的巴菲特每每会想起神农溪的纤夫,感慨命运的安排,人生的际遇。



9月29日下午,对话节目邀请了当年纤夫船长来到现场和巴菲特见面。老纤夫出场前,先让巴菲特看了一段节目组寻访老纤夫的录像,老纤夫已经不在神农溪拉船了,全家搬到了县城,住在一幢七层楼的房子里,过着幸福的生活。老纤夫上场,巴菲特和他热烈拥抱,淳朴的老纤夫拍着巴菲特的西装表袋说:“原来你这么有钱啊!” 老纤夫多半不知道在这个有史以来最杰出的投资家、人称股神心目中自己代表的是悲悯、宿命,这十几年他其实过得并不比任何其他人更痛苦,也许只有更开心,毕竟生活水平大大改善了。对于巴菲特来说,这一见面了却了不是心愿的心愿,修复了不是心理创伤的心理创伤,是件释怀快意的乐事。老纤夫的际遇折射了中国经济和社会的大发展,巴菲特深感触动。他在讲到中国发展时,从不吝啬渲染的词汇:“很难想象现在的中国和15年前的中国是同一个中国,城市面貌焕然一新,各项事业蓬勃发展。中央、省、市等各级政府为经济的发展营造了良好的环境,培养了许多像比亚迪这样的优秀企业和像王传福先生这样的优秀企业家,在很短的时间里取得了其他国家一百年也未必能够取得的进步,令人叹为观止!我很荣幸见证了中国过去15年的大发展,我希望我还能见证中国接下来10年20年甚至更长时间的大发展,见证中国成为世界一大强国! ” 当然他时刻不忘为比亚迪争取支持:“我们应该支持像比亚迪这样的公司,因为它的发展不是简单的一家公司的发展,它的技术会给13亿中国人民带来福祉,给 65亿地球人带来福祉,让我们祝愿这项造福人类、泽被子孙的伟大事业获得辉煌成功!



总结此次中国之行时,他这样说到:“这几天的中国之行太神奇精彩了(amazing),比亚迪的发展、各大城市的发展、整个中国的发展都给我们留下了十分深刻的印象,我们回去后会告诉我们的股东、告诉美国民众这里中国人民取得的巨大进步。我十五年前首次访华,三年前又去过大连,这次回来考察比亚迪,看到比亚的的大发展很是高兴激动,希望在不久的将来,我们还会来到中国,见证比亚迪年产电动客车年产50万辆的光辉一刻。 ”



最后一天在长沙答记者问时,巴菲特说:“这次中国之行所见所闻远远超过了我的预期!我当然也在电视等媒体上经常看到有关中国的报导,听到很多数字,比如 GDP的增长率等等,但是眼见为实,亲眼看到后的震撼力还是十分强烈。中国经济充满活力,孕育了大量的优秀企业和企业家。自我第一次来访至今15年间,中国经济取得了突飞猛进的发展,我坚信这个趋势会继续下去,中国经济将来会获得更大的发展。我向中国、中国人民致敬!”



如果说盖茨促成了巴菲特的首次中国行,给了巴菲特了解中国的机会,那么真正让巴菲特对中国产生好感的是芒格。被誉为本世纪最伟大的思想者的芒格很崇尚中国文化;对于很多西方人不能理解接受的一些中国现象,芒格很宽容,认为中国的制度系统“由于历史沿革的原因,有些奇怪,但是行之有效”。 2008年Berkshire Hathway股东年会上,有股民对于中国政府处理西藏问题的方式表示抗议,要求Berkshire Hathway出售可口可乐的股票,因为可口可乐是北京奥运会的赞助商。不愿得罪人、希望所有人都喜欢他的巴菲特碰到这种不涉及利害的冲突争议,一般打马虎眼,息事宁人。芒格则不然,他从不因为怕得罪人而放弃直抒胸臆,而且崇尚理性的他最讨厌用意识形态代替大脑思考。芒格缓缓说到:“西藏问题的是非曲直且不去说,我只问你,中国的民主制度是进步了还是退步了?既然是进步了,我们为什么要打击她呢?你难道是希望它退步吗?再说了,民主是个过程。 1929年美国举办奥运会时美国妇女还都没有选举权呢。 按照你的说法,我们当年就因该阻止美国举办奥运会。” 一番话,说得那股民哑口无言,一天会议从此再无人提中国民主问题。



芒格对中国的好感不知来源何处,可能是因为他很推崇孔子的思想的原因,他和孔子有着很强的认同感。他在北京接受采访解释自己为什么在中国比在美国更受欢迎的原因时说:“我觉得主要的原因可能是我的价值观比较接近孔子,重思考、重原则、重家庭、重教育,强调活到老学到老,学习是一种道德义务,life- long learning as a moral duty,主张用智慧改善自身、家人、同胞乃至整个人类的生存条件,use your wisdom to make your family and the world better, 务实,不偏执,我没有传统意义上的宗教信仰。”



慈善公益,见仁见智

在这次中国之行中,巴菲特表示,把一个企业经营好,特别是像比亚迪这样的企业,为人类造福,本身就是慈善;盖茨认为,在此基础之上,可以以个人或公司的名义进行一些帮助弱势群体、赈灾救难等具体的慈善活动;芒格提到,欧洲包括英国在内,在慈善方面都做得不大,亚洲也不大。他说,“对于Warren和Bill的雄心壮志(笔者:大概就是指劝捐的雄心壮志)我表示同情和理解,不过我不会指示中国人该怎么做慈善,这是他们自己的事情,我可以选择捐我自己的钱,别人的钱捐不捐是他们的事。”



尽管巴菲特三天半行程中只有一个晚上参加盖茨基金的活动,但是那晚的慈善晚宴却吸引了全国乃至全球的目光,“劝捐鸿门宴”引发了国内外对于中国慈善业的激烈讨论。



有数据显示,美国慈善捐赠资金是GDP的1.7%,欧洲是0.7%,而中国是不到0.01%。为什么中国没有所谓捐赠文化?除了经济发展阶段不同、慈善机构治理透明程度不同等原因外,可能还有一个是价值观、人生观、世界观的原因。



巴菲特能捐出99%的财富,这和他价值观中的“娘胎彩票”理论分不开。 他说:“I’ve had it so good in this world, you know. The odds were fifty-to-one against me being born in the United States in 1930. I won the lottery the day emerged from the womb by being in the United States instead of in some other country where my chances would have been way different.”“我很幸运,1930年出生于美国,这个出生时空组合的概率是50比1,我从娘胎里出来的那一刻就好比中了50比1的彩票。如果不是出生在美国,而是其他国家,我的境遇就很不同了。” 他认为,一个社会应该鼓励强者自由翱翔,追求成功,但是成功了一定要帮助由于种种原因而没有成功的人,要回馈社会。 对于那些自以为“I did it all myself”全靠自己、和社会没关系、不愿意回馈社会的所谓成功人士,巴菲特很是反感,说:“你让他去选择,一个是生在孟加拉国,不用付税,另一个是生在美国,看他愿意付出他收入的百分之几以获得生在美国的娘胎彩票!” 巴菲特和盖茨是最早最激烈反对布什总统逐渐撤销遗产税计划的富人。巴菲特义愤填膺地说,我反对世袭相承的王朝,这好比在这一界奥运冠军的孩子中选拔下一界奥运的冠军,还有比这样的制度更背离民主精神的吗?一个少女单身妈妈领些社会福利金,你们富人都要嚷嚷说这样培养了穷人的依赖性,不公平;那你们给子孙后代留了这么多饭票,他们几代人可以完全不劳而获,就因为他们投对了娘胎,这样就公平了吗?!巴菲特对于自己的三个孩子从不纵容惯养,三个孩子上的都是公立学校,衣食住行都很普通,他们并不知道家里很有钱,过着和其他孩子一样的生活。



在巴菲特的思想里,有这么相互关联的两点,一是出生的时空是随机的概率事件,出生时空有利,好比中彩;二是致富发财、获得成功不完全是个人的努力,离不开社会这个大环境。所以中彩的富人捐钱做慈善,帮助没有中彩的其他人,是天经地义的。巴菲特不觉得自己有多了不起,他曾经在多个场合讲过以下相似的话:我是很幸运的,如果我出生在非洲,整天要和老虎狮子赛跑的话,我恐怕早就成了老虎的早餐了,因为实在跑不过别人;我很幸运,在我很小的时候我就知道自己喜欢做的是什么事情,我天生的性格使得我很适合做这个事情,并且在后天又获得了将这个事情做好的知识、技能,这个事情做好后又给我带来了巨大的财富和很高的社会地位。我太幸运了!一个士兵保家卫国,功勋卓著,得到的回报是国家颁发的一枚奖章;一个教师,教书育人,桃李天下,得到的是学生的感谢信;像我这样一个投资者,只是做了我该做的事情,得到的竟然是不可想象的巨额财富。他在北京比亚迪成点亮西藏捐赠仪式活动现场说:“Bill and I are extremely lucky. Efforts rewarded, I just get paid very well. Bill和我是超级幸运的,我们当然也很努力,但是我们的回报超级高。其实我没有什么特别之处,很多人比我更聪明更努力,我只是得到的报酬很好而已。我们有幸获得这么多的财富,简直不可思议。 Extra wealth,但是一个人活这一世,吃穿用度,花不了这么多钱的,剩余的财富应该回馈社会,帮助那些没有我们那么幸运的人,他们可能出生在贫穷的地区,没有接受良好教育的机会,或疾病缠身,或遇天灾人祸,我们应该帮助他们,这是我们应尽的义务!”



有了这样的价值观、人生观,不捐是不可能的事。这和东方文化不一样,东方文化深受佛教影响,人们多多少少相信因果轮回。投胎投得好,不是随机中奖,是上辈子积的德;既然是我上辈子积的德,这辈子的荣华富贵当然我来享受,凭什么要我捐出来帮助别人?谁让他们上辈子没积那么多德?当然,按照因果关系,如果这辈子捐钱积德了,那么下辈子还会有荣华富贵。问题是,下辈子到底有没有谁也不知道,下辈子等下辈子再说吧。所以,按照这个逻辑,不捐是天经地义的。给定巴菲特的思想,捐是默认状态;给定因果轮回思想,不捐是默认状态。如果不捐是默认状态,那么再加上发展阶段、程序方式上的一些障碍,中国几乎没人响应巴比裸捐号召也就很正常了。



除了价值观方面的区别,还有一个区别是立国精神。美国的立国精神是自由、平等、民主,父传子、子传孙的封建意识让崇尚“美国之梦”的巴菲特深恶痛绝;但是他的深恶痛绝倒让大多数中国人不能理解,几千年的封建王朝统治使得封建意识根深蒂固地植入了现代中国人的思想中。有人开玩笑说,美国人是为下一分钟活着,印度人是为下一辈子活着,中国人是为下一代活着。打个不恰当的比方,好比财务年度,美国是一代一结帐,印度是三代一结帐,中国是两代一结帐。既然是为下一代活着,一旦富贵了,把饭票留给下一代以及下一代的下一代,不是很正常吗?别人也没什么好说的,投对娘胎就是最大的本事。所以巴菲特的义愤填膺让马云也一样义愤填膺,马云说一个不把财富留给自己孩子、不照顾自己孩子的人,你怎么能相信他会照顾社会呢?正是这样的思想,才会使得中国权贵资本主义大行天下,而天下还很太平。



睿智的芒格在北京活动现场最后补充的一句话或许提示了我们慈善的另一个侧面:“And you are not allowed to take it to grave. More fun to give it away yourself. 反正也带不进坟墓去,不如自己捐掉,这更有意思。”



中国经济:转型与泡沫

有人问芒格:“中国以前靠劳动力密集型产业发展经济,现在这些行业利润越来越薄,难以为继,而资本密集、技术密集的行业尚未发展起来,而且如果发展资本密集型的行业,那么原来的劳动力到哪儿去找工作呢?您认为中国经济转型的出路在哪里?”芒格回答:“中国还有大量的劳动力没有就业机会,我不觉得劳动力密集型产业就不该发展了;而且,技术密集型、资本密集型行业中国不是已经在发展了吗?很多行业高精尖的技术都在中国啊,中国有很多技术水平领先世界的公司,比如比亚迪。”巴菲特补充:“在人类发展的过程中,一个行业的重要性是会发生变化的,这是规律。比如,1920年,美国1.5亿人中从事农业的人口高占 30%;现在美国3.1亿人口中只有2%的人从事农业。如果1920年的时候你和当时的美国人说,以后只有2%的人从事农业了,他们会很惊讶地问,那么剩下的人不就失业没事做了吗?今天我们知道,其实不是这样。农业在经济中的占比降低了,但是涌现了很多新兴产业,人们不怕没有工作做。比如,八十年代,盖茨他们开创的新行业就给成千上万人提供了就业机会。你们的经济在过去二三十年发展迅猛,我想将来二三十年还会继续发展下去;现在中国的很多工作二三十年前的人是完全想不到的,再过二三十年会有怎样的工作,现在的人们也是同样不可想象的。不用担心以后没有工作,要动态地思考这个问题,只要经济发展,只要你勤奋努力,就不怕没有事做。”



有记者问芒格:“您是否认为中国股市有严重的泡沫?” 芒格马上回答:“当然有严重的泡沫啰!中国人天性好赌,没有泡沫才怪呢!不过这也没有什么,哪个国家的股市没有过泡沫呢? Some Chinese are over-obsessed with gambling有的中国人沉溺于赌博,沉溺于急功近利赚快钱,把股票看成赌场的筹码,这太糟糕了!股票背后是有实实在在的企业的,不是赌场的筹码!我们应该做投资,投资于企业,股票只是一个载体,不能投机赌筹码。如果变成了一个职业赌徒,一生都耗在赌博上,就算赚了钱又如何?这是多么糟糕可怕的一生!terrible terrible life!美国已经犯过这种愚蠢的错误了,结果是整个资本市场变成了一个大赌场,欺诈猖獗,疯狂搏傻,泡沫越赌越大,破裂之后损失巨大,惨不忍睹。前车之鉴,后事之师呀,你们不要犯同样的错误了!”



投资理念,4M制胜

巴菲特说他自己很幸运,很小的时候就知道自己喜欢做什么,并且拥有将这件事情做好的天份以及后天习得的技能。这件事情就是投资。巴菲特认为两件事情很重要,一是赚钱,二是长寿。估计很多人也都这么认为,但是很少有人能都做到。巴爷说,我要赚钱,有钱了我就有了自由,有了自由我就可以做我喜欢做的事情。巧妙的是,他喜欢做的事情还是赚钱,这就形成了一个良性循环。他的财富像雪球一样,从六岁时开始卖口香糖、可口可乐积攒的几分几毛的第一片雪片滚到顶峰时世界首富600亿美金,然后他又将其中的99%捐去做慈善,自己生活十分节俭,至今住着50年前花了31,500美金买的房子,在简陋的办公室办公,穿着很普通甚至可以说很土气的衣服,自己开车上下班,自己搬行李,吃着汉堡和樱桃可乐。我们中国任何一个有点钱的人比他的物质享受都要多不知多少倍,比如,洗头捏脚之类的服务巴菲特估计是没有享受过的。 但是他的生活质量很高,主要是精神思想上的享受。对巴菲特来说,赚钱可以算是一种数字游戏,是智力的较量。他从小喜欢数字,喜欢概率,喜欢收集,喜欢竞争,喜欢伸张正义。他小时候很喜欢跟父母去教堂,大人忙着唱圣歌,他忙着看圣歌作曲者的生卒年份,计算他们的寿命,结果发现这些作曲者并没有因为为上帝谱写赞美诗而比常人多活几年,很是失望。他会坐在街头记录每一辆路过的车的车牌号码,计算每一个数字出现的概率,乐此不疲,因为他相信哪天街角那家银行遭抢劫后,他的记录对警方破案会大有帮助。他小时候喜欢收集小石头、可乐瓶盖、邮票等东西。他把三颗小石头放在浴缸边上,给每一个小石头取好名字,他和姐姐、妹妹各认领一颗,他一摁秒表,三人同时把小石头推进浴缸的水里,看哪一颗小石头最先到达浴缸底部,花了几秒钟。他不厌其烦地天天拉着他姐姐妹妹玩这个游戏,希望小石头天天有进步。这些性格特征的组合十分难得,投资成功正是需要这样的组合。不过,他也完全有可能将这个组合用在其他方面。好在命运没有这样安排,不然我们就见不到有史以来最优秀的投资家了。这要感谢巴菲特的父亲,他在三个孩子十岁时都带他们去进行一趟东部之旅,巴菲特选择去的是华尔街。在证交所的餐厅里,他看到证交所的会员们用完餐后会招呼一个脖子上挂着一个托盘的人,托盘里放着各种烟叶,那人就根据客人挑的烟叶现场卷制雪茄烟。巴菲特看呆了,他意识到这些证交所的人肯定赚了很多很多钱才能在满目苍痍的经济中还过着这样讲究的生活,雪茄都是定制的,这样享受。巴菲特看到卖雪茄烟的人这一天,也是他人生目标明确形成的一天,他暗暗下定决定,一定要赚钱,一定要赚钱!当然,他赚钱不是为了抽雪茄,或者其他的享受,而是为了获得自由,为了不受制于任何人,为自己工作,为自己生活,做自己想做的事情。从那一天开始,他把喜欢数字概率,喜欢收集竞争,喜欢公平正义等性格特征都用到了投资中,慢慢形成了自己独特的一套投资理念和方法,在接下来的70年里创造了巨额财富。



对巴菲特投资理念的形成起了最早最大影响的莫过于本·格莱姆,他是巴菲特在哥伦比亚大学读书时的老师,是巴菲特心目中的英雄。格莱姆的投资公司在20年间平均每年跑赢市场2.5个百分点,这在巴菲特出现之前是很十分了不起的成绩。格莱姆取得这样骄人成绩的主要原因是他分析数字的能力非常了得。在他之前,股票的估值没有什么道理可讲,基本上全是臆想猜测。格莱姆建立了第一套系统全面评估股票价值的方法。不过他只分析公开现有的数据,一般是公司的财务报表,而不愿意去打探非公开现有的信息,他拒绝走访公司,了解管理层,他认为这是作弊,因为他把投资看成纯粹的智力游戏。



巴菲特师从格莱姆,学到了三大道理:一、股票是拥有一个企业的一小部分的凭证,它的价值不是虚无缥缈的,它有内在价值,它的内在价值取决于它所代表的企业的价值;二、投资决策的依据是估算分析,估算分析难免会有误差,所以,为了保证投资结果不被误差寝室殆尽,需要设立一个较大的价格安全边际;三、“市场先生”是你的仆人,不是你的主人,格莱姆将市场比拟为一个人,这位先生喜怒无常,情绪阴晴不定,又恐惧又贪婪,不要让他影响你对价值的判断,他的喜怒好恶不能代表任何问题,他只是你的仆人,给你提供买卖股票的工具场所而已。



这三点让巴菲特受益匪浅,但是一定程度上也束缚了他的投资。因为格莱姆超级冷静的理性导致了沉闷的悲观主义,表现在投资上,就是所谓“烟屁股投资法”。他会很辛苦地寻找市值大大低于资产账面价值的股票,甚至有一段时间只找市值低于流动资金(流动资产减掉流动负债)的股票,这些死了比活着更值钱的企业(清盘资产变卖所得资金高于股票价格)被称为香烟头,意思是它们像被人抽得差不多的扔掉的香烟头,格莱姆会买进大量不同的香烟头,分散风险,总有一些香烟头可以抽到最后一口烟。这样的投资尽管很辛苦,又平淡,回报也不是非常高,但是它的风险很低,相对于承受的风险来说回报是很高的。



巴菲特早年的投资就是这样捡香烟头,接触菲舍的理论和认识芒格之后才有所改变。芒格认为格莱姆的悲观理性主义使得他错误地认为将来充满着风险而不是同样充满着机会,这种不对称的认识阻碍了投资。和格莱姆正相反,芒格喜欢优秀的企业great businesses,管理层能力强,品牌强大,这些别的企业模仿起来都需要很长一段时间;可以自我造血,不需要隔一段时间就要投入资本以维持营运。芒格一旦看准了投资机会,还会去借所有能够借到的钱去投资,充分运用融资杠杆,这在巴菲特也是匪夷所思的。芒格常说,投资要稳准狠,你要认为不好,那你就索性不投;你要认为真的值得投,那为什么不多投一点?任何中间状态在逻辑上都不成立的。 1963-64年间,巴菲特和芒格处于“热恋期”,每天通话不少于三个小时,芒格将巴菲特视为投资之王,但同时也认为自己也很聪明,能在认为自己正确的时候坚持己见。他的名言是:“你会同意我的观点的,Warren,因为我是正确的,而你是聪明的。” 在芒格的影响下,巴菲特慢慢开始将格莱姆的悲观谨慎和芒格的乐观从容结合起来了,其实巴菲特对于美国经济和企业的长期发展是很有信心的,芒格的投资理念也暗合了他的思想,他开始不再捡烟屁股,不再在一堆金子里找金针,最终形成了现在倍受世人推崇的“价值投资法”。为了方便记忆,笔者用4M来解释对“价值投资法”的理解。



第一个M可以理解为市场,或者行业,也就是这个企业所在的行业是一个能够赚钱的行业。有些行业就是不能赚钱,这可以用波特的五力分析模型来分析,即同业竞争、进入壁垒、替代品、供应商的议价能力、买方的议价能力五个方面,在现代经济中,可能还要增加一个互补品这一力量。五力分析模型的精髓是全面性,每一个单独的力量都只是必要非充分条件,缺了任何一个力量,这个行业的获利能力就会受影响。比如,飞机制造业,同业竞争者少、进入壁垒高、替代品少、供应商的议价能力弱,这对这个行业都很有利,但是最后一个力量,买方议价能力很强,这个行业盈利能力就不强。所以,一个行业一个企业的盈利能力高低要综合分析,不是说经济发展了所有行业企业的获利能力都会提高,不是说新兴技术的行业企业肯定能赚钱。 1999年7月,在因特网泡沫鼎盛的时候,巴菲特参加太阳谷的峰会并发言,他旁征博引历史数据委婉地说明他的判断:这是个泡沫!1964年12月31号到 1981年12月31号,这17年间,美国经济总量翻了5倍,财富500强企业总销售收入翻了不止5倍,道琼斯指数在这两个时点的数字分别是874.12 和875.00。他又举了汽车行业的例子,美国曾经有2000家汽车公司,最后幸存下来的只有3家,就这3家,曾经一度市值都低于账面价值。汽车是二十世纪上半叶最伟大的发明之一,给人类带来了巨大的便利,对美国经济具有重大贡献,对于投资者,它的影响也很大,但是是负面的。他还提到了二十世纪上半叶另一个伟大发明,飞机,几年前,对于航空业的股票投资累计回报是为零(笔者:我们知道,现在是负数)。他还开玩笑说,如果当年他在莱特兄弟试飞第一架飞机的现场的话,他希望自己有勇气把那架飞机射下来,“这是我向未来投资者应尽的义务”。他后来还曾说,似乎所有带翅膀的东西都投不得。巴菲特几乎从不投高科技企业,这可能是个原因。诚然,科技造福人类,但是人类不是投资者。



第二个M是管理层,管理层要能干可靠,人是至关重要的,同样的事情,不同的人去做结果会很不同。有的人适合做管理,做得好;有的人不适合做管理,做不好,这是客观规律。芒格对于管理人才的问题是这么看的,“我们不培养他们,我们寻找他们。”



第三个M是护城河(moat),即可持续的竞争优势,比如需求方来讲的品牌效应、供应方来讲的规模经济效应等。



第四个M是安全边际,即购入的价格应该远远低于价值,这样就算分析估算有误差,投资回报也不会荡然无存。



每一个单独的M都只是必要非充分条件,缺了任何一个M,这个企业就不会成功。所以说,成功的企业个个相似,不成功的企业各有各的不成功。如果投资符合这四大条件,那么就是一个理想的投资,它不断地带来很高的投资回报,我们再把它产生的资金配置到回报率同样高的地方去,这就形成了一台滚雪球的机器 (compounding machine),财源滚滚来了。 Berkshire Hathway当年是美国服装衬里最大的生产商,但是这个行业本身不赚钱,最后巴菲特不得不将它转型成他做投资的平台。可口可乐当年的首席执行官 Ivester食品安全问题处理不当、过度压榨瓶装商,没有能力,最后巴菲特不得不请他走人,至于把老婆买浴帘的1500美金发票拿到公司报销的首席执行官那当然更不能用。巴菲特旗下七十多家公司几乎都有由品牌或者规模经济效应等形成的护城河,比如喜诗糖果属于前者,GEICO属于后者。最后一个M,安全边际,这是很容易理解的,前面三个M讲的都是分子,投资回报,这第四个M讲的是分母,投资本钱,企业再好,如果股价已经很高了,再买就危险了,投资回报就不高了。



巴菲特为什么会投资比亚迪呢?众所周知,是因为芒格的强烈推荐。都想把莱特兄弟试飞的第一架飞机射下来的巴菲特没有想炸掉比亚迪出品的世界第一辆纯电动车反而投资占了10%的股份,这的确让很多巴迷百思不得其解。其实,投资比亚迪并不违背巴菲特的4M投资理念,巴芒从来没有说绝对不投高科技,只是说不投不能理解、看不懂的技术,巴菲特此次访比答记者问时也一再强调“我们只投我或者芒格看得懂的企业”,尽管巴爷对电动车、新能源可能不太懂,但是博览群书、对科技一向很感兴趣的芒格对这个领域应该是比较了解的,此次86岁高龄随行访比,足见芒格对自己判断的信心。另外三个M当然更符合了,对于王传福挂帅的比亚迪管理层巴芒是越看越欢喜,在各个场合都给予了最高评价。比亚迪的护城河也很深,铁电池技术独占鳌头,无人能敌;品牌也有一定优势。安全边际更是没有问题,巴菲特的比亚迪投资现在已经翻了7倍。当然,巴菲特力挺比亚迪,也有可能是属于芒格说的“结婚前睁大两只眼,结婚后睁一只眼闭一只眼”的情况,反正在巴菲特近2000亿的投资组合中比亚迪是沧海一粟。但是这是我们中国人唯一的一粟,还是让我们祝福比亚迪一路走好,不辜负巴芒,不辜负国人。



三人行,必有我师

巴菲特、芒格、盖茨此次锵锵三人行,估计是历史上最后一次了。三人的关系很是有趣,巴菲特和芒格是半个世纪故交,巴菲特和盖茨是忘年交,两人相差25岁。芒格和盖茨都是巴菲特的朋友,不过相互之间没有太多的交往,两人都是属于绝顶聪明也意识到自己绝顶聪明很难和不聪明的人打交道很难忍受不聪明人的不聪明的那种聪明人。巴菲特相对比较能和别人相处,尽管他也会不耐烦,但是他会努力掩饰。由于他母亲的关系,他从小缺乏安全感和自信心,所以一辈子都很努力地去讨好别人,希望大家都喜欢他,他还专门去听卡耐基的课,学习和别人团结友爱的方法。他很会激励旗下公司的管理层,用他自己的话说,会“卡耐基”他们。对于身边的工作人员也是一样,他会夸奖翻译说:“你真是翻得太好了!” 怕翻译翻饿了,递一盒打开的巧克力过去说:“你吃块巧克力吧。” 吃到巧克力和边上看到的人都十分感动。



比亚迪的投资是芒格主导的,所以这次访比,可以说是盖茨陪巴菲特陪芒格,这样三人就一串儿都来了,往台上一坐,整整1000亿美金坐在那儿,蔚为壮观。芒格对于中国和比亚迪的推崇完全可以理解,巴菲特看在老哥的面上对于中国和比亚迪的推崇也可以理解,倒是盖茨很不容易,一路从深圳陪到北京,陪到长沙,而且发言时十分谦虚,中国的发展举世瞩目,令人叹为观止,比亚迪创新为本,造福人类,十分了不起,云云。长沙站有记者问盖茨,盖茨先生,您是世界上最优秀的企业家,您对比亚迪有什么建议吗?盖茨回答说:“比亚迪有着最优秀的领导人,做得非常好,不需要我给他们提什么建议吧,他们的创新能力和快速增长倒是值得我们好好学习。如果说微软有什么经验的话,那就是要有长远的目光战略、要注重人才的培养发展、要重视客户基础的打造,但是这几点我觉得比亚迪都已经意识到了,也都做到了,所以芒格先生才会这样推崇比亚迪,告诉Warren一定要投资。我很荣幸这次能够一起来拜访比亚迪,见证比亚迪的成功发展。”



现年55岁的盖茨不再是哈佛辍学创业的毛头小伙了,两鬓斑白,满脸斑纹,但是举手投足还是和往年一样,一种慵懒倦怠百无聊懒的样子,太聪明的人似乎多多少少都这样,不过说起话来就完全不同,声音清晰犀利,很有穿透力,逻辑缜密,用词精当。主持人寒暄中问到盖茨,“听说您是twitter微博的粉丝,是这样吗?”在待人接物、世故人情方面比较冷淡“微薄”的盖茨,说到技术就热情了,说:“微博是个好东西,这几天在中国出访,我随时发微博给我在美国的家人朋友同事,告诉他们我的行程,所见所闻,这样的沟通实时性和现场感很强,太好了!”



在和比亚迪员工对话时,他还详细谈到了未来技术发展的四大趋势。一是输入方式的革新,目前为止,信息输入系统主要靠键盘,以后手写、语音等技术将降低键盘作为信息输入方式的重要性,这是最最大的趋势;二是收看界面,以后人们通过视觉获得信息的界面会统一起来,书、电视、因特网等等都会统一到一个界面上;三是教育的数字化,将来顶级学校的顶级教授的授课世界各地的学生都可以接受到,你可以按照自己的特别度身定制教育的内容,这将大大提高教育的效果和效率;四是机器人的普及将会成为现实,我想比亚迪以后就会开发出机器人,软件和硬件高度结合,这方面微软也许可以和比亚迪合作。



巴菲特带着他这两位同样是几百年也出不了一个的朋友造访中国,造访比亚迪,给比亚迪带来了无限的动力,给巴迷们带来了又一次思想的盛宴,给中国人带来了骄傲和自豪!祝巴芒健康长寿,祝巴比心想事成!

Basic Approach

Spend 99% time to find one or two great company that can be the next Baidu, QQ.
(study companies that growed 20 or more times in history, and study companies that didn't)
Ignore the fluctuate that can cause the price to drop 50%
Independent thinking using your own judgement and invert thinking.
(How to fail in the market?)

Transcation: only do 1 or 2 times in a year, to buy or to sell.
Wait until the price is reasonable or down 50%

18年投资历程最重要的经验是坚忍,市场的利好和利空,对投资本身几乎不构成任何影响

投资持续成功路径:一是成为像巴菲特那样的人;一是找到像巴菲特那样的人;没有第三条路。

真正的投资是分享伟大企业的成长,而不是此赚彼赔的零和游戏。

各种经济金融危机以及自然灾害基本都发生过,好像没有一年平静没事,只不过即便同样的事件,牛市中市场或被解读为好消息,熊市中或被解读为坏消息。
”在杨天南看来,市场的利好和利空,对投资本身几乎不构成任何影响

谈起18年投资历程中最重要的经验,杨天南认为,“最重要的经验是坚忍。他说,专业人士无论好和坏、无论牛和熊都在,可以称之为坚毅,也可称之为煎熬。“总之,如果这些人中有些取得最终的胜利,算是上天对于坚忍的奖励并不为过。”

October 03, 2010

巴菲特BYD之行 - 20年后我们会很高兴仍持有,是否现在买depends on 价格,45以下可买

我的思考:2010-DEC每股BOOK VALUE大概11.5港元(9月刚公布的BOOK VALUE是208亿半年间增加了18亿,估计到2010DEC大概可以再增加20亿RMB,即228亿RMB=262港币,发行22.75亿股则每股BOOK VALUE大概11.5,3倍PB就是34元,4倍就是45元左右), 芒格说过有些伟大公司3倍买入仍然是笔好买卖,所以44港元买入应该是个好买卖,当然越低越好。不过用PB对这种公司估值不好,更好的应该是PE,P/CASHFLOW方法,如果今年每股EPS大概2.8HKD,43/2.8=15X PE,可见43港元可以开始买入,应该也是接近巴菲特愿意增持付出的价格了。

http://finance.qq.com

据港媒报道,股神一行人浩浩荡荡出访中国前,有传言指巴郡会减持比亚迪(01211),但巴郡旗下中美能源(MidAmericanEnergy)主席索科尔(DavidSokol)却一口否认,「我的估计是,20年后我们会很高兴仍持有」,又称随时愿意增持。

称随时愿意增持

他表示,中美能源现时已持有约10%的比亚迪股权,在市场上再增持的效益不高,故若公司有需要发股集资,又愿意让中美能源增持,他们乐意这样做。

比亚迪计划年内发行A股于深圳上市,索科尔称虽不能买入A股,但明白公司希望藉此增大内地投资者的基础,故对此亦相当支持。

支持比亚迪发A股

除此之外,不少投资者在进场注资之前,都有脱手获利的部署,但索科尔称中美能源及巴郡几乎没有相关的策略;在买入股票后,相信可以作长期持有。

他以比亚迪为例,认为它兼备企业家精神及技术优势,长远于电池及电动汽车都会有优势。巴郡于其发展的早段买入,就是希望可成为其增长的一部分,并非着眼于短期回报。

2008年9月,中美能源以每股8元买入2.25亿股比亚迪H股,以上周五收市价62.3元计,账面利润已达122亿元。

身为股神于比亚迪的代表董事,索科尔到中国的次数因而更多,单是深圳就到过六、七次。他称2008年首次跟比亚迪主席王传福 见面,他当时订下的各项计划,均逐一实践,故对其领导有无比的信心。

当然,以比亚迪这样高的增长速度而言,不时犯错亦无可厚非。「这就是生意的一部分,若一点错误也没有,你大概就没有很尽力试。」

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巴菲特到访中国后表示,「对我而言,比亚迪是正确的选择」,并确信比亚迪将是绿色技术和汽车发展的未来领导者,而他更向比亚迪的经销商许下承诺,「等到比亚迪汽车销量破千万时,我还会再来。」

CBN:是否会出售比亚迪股份?

巴菲特:今年不会出售。

●CBN:中石油和比亚迪是两个完全不同的公司,为什么要将对这两个公司的投资加入到你的投资组合里面?

巴菲特:比亚迪是一个比较新的公司,将来要做的事情肯定是现在大家都没做过的,不过买这两个公司(股票)的共同点在于:我买的时候这两个公司的价值都是被低估的。


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巴菲特:我看到了一家在世界上都可以说是一流的公司,如果你看一下他们从1995年的记录,从30万美元开始,或者是短短的七年之前,公司开始进入汽车市场,这家公司都取得了历史上没有人取得过的成绩,他完成的事情我从来没有见过,无论是在汽车行业,还是从我一生的经历来说,他是一个很神奇的人。我一直没有发现这家公司,我希望我可以早一些看到这家公司。


芮成钢:你是乘坐比亚迪的车出现的,查理芒格甚至戴了一条比亚迪的领带,你们对于你们投资的公司和产品表现出来的支持显得非常的开放。



巴菲特:我认为这是一家非常棒的公司,非常棒。我认为这家公司在未来应该做的最重要的事情,当然没有人能确保未来会发生什么,但是他们在非常严肃的从事着一件对这个星球很有意义的事情,当谈到电力汽车,太阳能等等,这样的话题会影响成千上万的人们,也许会上亿。这是一家非常重要的公司。


芮成钢:我了解了,你目前还没有要卖掉你持有的部分比亚迪股票?


巴菲特:不会,不会,这个我可以向你保证我不会。我不敢保证我不会买进,但是我可以保证我不会卖掉这些股票,我会一直持有这些股票很多年,也许会一直持有它们到我离开人世。
芮成钢:比亚迪最初吸引你的是什么?现在中国都在谈论新能源,比如电动汽车。但是在中国,我们也担心在新能源出现泡沫。


芒格:当然,我们当然担心存在泡沫。中国人民历史上就很好冒险。所以中国政府要一直理智和富于决断力。我认为,泡沫对中国绝不是好事。我认为,产生泡沫的可能性很大。中国的股市存在猛涨猛跌的情况,当然,每个国家的股市都是这样。但是我不会根据猛涨猛跌的行市决定是否投资,我一直跟踪的是长期表现。在比亚迪的投资上就是如此。



芮成钢:在投资比亚迪的事情上,巴菲特先生和你是否很容易就达成共识了?
芒格:对我来说,这不难。我一般做决定时不会犹犹豫豫,在这样一个不同寻常的地方,有我们这样不同寻常的人物,我们创造了很多商业奇迹,我一般不会跟着涨涨跌跌的形式走,我会根据审计的记录做决定。




芮成钢:那么,现在是否是时候出售部分比亚迪股票呢?

芒格:这不是我们的风格。我是芒格家族的一员,我不会让比亚迪的股票受到任何影响。


芮成钢:到底是什么让你们对比亚迪着魔?王传福自己没有发行股票,他自己就是股东,这有点儒家的味道。

芒格:他没有公开募股,而是把股票分给自己的员工,这是儒家的文化。亚洲国家的公司内部有裙带关系,但是比亚迪公司就没有王传福的裙带关系。他工作起来真的很努力,他希望员工通过技能和奉献得到提升。对投资者来说,这样的体系更好,公司的管理也比家族企业的管理更好,它们(译者注:比亚迪与家族企业)有巨大的差异。
芮成钢 :在您眼里,什么样的生活才是富有的生活?

芒格:富有的生活就是良好的家庭生活,这也是儒家的理想境界。活到老,学到老,发挥道德模范的作用,不仅有智慧,还要用你的智慧使世界、家庭、朋友变的更好,这其实是很简单的原则。我认为大多数中国人都是有这样的原则的,但是在美国和中国都有这样的趋势:有些人对冒险过于沉迷,甚至有的还是明知故犯。
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http://finance.qq.com/a/20101003/000533.htm
选择有竞争力且价格合理的投资机会

  电动汽车在中国市场会越来越大不需要再给比亚迪建议了在中国投资不担心汇率问题来华访问超过预期

  问:巴菲特先生到中国参观了三天,想请您谈谈对中国经济未来有什么看法?您成功投资比亚迪是一个非常英明的决定,那么下一个你还想投资哪一个企业?

  巴菲特:你也知道我一直非常关注全世界的投资机会,几年前我看到了中石油的年报,之前我对中石油就非常感兴趣,最后买了他们的股票。你知道我随时都在考虑投资的问题,当然也可能在中国。至于今后有没有机会?中国经济增长很快,当然有很多机会,我会选择能够利用和看得到的、并且有竞争力的机会,还有价格要合理的,这样才能符合价格理念。

  第二个问题,中国经济正在蓬勃向上、欣欣向荣,我认为在过去二三十年,中国经济发展得很成功,这种现象将来还会继续存在下去,我不认为这些要素会消失,中国未来的经济会发展得更好更快。

  电动汽车在中国市场会越来越大

  潇湘晨报:我有一个问题想问巴菲特。您刚才参加了K9下线仪式,您怎样看待这辆大巴的市场前景?如果比亚迪把它带到美国去,会不会有市场?另外,您在 2008年股东大会上说过,选择一个正确的行业投资如同找到一个漂亮的女人,您能否告诉中国的企业家,如何找到“漂亮的女人”?

  (大笑)巴菲特:我想这个市场(电动大巴)对中国来说非常广大,不仅仅在公交领域,还有计程车也是一样。我们看到电动车上市之后在市场上受到广大消费者的认可,所以我想中国市场这方面的事业将会越做越大。至于美国市场,我还没有了解清楚,但是我想如果电动汽车能够帮助我们降低污染,那么没有道理不能发展起来,美国也正在计划开始大量使用混合动力车,所以不排除使用纯电动汽车的可能。

  我选择投资的理念非常简单。首先我和芒格先生要对这个行业非常了解。还有我们选择的这个行业是长期可以持续的,另外一点是这个企业的管理层是可以进步的,而且它的价格要合理。我们确实找到了很多符合我们标准的企业,我们旗下有70多家这样的公司,我对它们感到非常满意。我觉得如果把投资的方法跟你们找婚姻伴侣结合在一起的话,一定会找到你们合适的伴侣。

  不需要再给比亚迪建议了

  问:盖茨先生,你对中国企业比如说对比亚迪的发展有什么建议?请问芒格先生,刚刚签署的《10MW储能电站采购框架协议》,是中国在这方面最大的项目,您怎么看待储能电站的前景?

  盖茨:我这次来华访问非常荣幸地见到了比亚迪的领导人,根据我的判断,我觉得王传福 先生也是中国企业界最优秀的领导人之一,我觉得他们并不需要我给他们提什么建议了。他们做的很多工作取得了巨大成效,以前在微软有长远的计划,招聘培训发展和培养人才,重视客户基础培养。我觉得他们都已经做到了,所以芒格先生看中比亚迪很正常。对我来说,我感到非常荣幸有这样一个机会,可以看到这样一个伟大公司成长的过程。

  查理·芒格:关于您问的第二个问题:储能电站的技术将来在欧美市场的发展前景应该会非常灿烂。

  在中国投资不担心汇率问题

  问:巴菲特先生,当您长期投资的时候,货币问题是不是考虑的一个因素?美国国会刚刚通过了一个法案,您觉得对中美汇率有什么样的影响?您是否会考虑增加对于比亚迪的投资?

  巴菲特:我们当然要看公司所在国家的汇率情况,如果这个国家的汇率长期不稳定,如果这个国家有非常高的通货膨胀,我们是不会愿意去这个国家投资的。等到5年或10年我们受益的时候,那时就贬值了。

  在中国进行投资的时候,是没有发生这个问题的,在欧洲很多国家汇率都没有这个问题。以后我们也不会担心中国汇率的问题。

  查理·芒格:如果需要增加比亚迪的投资,需要公司许可,不是马上可以回答。比亚迪现在的发展很好,不一定需要我们增加投资才可以获得更大成功。我们不便对中国和美国之间的汇率问题指手画脚,这是两个国家的问题,所以我们没有什么建议可提供。

  来华访问超过预期

  问:巴菲特先生,请问您对这次中国之行的印象怎么样?

  巴菲特:我这次来华访问印象非常深刻,大大超过了我当时的预想。我在网络电视媒体上看到了很多中国发展的报道,但是眼见为实,见到之后这种震撼非常强大。我们看到中国经济发展体现在各个方面的进步,在过去这十多年,中国的经济发展非常蓬勃,并出现了非常优秀的企业家,他们取得了非常优秀的成绩。

Giverny 2008 - The opportunity of a generation

To Giverny Capital’s partners,
2008 was a difficult year in the stock market, to say the least. We believe that the market drop – and
the high level of pessimism – have created great investment opportunities to a degree we have seldom
seen in the modern history of financial markets.
From these depressed levels, we believe that the potential rewards for stocks are very high. We
believe that the potential returns for stocks in general have not been this promising since 1979:
• Valuation for stocks in general are very low. The price-earnings ratio to normalized profits is
around 9 times for the S&P 500.
• Consumer confidence in the US is at an all-time low of 25 (1985=100). The lowest it had
reached before was 42 in 1974.
• Just in the US, there is around $7000 billion in cash (waiting to get back in the market). This is
an amount sufficient to acquire all of the companies in the S&P 500.
• Interest rates on Treasury bills are almost zero. The bond alternative is far from attractive.
• Most investors are pessimistic. Institutions have a very low asset allocation for stocks.
Historically, these were signs of future great returns for stocks.
• We can purchase shares of outstanding companies at a third of their intrinsic values, a situation
we have rarely seen.
• Finally, the legendary investor Warren Buffett is very optimistic toward stocks: he urged
investors to invest for the first time since 1979. He wrote: “A simple rule dictates my buying:
Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful. And most certainly,
fear is now widespread, gripping even seasoned investors.”

The year 2008 in review
Last year, we ended our letter with these words: “If there is a recession in 2008, we are ready.” We
entered into a recession last year. Here is a review of some of the main news of a year that was far
from ordinary:
􀂃 From their peak, world markets were down by more than 50%. Even those that were
considered (wrongly it seems) “decoupled” from the US economy went down. Markets in
China, Brasil, Russia and India were down from 50 to 75%.
􀂃 Most industrialised countries went into recessions.
􀂃 Housing prices were down by 20% in most industrialised countries.
􀂃 Three of the top five stock brokers in the US vanished or were forced to merge into a new
entity (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch).
􀂃 The three financial titans AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae collapsed.
􀂃 Short-term interest rates in Canada and US are almost zero.
􀂃 The S&P 500 dividend yield is higher than 10 year Treasury bonds by more than 1%,
something that last happened in the mid 1950s.
􀂃 It is estimated that around one of three hedge funds could close because of the crisis.
􀂃 Oil prices went from a peak of US$147 in July to a low of US$35 in December.
􀂃 The Canadian dollar dropped 23% compared to its US countepart.
􀂃 The Canadian stock market was not immune: from its peak, the S&P/TSX dropped 50%, the
small-cap index by 60% and the TSX Venture by 75%.
We are always psychologically ready for recessions or market corrections. At the same time, we share
the same agnosticism as Warren Buffett’s as for the capacity to predict them (we leave that to
astrologists, market strategist and other fortune-tellers). We have accepted since the start that market
and economic cycles are parts of our capitalist systems and manage our assets accordingly.
Since 1945, there have been 11 recessions. Four times, the stock market dropped by more than 40%.
And crises have one thing in common: they all ended!
The recent economic crisis originated from the drop in real-estate prices and in the huge consequences
on the financial institutions, worldwide. Afterward, the crisis spread to all industries. The market
correction was then amplified by the huge number of speculators that crowded the investment world in
the years 2006-2007. For example, we wrote to you last year that at some point, there were $200
billion of oil contracts owned by investors. These were not destined to utilisation. Speculators were
hoping to find “other” buyers to purchase their contracts before the delivery date. Forced to sell, losses
were tremendous for most of them. There was also, the private equity firms (a new name for LBOs)
that acquired companies by leveraging them to dangerous levels. Many of them were forced to sell
securities to improve their balance sheet. All this deleveraging process is still hurting the economy.
And as always, market drops created by the selling of speculators have created more fears for many
other investors (even those that don’t need to sell). It is hard for many investors to keep a long-term
view during market corrections, especially when it lasts many months. But they have to. While it is
impossible to know when, we are certain that this crisis will pass. Our civilization has gone through
tougher times! A wise man once said that history doesn’t repeat itself but it rimes!
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Our portfolio did pretty well given the circumstances. We have always focussed our capital in solid
companies with great balance sheets and good profit margins. They also share an important ingredient:
honest and accountable people at the helm. Our companies are not immune to recessions. But we
believe that they have what it takes to pass through them. Some of them will emerge even stronger!
Finally, we are prudent in the price we pay for stocks. That helps in bear markets.
Some of our companies were hurt quite a bit by the recession but, for the most part, our investment
philosophy helped us beat the market this year, the same way we have done it since 1993. And we are
also taking advantage of the market crash to purchase great bargains. As Warren Buffett would say:
“be greedy when others are fearful.”
The level of undervaluation of stocks in general
Although we’re stock pickers (not investors in the market per se), we do closely follow the general
valuation level of the S&P 500 (in our opinion, the most important index in the world).
To value the S&P 500, we take into consideration three parameters: operating earnings, normalized
earnings to smooth out the economical ups and downs and long term interest rates in the US. The last
parameter is used to compare price-earnings ratio (P/E) to bond alternatives. Over a long period of
time, the market P/E tends to follow the inverted yield of interest rates. Of course, in periods of
optimism, the normalized P/E of the S&P 500 can be way higher than interest rates would justify. And
in periods of pessimism (like right now!), P/Es can be way lower than their intrinsic value.
If we look at the following chart, the S&P 500 seems to us undervalued by more than 50%, a discount
rarely seen (note: in 2008 we use a 4% level for the 10 years bond although it was 2.5% at year end).

In 2008, the rolling 10 years average returns of the S&P 500 was less than -1%. It was only the second
time in the last 200 years that this return was below 0% (the other time was for the 1929-1939 period).
In 10 years, the market has gone from overvalued to undervalued.
But in the end, the only way to lose money in the stock market over the long run is to sell during
corrections or recessions. So the emotional goal of the typical investor is not to fall into the “trap” of
bear markets. This “trap” awaits those that can not be impervious to stock market fluctuations.
Although it is far from easy, the key to attain such wisdom is to consider stocks as parts of businesses.
And – big news! – that’s what they are. Nothing else!

Giverny - Annual Letter to our Partners 2009

2009: A Year in Review
We began our 2008 Annual Letter with a simple phrase: “The opportunity of a generation.”
We wrote this in February of 2009 when the markets were freefalling to levels not seen since 1997.
There were plenty of bargains and some of the world’s best companies were trading at enormous
discounts to their intrinsic values. We may never see these sorts of valuations again in our lifetime
(except for maybe Jean-Philippe who, with his daily diet of kefir, is likely to live to 120).
During the first quarter of 2009, many of the companies in our portfolio were trading at a third, and in
some cases, at a quarter of their intrinsic values. We invested every dollar we could find, our own as
well as those of some of our courageous partners, into these bargains. The markets and our portfolio
rebounded and our holdings rose nearly 28% for the year (12% when adjusted to Canadian dollars).
This 28% return on the Giverny Capital Portfolio was slightly less than our corresponding benchmark
due to the underperformance of three large holdings that spanned across our three portfolios: Berkshire
Hathaway (US), MTY Food (Canada), and Nitori (International). Despite this underperformance in
the stock prices of these holdings, it is important to note that these companies still had a good year in
2009 when we assess their progress in growing their intrinsic values.
The market’s sharp rise since its March 9th bottom will not make us forget that 2009 was perhaps the
worst year in economic history since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was unthinkable just a few
years ago that the aggregate revenue of all companies would drop by 20% in a single year. Never
would we have heard chatter about a possible nationalization of the American banking system—the
very foundation of the best capitalist society in history. The Irish banking system collapsed while the
British banks, formerly the crown jewel of banking, struggled to survive. The stock markets in the
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) tumbled between 55% and 75%.
I remember a conference last March where my longtime friend Bernard Mooney attempted to convince
a skeptical audience that this was the time to invest in the market. Certain attendees were visibly
hostile and shouted that this was the end of capitalism.
5
In the beginning of the year, many investors, including some of the most experienced, had a significant
portion of their portfolio in cash and highly liquid investments, despite the fact that the return on these
investment was essentially nil. For a short period of time, the return on US Treasury bonds was
negative. Rarely, if ever, have we reached such a level of pessimism. At the bottom of the market, as
we mentioned in last year’s letter, there was enough liquidity in the US to purchase all the companies
in the S&P 500. Still, there is little use having all this liquidity if you wait for an even lower level to
buy into the market…
And at the end of the day, capitalism survived, the system did not collapse and those who were
courageous to hold onto their shares were rewarded.
What lessons have been learned from the crisis of 2008-2009?
We find it helpful to read historical writings in times of pessimism in order to keep current events in
perspective. Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1859:
"It is said an Eastern monarch once charged his wise men to invent him a sentence to be
ever in view, and which should be true and appropriate in all times and situations. They
presented him the words: 'And this, too, shall pass away.' How much it expresses! How
chastening in the hour of pride! How consoling in the depths of affliction!"
It is the nature of our civilization, for better or for worse, to have periods of both economic expansion
and economic contraction. When we look at our scorecard, however, our civilization has made
constant progress—progress towards a higher standard of living.
But one of the side effects of our system is that during periods of expansion, some participants try to
hasten their journey towards greater wealth by using the lever of debt. This works for some time and
the neighbor, who considers himself just as intelligent, concludes after considerable reflection: “Why
not me?” This continues to work for a while… until a period of contraction presents itself, always
without an official announcement. And those who were imprudent are punished. Unfortunately, during
several quarters, all participants are punished whether they acted prudently or not.
Many people who have lost their jobs, for example, were forced to sell stock at abnormally low prices.
But this wasn’t the case for everyone. Those who have the opportunity to wait for better days should
remain emotionally immune against market drops. Because, at some point, the market will rise and
reach new heights as the upward human quest for progress return to its historical road.
Economists who attempt to predict such cycles and the market in the short term fail to realize that they
need to keep track of several hundred million factors which are the several hundred million human
beings who participate in this vast activity. What’s involved here doesn’t just entail tracking a dozen
economic indicators. Such economists remind me of the scientists from a thousand years ago who
simplistically separated all the elements into four: earth, water, air, and fire.
Here are the lessons we can draw from the crisis (note: some of these were principles already known):
 Everything that cannot rise forever will someday stop. This certainly occurred with the
speculation on derivative products, technology stocks in 2000, American residential real estate
6
in 2005, Dubai real estate earlier this year, biotech companies in the early 1990s and with the
price of oil in more recent years. These are just a few recent examples!
 It is the nature of things that with every economic cycle, some businesses disappear while new
ones are born. This reminds us of the cycle of life here on Earth.
 Companies that went bankrupt all had faced a common pitfall: too much debt. The companies
that withstand crises are most often the ones with solid balance sheets and with leadership that
is prudent, trustworthy and devoted. Isn’t this perfectly logical?
 Warren Buffett once said that investors should not be in the market if they are not willing to
accept a temporary drop of 50% in the values of their portfolios. I always mention to our
partners that that this was likely to happen once in their life as an investor—I knew it would
happen but I didn’t know “when”.
 Many investors who were on margin at the beginning of 2009 were forced to sell at the worst
possible time. An investor who uses margin to invest can do well for 30 years and then lose
everything in a single day of irrational market movements.
 The irrationality of short-term market fluctuations makes derivative products extremely volatile
(options, swaps, etc.) When many people try to sell these instruments at the same time,
derivative products can become worthless overnight. When this is combined with leverage
(debt), you end up with an explosive cocktail.
 The good news is that the market, as Ben Graham wrote 60 years ago, ultimately renders an
accurate assessment of the intrinsic value of companies over the long term. To remain calm
and rational in the face of wild fluctuations in stock prices is, beyond the shadow of a doubt,
the most significant quality an investor can have or try to have.
 At the end of the day, in order to build wealth, there is a simple approach which we have
followed for 17 years at Giverny Capital: investing for the long term in high-quality companies
purchased at attractive valuations—investing in companies that will survive the crises of our
civilization and the short-term irrationally of our economic system.
But even such a sound philosophy isn’t enough to succeed in the market—another quality is necessary.
In 1949, Ben Graham wrote the following in the conclusion to “The Intelligent Investor”:
"Have the courage of your knowledge and experience. If you have formed a conclusion
from the facts and if you know your judgment is sound, act on it—even though others may
hesitate or differ." (You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you.
You are right because your data and reasoning are right.) Similarly, in the world of
securities, courage becomes the supreme virtue after adequate knowledge and a tested
judgment are at hand.”
Review of the Decade
2009 wasn’t the only difficult year in the last decade—quite to the contrary. The beginning of the
decade started on a note of extreme overvaluations, particularly with technology stocks. The
NASDAQ reached 5000 on March 6, 2000, a level not to be reached again anytime soon. Investing in
the market, aside from a few sectors tied to natural resources, has not been a pleasant experience since.
Over the course of the last 100 years, the last decade was the only decade when the S&P 500 actually
lost value aside from the 1930s. The market that was highly overvalued in 1999 is one that became
highly undervalued in 2009.
A significant number of companies disappeared almost overnight over the last decade (the corporate
cemetery is full of companies formerly believed to be indestructible). Nevertheless, others were born
7
or reborn and became titans of industry within a few years (Google, Apple, Amazon, Intuitive
Surgical, PetroChina, Tata Group, etc.) If there is one constant in the business world, it is change!
In the graph below, we can clearly see that the most important world indices experienced very modest
gains over the last decade, well below their average 10% annualized returns. The market returns were
further weakened by an additional 3% annually due to the strengthening Canadian dollar over the last
10 years. The Loonie climbed from $0.69 to $0.95 over the decade.
Out of the markets in the West, Canada was one of the only markets to counter this trend, with an
approximate annual return of 5.6%. It is worth noting, however, that Canada only represents 3% of the
world economy. While Canada benefited from its high concentration in natural resources over the last
ten years, it is also important to consider that Canada is well behind many countries in terms of
productivity and innovation in knowledge-based industries such as technology and medicine.
Decade
2000-2009
Annualized
Returns In $CAD
MSCI World 0.2% -3.0%
UK 0.9% -2.4%
Japan -5.7% -7.8%
US -1.0% -4.1%
Average -2.3% -5.3%
Canada 5.6% 5.6%
Giverny Global 7.2% 4.4%
The holdings in the Giverny Global Portfolio had an annualized return of 7.2% which outperformed
our benchmark by over 6% on an annualized basis. In Canadian dollars, our annualized return was
4.4%. We are confident that the intrinsic value of the companies in our portfolio increased at a much
higher rate than their average annual market performance of 7%.
We also believe that the current level of the Canadian dollar is higher than a level that would be in line
with purchasing power parity between the Canada and the US (which would be around $USD 0.84).
We are therefore confident that the appreciation of the Loonie since the year 2000 is unlikely to
continue to such a degree (if any) in the next decade.
We can conclude that the next decade is likely to differ sharply from the preceding one in terms of
returns, for both world indices as well as our portfolio.
Owner’s Earnings
We do not evaluate the quality of an investment based on short-term stock quotations, but instead, take
the perspective of ownership in the companies in which we invest. As such, we analyze the growth in
earnings for our companies and study their long-term prospect.
Each year, we present to you a chart indicating the growth in the intrinsic value of the companies in
our portfolio using a method created by Warren Buffett: owner’s earnings. This enables us to estimate
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the intrinsic value of our companies by adding the growth in earnings per share and the average
dividend yield of our portfolio.
The intrinsic value of our portfolio companies remained flat for 2009. This is nothing to write home
about but we are satisfied given the extremely challenging economic environment.
The market value of our companies, according to the stock quotes provided by the market, increased
28% in 2009. This increase in market values made up some of the lost ground in terms of the relative
difference between intrinsic value and market value that had developed over the last several years.
Giverny S&P 500
Year *** Value * Market ** Difference Value * Market ** Difference
1996 14% 29% 15% 13% 22% 9%
1997 17% 35% 18% 11% 31% 20%
1998 11% 12% 1% -1% 28% 29%
1999 16% 12% -4% 17% 20% 3%
2000 19% 10% -9% 9% -9% -18%
2001 -9% 10% 19% -18% -11% 7%
2002 19% -2% -21% 11% -22% -33%
2003 31% 34% 3% 15% 28% 13%
2004 21% 8% -12% 21% 11% -8%
2005 14% 15% 0% 13% 5% -8%
2006 14% 3% -11% 15% 16% 1%
2007 10% 0% -10% -1% 6% 6%
2008 -3% -22% -19% -30% -36% -6%
2009 0% 28% 28% 3% 27% 23%
Total 386% 344% -42% 79% 132% 53%
Annualized 12% 11% -1% 4% 6% 2%
* Estimated growth in earnings per share plus dividend yield
** Market performance, inclusive of dividends
*** Results estimated without consideration of currency fluctuations
Since 1996, according to our calculations, the intrinsic value of our companies has increased by 386%
(nearly a fivefold increase) while their stock prices have increased by 344%. In the long term, despite
the ups and downs of various economic cycles, the stock prices of companies will follow the growth in
earnings per share of their underlying businesses fairly closely.
It should be noted that our stocks outperformed the S&P 500 since 1996 (by about 5% annually) for
the primary (and simple) reason that their underlying businesses outperformed the S&P 500. It is in
this manner, rather than through any speculation on market quotations, that we intend to continue
meeting our objective of outperforming the market.
The Flavor of the Day for 2009: Canadian Residential Real Estate
We are asked regularly about the current flavor of the day—in other words, what we should avoid.
After technology stocks in 1999-2000 and natural resource stocks in the last couple of years, the
segment of the market which we consider alarming is the Canadian residential real estate market.
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Warren Buffett likes to say that there is no greater sedative than money easily made. While Canadian
residential real estate has been a tremendous source of wealth since 2000, those with a longer memory
will recall that real estate prices didn’t move one iota during the preceding decade. So, the first phase
of this increase is a simple “catch up” on the price of the intrinsic value of a home (typically tied to
disposable income per capita). Like all assets linked to supply and demand, a sharp increase often
creates its own momentum which leads to a second phase of an increase when fundamentals can be left
behind in favor of speculation.
The beauty of the capitalist system is that its invisible hand always ultimately equilibrates prices—
each exaggerated rise is therefore followed by a readjustment. This occurred during the most recent
recession in the US as well as nearly all countries in Europe. The decrease in the US was of a
magnitude not seen since the Great Depression (-30%), with enormous consequences on the overall
economy.
Canada, to this day, has avoided this readjustment in prices—with the reason seemingly more rooted in
politics rather than economics. The federal government strongly encouraged banks to continue
lending with the assistance of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to support
borrowers. Canadian consumers, boastful about the fact that housing prices had not fallen, continued
to spend and even, in some cases, considered themselves immune to the global recession. Housing
prices continued to rise.
Source: Giverny Capital Inc.
We can see that the average price of a home sold in Canada reached $333,000 in 2009. If we look at
this number through the lens of GDP per capita, this is a ratio of 8:1. The historical average for this
ratio is 6:1. We conclude that current prices are roughly a third higher than their historical prices,
especially in western Canada.
In the US, during the great real estate bubble, a large portion of mortgage titles were transferred from
banks to the quasi-governmental agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These mortgage titles were
subsequently securitized and sold on secondary markets. When housing prices collapsed, the
Canadian Housing Prices
6 6 6 6 6 6
5 5
5 5 5 5
5
6 6 6
7
7
8
6
0.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
199 199 1992 1993 199 199 199 199 199 199 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
- $
50 000 $
100 000 $
150 000 $
200 000 $
250 000 $
300 000 $
350 000 $
Price/GDP per Capita
Average Housing Price
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American government was forced, in order to save the system from floundering, to take over Fannie
and Freddie and the billions of dollars in securitized mortgages that they stood behind.
Back in Canada: in order to counter the recession, the federal government decided to encourage the
CMHC to increase its level of involvement in residential mortgages. The CMHC therefore increased
its level of mortgage securitization and, with the seal of approval from the federal government, had no
problem finding eager buyers thirsting for guaranteed fixed rate investments. From 2007 to 2009, in
only two years, the total for securitized mortgages supported by the CMHC ballooned from $CAD 165
billion to $CAD 373 billion.
Source: 2008 CMHC Annual Report
This financial commitment on the part of the CMHC is a significant potential liability on the part of
the Canadian federal government—and I think we all know who could end up with the bill. Canadian
banks do not hesitate to provide loans to home buyers since they know that the CMHC is essentially
guaranteeing a significant portion of the loan. Fueled by low interest rates and accessible money,
Canadians continue to buy houses at ever-increasing prices. Here’s how we summarize the situation:
 Canadian housing prices in relation to GDP per capita is at a record level
 Mortgage rates are at rock-bottom levels (many are able to borrow at 2%) which means that
mortgage payments are abnormally low in relation to the cost of homes.
 Money is easy to borrow, thanks to the CMHC which repackages these debts and resells them
to people looking for a savings vehicle.
 The percentage of equity to assets at the CMHC has dropped from 4.2% to 2.8% over the last
five years.
 Home buyers are convinced that the price of their homes will never drop. Real estate is
somehow viewed as an investment without risk. Our general experience in the markets tells us
that real risks are at their apex when they are perceived to be at their low point.
CMHC: Securitization (CAD$ millions)
80 800 $
103 709 $
129 500 $
165 332 $
233 958 $
372 600 $
- $
100 000 $
200 000 $
300 000 $
400 000 $
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 est.
Value of Mortgage-backed Securities
Current Level of Securitization by CMHC
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No one knows the future and we are the last to want to play the prophets of doom. We just happen to
believe that housing prices are high, especially in the west and in Ontario, and that these artificially
high levels seems to us propped up by political rather than economic arrangements. We keep this in
mind and our investment decisions are affected accordingly.
There is, of course, many non-financial advantages to owning your own home. There is no doubt that
home ownership is a source of great personal fulfillment for human beings—and, in the long term,
housing prices will continue on their upward movement. But it is important to realize that all the
ingredients are in place for potentially several years of difficulty as prices are readjusted in this
segment of the Canadian economy.
Our Companies
“Character: the virtue of hard times.”
- Charles de Gaulle
This section is for Giverny Capital’s partners only !
Five-year Post-mortem: 2004
Like we do every year, we go through a five-year port-mortem analysis. We believe that studying our
decisions in a systematic manner, and with some hindsight, enables us to learn from both our
achievements and our errors.
In the beginning of 2004, we bought shares in Knight Transportation at around $10 per share. With
the stock at $19 today, this investment turned out to be a good one. Knight has performed better than
just about everyone in the trucking industry, including Heartland Express (the company closest to
Knight in terms of productivity). It seems that our competitive analysis of the industry was accurate.
Yet, we are still a bit disappointed with this investment since the company’s growth rate, which was
around 26% at the time of our purchase, dropped sharply during the recession. This is normal given
the circumstances but we would have liked to see the company be more opportunistic about their
growth given the numerous expansion opportunities available these days. We are nonetheless
confident that the next economic cycle will offer us a better litmus test to judge the quality of this
investment.
In a completely different line of reasoning, in our “Mistake du jour” section for 2004, we awarded
ourselves a gold medal for selling Yahoo! at $8 when it subsequently climbed to $38. There are some
interesting conclusions to be drawn, given that the stock is currently trading at $15 and that the
company seems to have lost much of the competitive advantages I had mentioned back in 2004.
The first observation is that competitive advantages in the technological world are rare and often not
durable. The rapid progress in technology, while delightful to consumers, is rarely a source of riches
for shareholders. Yahoo! lost a good portion of its competitive advantage in 2004 to another business
that went public that year: Google.
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We learned to consider it dangerous to judge the merits of an investment too quickly. Years, many
years, are often necessary to reach a valid conclusion. Even the most patient investors can reach a
hasty conclusion. In the business world, as in the world of art, time remains the most objective (and
often the most merciless) judge in regards to the durability of one’s work.
Nothing gives more wisdom than perspective.
Mistake “du jour”
"Anyone who has never made a mistake has never tried anything new."
- Albert Einstein
Following in the “Givernian” tradition, here are our three annual medals for the “best” errors of 2009.
It is with a constructive attitude, in order to always become better investors, that we provide this
detailed analysis. As is often the case with stocks, errors from omission (non-purchases) are often
more costly than errors from commission (purchases).
Bronze Medal: BYD
During the Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting last May, I listened attentively to Charlie
Munger’s discussion of BYD, a Chinese company led by Wang Chuan-Fu. Charlie said with great
admiration that “Chuan-Fu is a combination of Thomas Edison and Jack Welch: I have never met such
a businessman.” When we consider that Charlie is 86 years old and that he has probably met the
greatest businessmen of the last two generations, it’s an extraordinary comment. His words didn’t fall
on deaf ears and I was instantly interested in BYD.
The company manufactures an array of products but the most important is a revolutionary battery used
in electric cars. Based on this invention, BYD launched itself fearlessly into the car manufacturing
business. As a fervent believer in the future of the electric car, I became enthralled with this highpotential
company. Keep in mind that, with revenues of over $5 billion in 2009, BYD wasn’t exactly
the new kid on the block.
My enthusiasm was cooled when I saw the company’s valuation on the market. The stock was trading
at $15 on the Hong Kong market while the company only had EPS of $0.50 in 2008. A P/E ratio of 30
times seemed exaggerated in my mind. So being a persistent man, I woke up each morning to look at
BYD’s closing price in Asia hoping that the stock had dropped so I could buy a stake in the company
at a more reasonable valuation. This was in vain.
The company had an exceptional year in 2009. After nine months, BYD’s revenues climbed 39% and
their new car division grew 50%. The company’s EPS has yet to be announced but it’s likely to have
doubled to $1.06 for 2009 and analysts expect $1.84 in EPS for 2010.
The stock has soared 400% in a year, reaching its current level of $65. Sometimes, the artistic side of
investing is to know when to let go, in a rare and exceptional moment, of market valuations and simply
make a leap of faith based on an exceptional human being.
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Silver Medal: TJX Companies
TJX owns chains of retail clothing stores. Its sweet spot in the marketplace is selling branded clothing
at discount prices by buying discontinued apparel lines, surplus inventory, etc. In the US, the
company’s brands include T.J. Maxx, HomeGoods and Marshalls. In Canada, it owns Winners and
Homesense. TJX is highly profitable and its returns on capital are unmatched by competitors. I have
known this company for a decade or so. In 2000, the stock had fallen to $10 per share and was trading
at 10 times earnings. I thought of buying shares at the time but decided to pass on the idea—with
great regret.
The company grew its EPS at 12% annually during the decade. This rise in earnings seemed
surprisingly high since sales were only growing at 5-7% per year and, with 2743 stores, this retail
concept seemed quite mature.
The key to success at TJX is in the management of its capital. Through opportunistic buyback of its
stock and continuous margin improvement, the company was able to create enormous wealth for its
shareholders.
I knew two things when the stock lost half of its value at the end of 2008: that the company’s business
model was well suited for a recession (subsequently proven by the company’s EPS soaring 48% in
2009), and that the company would buy back some its shares at these attractive valuations. The P/E
ratio was once again at 10, and once again, I remained motionless.
The stock doubled in a year and is now trading at four times its price from 2000. Despite this rise,
TJX is still only trading at 12 times its 2010 estimated earnings. When a stock doubles in a year and is
still undervalued, it shows how much undervalued it was before.
Gold Medal: Cabela’s
Cabela’s became publicly traded in 2004. Since 1961, the company has been the leader in catalog
sales (and now on the Internet) for products related to hunting, fishing, camping and scuba diving.
The company more recently began operating “big box” retail stores. Michael Shearn, our friend from
Austin (Texas), had spoken to us with great enthusiasm about this business based out of Sidney,
Nebraska. Though the stock didn’t seem attractively priced at the time of its IPO at $24 per share, we
knew that this company’s competitive advantage merited that we pay particular attention.
In the summer of 2004, I visited one of the company’s new (and very impressive) stores in Kansas
City. I was highly impressed with this retail concept.
Two years later, Michael and Jean-Philippe visited the company and spent the afternoon in Sidney
meeting with upper management. They returned persuaded that the company had compelling
competitive advantages and an able management team.
Still, we all shared some reservations about the high level of capital required to open the company’s
extremely large stores (and their low return on capital). We were also concerned that a substantial
portion of the company’s profits were from its financial division which issued credit cards to
customers of Cabela’s.
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On the other hand, we also believed that the company could eventually realize certain economies of
scale with a larger network of stores and that this should improve the company’s returns on equity
over time. We decided to buy a few shares, if anything to simply follow the company more closely.
The stock of Cabela’s fell sharply in 2008, from a high of $28 in 2007 to a bottom of $4. The retail
sector was practically torn apart by the drop in consumer spending. On top of that, everyone on Wall
Street avoided companies with financial divisions like the plague, regardless of the quality of a
company’s loan portfolio. Cabela’s was different, with its loyal (if not fanatical) customers. The
company’s customers were also wealthier than average and had higher credit scores.
It’s not surprising then that EPS dropped relatively little, from $1.31 in 2007 to $1.14 in 2008. When
it was trading between $4 and $5, the P/E ratio on Cabela’s shares was only four times. Without any
future growth, such a valuation corresponds to an annual return of 25%!!
To find a high-quality business that is dominant in its industry and is trading on the market for four
times its earnings is a rare event in the life of an investor. I could have used the excuse that we were
fully invested and that all our stocks were undervalued. But I certainly could have sold another stock
in our portfolio that was trading at half of its intrinsic value to buy Cabela’s that was trading at one
fifth of its value. Selling a 50-cent dollar to buy a 20-cent dollar makes a lot of sense.
The company’s earnings rose 18% to $1.35 per share in 2009. The company has performed extremely
well despite the tremendously challenging economic headwinds. Wall Street regained its wits about
the value of this business and the stock has risen to $16 in just a few months. This error of omission,
with a price tag of 300%, merits a gold medal.
Conclusion: Warren Buffett’s Big Wager
One of the most significant events of 2009 for our portfolio was the acquisition, through a tender offer,
of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF). We had owned stock in BNSF since 2007-08 and, in
November of 2009, Berkshire Hathaway offered $100 per share for Burlington—a 27% premium to
the current price of the company’s stock.
Warren Buffett and BNSF Chairman Matthew Rose (Source : CNBC.com)
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This $34 billion acquisition is by far the largest over the course of Warren Buffett’s long and
illustrious career. In his press release, Buffett makes this pertinent comment:
“Our country’s future prosperity depends on its having an efficient and well-maintained rail
system. Conversely, America must grow and prosper for railroads to do well. Berkshire’s $34
billion investment in BNSF is a huge bet on that company, CEO Matt Rose and his team, and the
railroad industry. Most important of all, however, it’s an ALL-IN wager on the economic future
of the United States. I love these bets.”
M. Buffett, regardless of the metaphor used in the press release, is no gambler. In fact, the master of
intelligent investing is faithful to a rule he laid out some 50 years ago: “To succeed in the stock
market, be fearful when the others are greedy and greedy when the others are fearful”.
We are, as M.