Stocks are simple. All you do is buy shares in a great business for less than the business is intrinsically worth, with management of the highest integrity and ability. Then you own those shares forever. I will tell you how to become rich. Close the doors. Be fearful when others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.

March 27, 2011

沃特・施洛斯(Walter Schloss)and Pricing Power than Management

(本文刊登于中国工商银行《现代商业银行・管理智慧》杂志2011年第2期)

纽约的基金经理人沃特・施洛斯(Walter Schloss)有两个让人印象深刻的地方,一个是他算得上在投资领域中工作最长的人——近半个世纪;另一个是在其工作的时间里,与标准普尔500指数不到10%的增长率相比,施洛斯为股东带来了平均20%多的年复合收益率,这是一个非常优秀的业绩。

施洛斯最早的投资可以追溯到1934年,那时他只有18岁,他就在华尔街上开始投资。1935年,施洛斯向一位名叫阿蒙德・俄普夫的合伙人请教如何走进“统计世界”,这位合伙人说,有个叫本杰明・格雷厄姆的人刚刚出版了一本《证券分析》。他说:“读这本书吧,如果你掌握了它说的一切就不必看别的了。”于是施洛斯从那一年起到1940年进入纽约证券交易学院,师从格雷厄姆。后来,他干脆辞去工作,效力于格雷厄姆。1946年施洛斯加盟格雷厄姆-纽曼公司。施洛斯工作的重点就是潜心寻找价格低于营运资本的股票。施洛斯通过系统研究,发现格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的经营状况非常优异。在1936-1946年10年中,美国股市总体趋势是下跌的,比如标普工业指数下跌了0.6%,而格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的年平均收益率却高达11.8%。特别是1942-1945年4年中,标普工业指数上升了26%,而格雷厄姆-纽曼公司的年平均收益率也同步上升了26.3%。

施洛斯第一次出现在人们的视野里是在1971年。当时亚当・史密斯在《超级金钱》一书中介绍了巴菲特和他谈论有关沃特・施洛斯的事迹之后,对施洛斯做了这样一番的描述:他从来不运用或接触有用的资讯。在华尔街几乎没有人认识他,所以没有人提供他有关投资的观念。他只参考手册上的数字,并要求企业寄年报给他,情况便是如此。当把沃特介绍他们认识时,巴菲特曾经说施洛斯“从来没有忘记自己是在管理别人的资金,这进一步强化了他对于风险的厌恶。”史密斯写道,沃特有高尚的品格.并以务实的态度自持。对他来说.金钱是真实的,股票也真实的——并从此而接受了“安全边际”的原则。沃特的投资组合极为分散,目前拥有的股票远越过100支。他了解如何选股,将价格远低于其价值者出售给私人投资者。这便是他所做的一切。他不担心目前是不是一月份,不在乎今天是不是星期一,也不关心今年是不是大选年。他的想法非常单纯,如果某家公司值一美元,若我能够以40美分买进,我迟早会获利。他便是如此不断地行动:他所持有的股票种类远比巴菲特的多,而且比巴菲特更不关心企业的本质;巴菲特对沃特似乎没有太大的影响力。这是他的长处之—,没有人能够对他产生足够的影响力。

第二次施洛斯出现在人们的视野里是在1984年。当时沃伦・巴菲特在哥伦比亚大学发表题为《格雷厄姆-多德都市里的超级投资者们》的著名演讲,举的第一个例子就是施洛斯。早在学生时代,巴菲特就在哥伦比亚大学遇见施洛斯,那时施洛斯是参加了格雷厄姆的夜间课程。后来两人一起在格雷厄姆-纽曼工作。有一次巴菲特前往新泽西参加一家格雷厄姆持有股份的公司年会,而同样在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司工作的沃特・施洛斯刚好也在那里。他们开始交谈,一起吃中饭,从此成为好友。巴菲特说沃特没有上过大学,但他在纽约金融学院选修了本・格雷厄姆教授的夜间课程。1955年离开了格雷厄姆—纽曼公司,在其后28年中,他取得了优秀的投资业绩记录。巴菲特回忆他和施洛斯的往事,亚当・史密斯就是经他介绍采访施洛斯的。后来史密斯将施洛斯的事迹写进了《超级金钱》。

当施洛斯第三次出现在人们的视野里是在2001年。当时哥伦比亚大学商学院著名教授布鲁斯・格林威尔在《价值投资:从格雷厄姆到巴菲特》中花了整整一个章节介绍施洛斯。格林威尔称施洛斯是“极简抽象主义者”。说他的办公室很简陋,从来不访问客户,很少谈管理理念,不和分析师交流,也不上网,不会被说服做他不愿意做的事,甚至和别人谈话时,也要限制时间。他只相信自己的分析,长期以来遵循他的惯例:只买便宜的股票。这一方法使得他几乎专注于研究上市公司每个季度发布的财务报告。施洛斯的投资策略就是“买便宜的”。这里的便宜是指相对于价值的价格。施洛斯最注意的就是价格下跌的股票。最好的情况就是股票能下跌到2年或3年来的最低点,而通常是大多数投资者最不能容忍的事,大多数投资者只注意大家都看好的股票。

施洛斯只买股票,既不会投资于金融衍生工具,也不会购买股指或者商品,更不会卖空——他曾经卖空过,并且从中赚了钱,然而这种经历却令人不快。他绝不会试图控制市场,尽管他会借助市场来知道到底那只股票更便宜。当他找到一只便宜的股票时,他甚至会在他分析研究完成之前就把它买下来,而事实上,他对很多公司都有一个很基本的了解,他还通过价值线或标普指南迅速浏览这家公司的财务状况。施洛斯认为,要想真正了解一只股票,唯一的办法就是去购买它。由于他持有的时间一般是4至5年,因此他有足够的时间来进一步了解这家公司。他会继续查看季度报表,当然也不会忽略价格波动,甚至是每股2美分的收益或损失。施洛斯所关注的公司通常不处于那些变化快的行业,因此他可以原地不动的等待着。这就是格林威尔所说的“极简抽象主义”。

施洛斯的儿子名叫埃德温,埃德温是施洛斯好助手,他完全秉承他父亲的投资原则,因此父子俩同心同德。但是埃德温认为他也非常容易犯错误。这就是首次往往买进太多,以至于当价格进一步滑落时无法再买进。如果他首次买进后,价格不再进一步下跌,那么他的决策就是正确的。但是许多时候事与愿违,当然他也总有机会能够将平均成本降低,即以更低的价格进一步买进。因为父子俩久经沙场,他们不相信市场会与他们背道而驰,他们坚信价格是会回升的。当几十年的良好收益证实了他们的睿智时,谦虚就逐渐转为自信。

施洛斯是一位优秀的基金管理人,他对他的客户始终忠贞不渝。在基金没有获利的年份,施洛斯为了将支出控制在最低水平,甚至取消了自己应得的管理报酬。施洛斯说:“如果我的工作没有做好,就不应该获得报酬。”对此,巴菲特由衷地赞叹施洛斯说:“我想施洛斯的经营方式为我们所有人都上了深刻的一课(芒格已经领会其中的要义)。施洛斯持有所罗门兄弟公司的股票有一年之久,收益显著,而正是这只股票令伯克希尔不得不开动‘不可或缺号’(指巴菲特的私人飞机)的引擎,载着我往返于纽约和奥马哈之间穷于应付。”在施洛斯的股东里,有的股东的父母就曾是他的股东,有的甚至三代都是他的股东。他们当中的许多人算不上是有钱人,因此他们把钱投放在施洛斯的公司里,对于他们来说是非常重要的。这也是为什么施洛斯下定决心不辱使命的原因。不过,有意思的是,施洛斯就是不愿意向股东们透露他所买的股票名称,因为他所投资的通常都是一些拿不出手的股票。这使得人们不能在鸡尾酒会或者是其他什么地方可以吹嘘一下。

1994年,在纽约金融协会举办的格雷厄姆诞辰100周年的纪念仪式上,巴菲特和施洛斯进行了一次亲密的谈话。巴菲特说,格雷厄姆觉得任何形式都是一种欺骗,例如召开只有高层管理人员参加的会议,却将个人投资者排除在外。然而巴菲特倾向于进行“善意的欺骗”,但是在这方面施洛斯却是保守分子。在过去几年里,施洛斯的确已经取得了不俗的投资记录。施洛斯不喜欢跟管理层谈话或者与人们进行过多的交流,是因为他曾经亲眼目睹了格雷厄姆向一个投资商透漏了一只股票后,当他回到办公室时,那只股票上涨得他都无法购买。施洛斯相信,相对而言,股票更容易打交道,因为它不会和你争论,不会有情绪,你也不需要把它紧紧握在手中。他说,如今的巴菲特是个非同寻常的家伙,因为他不仅是位优秀的分析师,还是优秀的推销员,是一位有着卓越判断能力的人,这些特质是非同寻常的组合。施洛斯坚信,如果他打算收购某人的公司,巴菲特第二天肯定会退出。但有时施洛斯会觉得对巴菲特的性格或其他因素判断失误,抑或是施洛斯可能自己觉得没有意识到,巴菲特的确是由于不喜欢这一公司,真的想出售该公司才放弃的。当买下某家公司后,巴菲特会放手让公司原来的管理层继续经营该公司,这也是一个特殊的显著的特点。

施洛斯最大的“缺点” 是喜欢拥有大量的股票,最多时会有100只,不过往往最大的20只股票占了大约60%的份额。有时候他甚至会使用60%的资金来购买单只股票,这样的集中度一般是罕见的。巴菲特并不赞成他的这些做法,但是施洛斯说他无法控制自己。施洛斯说,“你必须做一些令自己觉得开心的事情,即使这些事情可能并不像巴菲特所从事的事情那样有利可图,毕竟巴菲特是独一无二的。”施洛斯拥有这么多的股票,其实其中某一单一股票的风险并不显著,他试图根据资产而非收益来买进被低估的股票。依据资产而非收益进行判断,使施洛斯的投资活动得到了改善,因为收益容易发生变动。巴菲特坚持自己的观点,认为施洛斯拥有数不清的证券,是“二手雪茄烟蒂”的投资方法:你找到了这些充分燃烧、只剩烟蒂的雪茄,它们是免费的,你把它们捡起来,还可以抽上一口。但任何事物都是有价的。巴菲特说,“最近施洛斯罕见地说他要买一根‘新雪茄’,但他是在削价处理时买的。”

施洛斯在另一场合这样评价巴菲特;“从来都没有人能做到像他那样……因为要使公司实现持续的增长是非常困难的,也许有一天他会用它(伯克希尔)吞并加拿大。”关于伯克希尔公司居高不下的股价,施洛斯认为把只有发行在外的公司股票数量乘以股价之后得到的市值,再与其他收入和资产规模都较小的市值进行比较才是明智的,“但遗憾的是,人们通常并不考虑他们打算买进股票的那个公司的市值,他们仅仅关注每股价格而不是公司的价值。”

施洛斯就是这样,他有自己独立的思考。实际上在1980年代以前,巴菲特基本上就是实施这种投资策略的。当然,后来巴菲特又揉进了菲利普・费雪的成长投资策略,这也不能说明巴菲特就是错误的或者是“背叛”了,这只是两个人的投资风格不同而已。施洛斯从格雷厄姆那里学到了买入廉价股的策略,坚持五十年不动摇,却从未想去改变它,而且任凭时光的流逝、风云的变幻,任何人也不能对他施以影响,从这一点上说,他确实是格雷厄姆最忠实的信徒。

 巴菲特:我选股最看重企业定价力而非管理

http://www.sina.com.cn  2011年02月18日 20:54  新浪财经

  新浪财经讯 北京时间2月18日晚上消息,据美国金融危机调查委员会(FCIC)发布的谈话录影带,股神巴菲特(Warren Buffett)在与FCIC对话时指出,他评估一家企业时主要看重企业提高产品价格的能力,有时他甚至不会考虑谁掌管这家公司或管理的水平如何。

  巴菲特表示:“评估一家企业时唯一重要的决定性因素是定价能力。如果你有能力提价而业务又不会流向竞争对手,你拥有的就是一家很好的企业。如果你在提价10%前还要祈祷,你拥有的就是一家糟糕的企业。”

  现年80岁的巴菲特是世界第三号富豪,他的个人财富源自辉煌的股票投资和企业收购生涯。巴菲特曾收购过铁路和发电商等诸多企业,这些企业的定价力源自其客户几乎找不到其他选择。巴菲特还增持了可口可乐和卡夫食品等公司的股份,这类企业的品牌具有吸引力,能够吸引和留住客户。

  巴菲特在录影带中还称:“出色的企业并不必然需要良好的管理。”FCIC对巴菲特的调查集中在他对穆迪公司的投资上。一些国会议员曾批评道,这家债券评级机构在房地产泡沫期向客户提供了虚夸的信用评级。巴菲特的回答是,他持有穆迪的股票是因为穆迪的市场份额领先,它与主要对手标普的强强组合使两家公司具有很大的定价灵活度。

  巴菲特指出:“我对穆迪的管理层一无所知。如果你拥有一个城镇上唯一的一家报纸,这种状况持续了约五年时间,你就拥有了定价能力,你不用到办公室施加太多的管理。”

  加州大学伯克利分校哈斯商学院的经济学教授赫马林(Benjamin E. Hermalin)则认为,具有市场统治地位并不能阻止恶劣的管理随着时间的推移毁掉一家企业。

  去年巴菲特以265亿美元收购了伯灵顿北圣达菲公司,该公司拥有美国西部地区连接煤炭、谷类和消费者产品生产商及销售商的总计超过3万英里的铁路。巴菲特掌管的伯克希尔-哈撒韦集团麾下的电力公司:中美能源控股也拥有定价能力,它向美国大平原地区的家庭出售电力,还负责从怀俄明州向加州输送天然气。(立悟)

March 25, 2011

Louis who?

A Maestro of Investments in the Style of Buffett

CHICAGO — Warren E. Buffett is hardly a man of mystery.

But when investors gather in Omaha in two weeks for the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, there will be a nagging question mark over the head of the 76-year-old chairman: who might someday replace him in each of the two roles he plays — chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway, and its chief investment officer?

A bit more is known about the choice of a future chief executive. Mr. Buffett has said there are three candidates from various Berkshire-owned companies. Buffett watchers speculate that the list includes David L. Sokol of MidAmerican Energy Holdings; Ajit Jain, head of the reinsurance division of Berkshire's National Indemnity Company; Tony Nicely, chief executive of Geico; Joseph P. Brandon, chairman of General Re; and Richard T. Santulli, founder of NetJets.

The bigger mystery is who will become the chief investment officer. Mr. Buffett says he does not know himself. On this point of succession, "frankly, we are not as well prepared," he wrote in his 2006 shareholder letter last month.

Here is a clue, though. He or she will probably be a lot like Louis Simpson.

Louis who?

Mr. Simpson, 70, has long overseen the investment portfolio of Geico, the insurance company Berkshire owns, which is now valued at more than $4 billion. He is also the only man other than Mr. Buffett who has managed stock investments in Berkshire's portfolio.

Mr. Buffett is a big fan. "He is the kind of person we are looking for: smart, classy, loyal," he said of Mr. Simpson in a telephone interview on Friday. But Mr. Simpson is just six years younger than Mr. Buffett, who has written that "for the long term, though, we need a different answer."

Applicants would do well to learn from Mr. Simpson, which is easier now that he has agreed to his first interview since Berkshire Hathaway gained total control of Geico in 1995.

In many ways, Mr. Simpson, whose title at Geico is chief executive for capital operations, is a lot like his boss. The two have the same general distaste for technology stocks. They both favor intensive research to find attractive companies to invest in, and they share a willingness to bet on returns from just a handful of stocks.

In terms of style, though, there are some major differences. Mr. Simpson, a deliberate, slow-talking executive, has maintained much lower visibility. "I have always felt I could do a better job in adding value by being somewhat removed from the circus and parimutuel atmosphere of the market," he said.

Mr. Simpson works in Chicago, where he moved from the La Jolla district of San Diego two years ago because his second wife, Kimberly, a chemical engineer, missed the energy of urban life.

Though he is already well-connected among Chicago's power brokers, he tends to describe people in terms like "fancy" if they are not the plain-spoken types that populate Berkshire's host of companies.

Mr. Simpson's work life is similarly low-key. On a recent spring day, he sat in his three-room office suite on North Michigan Avenue here, where he works with a small staff, explaining that it had been a particularly busy time.

Busy, though, is relative. There were no researchers running around, no Bloomberg terminals, and no interruptions. "We are sort of the polar opposites of a lot of investors," Mr. Simpson said. "We do a lot of thinking and not a lot of acting. A lot of investors do a lot of acting, and not a lot of thinking."

He does not crow about Geico's performance except to say that "it has been very, very good," and he is disarmingly honest about investments that have not worked out.

"Pier 1 was a horrible mistake," he acknowledged. "It was our own doing. They were totally out of touch fashion-wise, and it was a disaster."

Such mistakes notwithstanding, his track record has even led Mr. Buffett to brag about him periodically. In 2004, the only time that Berkshire ever stated Geico's performance separately, Mr. Simpson over 24 years had posted a 20 percent average annual gain, surpassing the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index by 6.8 percentage points.

Since 2004, Geico's results have been somewhat better than the S.& P. index, he said, declining to be specific. In 2005, the S.& P. was up 4.9 percent, compounded. In 2006, it rose 15.8 percent.

"He has an amazing record," Mr. Buffett said in the interview. "He does not make a lot of noise about it. He is a very sensible, sound, decent guy."

To find stocks, Mr. Simpson does not read analysts' reports. "They have their own agenda," he said.

Nor does he search data on the Bloomberg terminal for ideas. "If I have the Bloomberg on, I find I am looking at what the market is doing," he said. "I am looking at every news story. I really like to be the one who is parsing the information, rather than having a lot of irrelevant information thrown at me."

Sometimes he speaks with Mr. Buffett several times a week and sometimes not for a month or two. Mr. Simpson makes his own decisions and essentially works alone.

"The more people you have, the more difficult it is to do well," he said. "You have to satisfy everybody. If you have a limited number of decision makers, they are more likely to agree."

It is hard to know which stocks are Geico's and which are Mr. Buffett's picks. Mr. Simpson holds about 10 major positions: According to filings with the Maryland Insurance Administration, they are in American Standard, Nike, Comcast, Costco Wholesale, First Data, Home Depot, ServiceMaster and UnitedHealth Group (he bought it after the stock-option scandal). Geico's biggest position is Tesco of Britain, a stock also owned by Berkshire Hathaway.

Mr. Simpson found Nike, one of Geico's most successful holdings, through a stake in the rival Reebok. He had hired a journalist-turned researcher, and the researcher thought that Reebok was the "cat's meow," Mr. Simpson recalled, adding: "Paul Fireman ran the company, but not particularly well. The more we got into it, the more I saw the really quality company with the franchise and sports brand was Nike. It was truly a worldwide brand that did not have a lot of penetration in growing parts of the world such as Asia."

Thomas Russo, a partner in Gardner Russo & Gardner, also studied that industry for investors. Geico "did an enormous amount of research," he said. "They wanted to understand the management questions," adding, "We were researching companies in that same sector, and we had a pretty good idea of what was going on."

Mr. Simpson, who grew up in Chicago and has three sons, began his investing career at Stein Roe & Farnham. During a heady investment period in the late 1960s, he learned the perils of market timing when he worked for Shareholders Management, then a hot fund company run by Fred Carr. But when the market turned, Shareholders' Enterprise Fund took a nose dive, and there were substantial redemptions. Mr. Simpson resigned. "I viewed myself an investor, and they were trading-oriented," he said.

From there, he joined Western Asset Management where he rose to chief executive. Still, that firm basically followed analysts' recommendations.

It was not until Geico's chairman, John J. Byrne, called him in 1979 to become its chief investment officer that Mr. Simpson found a niche where he could put his own ideas to work. Berkshire Hathaway was already a shareholder in Geico, and Mr. Byrne sent several candidates to see Mr. Buffett about the management job. After a four-hour interview with Mr. Simpson, Mr. Buffett called Mr. Byrne. "Stop the search," Mr. Bryne recalled him saying. "That's the fellow."

Mr. Simpson's compensation has not been disclosed since Berkshire took over Geico in 1995. At that time, he received a moderate salary and a bonus based on how much the portfolio outperformed the S.& P. 500. He said that structure had not changed.

Mr. Buffett has noted that Mr. Simpson could probably make more money elsewhere. Mr. Simpson says he is not tempted.

Does the fact that Mr. Buffett seeks a younger heir for the long term upset him?

"If he would have asked me to take over the investments for Berkshire, I certainly would have done it," Mr. Simpson said, "but I certainly did not seek it out or wait for it to happen."

That kind of patience has proved to be its own reward. "Lou can keep running money as long as he wants," Mr. Buffett said.