万科：房价见底时间延迟至2012年

万科：房价见底时间延迟至2012年

1月5日，万科2008年的成绩出炉，虽然离调整后的计划还差一点，不过好于市场的预期。万科虽稳坐第一把交椅，但还是感觉压力很大。 
市场证明，万科对于楼市的预测向来很准，对于何时见底，众说纷纭，而万科把原来预测2009年见底的时间延长至2012年。
高层年终奖不保

1月5日晚间，万科公布2008年最后一个月的销售业绩。12月份万科实现销售面积66.1万平方米，销售金额53.4亿元。受年底购房高峰以及宏观政策的影响，12月增长明显，环比分别增加57.0%和49.6%。

至此，万科2008年累计实现销售面积557万平方米，销售金额478.7亿元，分别比2007年减少9.2%和8.6%。

尽管业绩有所缩减，但万科依然是行业的领跑者，并且与队友们的距离拉得更大了，目前，万科市场份额由2008年年初的2%增长到了2.6%左右。即便如此，万科还是感到压力很大。

平安证券房地产分析师刘细辉对记者说，这一结果与万科全年计划基本相符，12月的销售情况甚至要好于预期，回笼一部分资金后，万科的现金流也比以前更稳健。在财务上万科不断缩减开支，尽量减少成本。

据记者了解，占员工工资大头的2008年年终奖也将从上至下缩减，即高层没有，中层一半，低层照单全发。万科管理层主动降薪，这一举措倒是颇得民心。

以往万科总会在年底对来年销售目标做出计划，但今非昔比，如今万科显得很保守。

万科内部一高层对记者表示，这次经济危机从局部到全球，从金融到宏观，范围在不断扩大，俗称百年一遇，市场已很难准确预测，只有做好最坏的打算和准备。“万科没有对2009年做出销售目标预测，只能跟着市场走，不会给自己设定一个套，没有必要也没有意义。”

万科东莞一营销经理告诉记者，现在他们压力很大，2009年市场很艰难.记者从万科内部员工了解到，万科原来预测房价见底时间在2009年底，但是现在调整为2012年。显然，万科对市场已做了最坏的预测和准备。

“从一般的经济周期来看，需要五年时间走出低谷，但日本以及其他国家的房地产泡沫经验都不能拿来做比照，因为城市化进程和经济水平不同。”房地产专家吴其轮说。

刘细辉认为，目前的房价依然徘徊在高位，在经济危机来临的情况下，收入与房价相比，实际的房价不低，就深圳来说，关内房价普遍在一万以上，楼市下行的空间还很大。

2009年的市场走向很难企稳，而房价走势主要还是看收入，政策能在短期内给市场带来回暖，楼市走势可能就同股市一样，在小幅反弹后继续下行。“但直线下行很难，多半是缓慢向下走。”刘细辉表示。

对于2009年，万科认为下好三步棋，应该足够应付市场最坏的情况。首先是从资金财务上确保公司安全;其次是在调整周期中抓住扩大市场份额的机会;三是尽可能提升专业能力。

要保证资金安全，除了缩减日常支出，少占用资金去拿地，最重要的就是通过降价来带动销售回笼资金。“具体降价幅度会达到多少，会根据市场来定。”万科东莞一销售经理说。

市场证明，王石在2007年底提出的拐点论是对的，率先降价，也让万科继续稳坐行业老大交椅。不能不承认，万科对市场的把握很准，因此万科的一言一行，一举一动，都会令外界格外敏感。

“宁可过于悲观，也不要盲目乐观。”万科高层对记者说。

在拐点论提出一年后，王石又发表“买房不必等三四年后”的言论，表示拐点是针对买不起房的人而言，有能力的人想买房现在可以入市。业内人士分析认为，除了企业管理本身需要他做出最准确的判断外，王石还是个讲政治的人，为了扩大内需，国家希望通过政策和开发商降价联合带动房地产市场回暖，王石当然会见机行事。

罗奇：美国和中国的共生关系

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　　自本世纪开始以来，没有哪两个国家比美国和中国对于推动全球经济更加重要。美国消费者一直是全球经济需求端的主力，而中国生产商向来是供应端的主力。很少有人会对其益处持有异议。在2007年中期之前的4年半里，世界GDP增长率平均值接近5%——这是自20世纪70年代初以来全球经济最强盛并且持续最久的繁荣期。

强烈推荐

 

　　但是现在，两台引擎正开始减速，适逢20世纪30年代以来最严重的危机，世界经济大势不妙。这对任何一方乃至双边关系都构成了巨大的挑战。希望仍然存在，但有一个重要的“前提条件”——中国和美国齐心协力寻找共同的解决方案。然而，如果两国陷入不和，那么它们将两败俱伤——并对饱受危机肆虐的全球其它经济体造成严重后果。赌注是巨大的。没有犯错的余地。

危机中的世界

　　没有一个国家从这场痛苦的金融危机及衰退所带来的影响中幸免。尽管美国所谓的次贷危机可能是引发这场危机的始作俑者，但是在一个全球化的世界里，每个地区现在都像锁住了脚步一样停滞不前。这也包括中国——长期以来一直是最具活力的经济体，如果没有它，世界经济早已低迷。这还包括日益以中国为中心的亚洲其它经济体，它们要么径直步入衰退，要么经济急剧放缓。十年前的那场亚洲金融危机过后，现在新的危机又迫在眉睫。亚洲远未与世界其它地区脱钩，亚洲的问题——特别是中国的问题——与这场始于美国而随后又像野火般蔓延至发达国家的危机及衰退紧密相连。

　　这些问题之所以出现，部分原因在于两个经济体均处于失衡状态。美国的过剩消费模式因长期以来的资产泡沫支柱——房产和信贷——双双破灭而陷入极大的困境。中国的出口导向型增长模式因为受到巨大的外需冲击的负面影响而陷入困境，而这样的外需冲击很可能是美国后泡沫时期消费需求紧缩的结果。亚洲其它经济体——已经紧密融入以中国为中心的供应链的出口导向型经济体——现已无处可躲。1997-1998年那场令人痛心的金融震荡过去十年之后，亚洲正面临另一场危机。

　　重要的是，这些失衡的发生并非彼此孤立。美国的消费泡沫实际上也源自同样不稳定的亚洲出口泡沫。现在，两个泡沫均已破裂——全球经济的消费端和供应端。不可避免的情况发生了：在后泡沫世界里，长期沸腾的全球失衡终于来到危机关头（见图1）。

中国：不平衡并且不稳定

　　在经济繁荣时期，中国的失衡实际上是有利于己的。2001年至2007年间，中国出口在GDP中的比重几乎翻了一番，从20％提高到36％，同时全球出口占世界GDP的比例从24％上升至31％。换言之，中国的时机选择恰到好处。正当全球贸易经历其最辉煌的增长时，中国抬高了其出口依存度。这让中国有效地从20世纪70年代初以来最旺盛的全球繁荣中获益，截至2007年的7年中，其GDP平均以10.4%的速度增长。

　　时过境迁，现在美日欧罕见的同步衰退证明，世界贸易的繁荣时期已经颓败。中国的出口直到2008年中期以前还保持高达25％的同比增幅，后来局势急转直下，年末完全是负增长，2009年1月则下降了17.5％。

　　中国经济中出口占如此大的份额，而其飞速增长态势不复，无怪乎经济活跃程度的指标也同样大幅放慢。12月的工业产出仅增加了5.7％，而此前五年的平均增长速度是16.5％，是以前水平的三分之一。当年的实际GDP增长率为6.8％，与过去三年12%的平均增速形成了鲜明对比。

　　中国的经济增长同比放缓的数据还掩盖了近期经济形势走弱的严重性。用这些数据推算下个季度的变化，即美国目前使用的算法，会发现中国GDP和工业产值增长到2008年结束的时候会持平或负增长。这种突然的减速意味着中国要实现政府制定的2009年GDP增长8%的目标是困难的，很可能最后的增速是接近6％，甚至更低。在一个危机肆虐的世界里，中国并非一片繁荣的绿洲。

　　对于一个长期注重社会稳定的国家而言，这种增长落差令人担忧。它已经对中国的就业造成了严重伤害。政府现在已经确认沿海出口制造业丧失了超过15%的工作岗位——考虑到中国有约1.2亿人的流动就业大军，这相当于2000万名工人。如果出口及GDP下滑持续下去，中国劳动力市场的不景气就会加深——加大长期以来令人担忧的劳动力方面不稳定局面的风险。我依然相信中国领导人会尽全力来避免这样的情况。但是在这场全球衰退中，至少可以这样说，挑战令人生畏。

亚洲：以中国为中心并且身处险境

　　21世纪将是亚洲的世纪，这已经是传统看法。中国奇迹般的发展故事是这一观点的中心——很多人相信，这种转变将不可避免地把全球力量的钟摆从西方拨向东方。说这种结构转变将会把世界翻个里朝外几乎一点都不夸张。亚洲梦是一个强大而又令人兴奋的故事——就像一块磁石，将世界各地的金融及人力资本都吸引过来。

　　我想，现在就开香槟酒庆祝还为时过早。亚洲世纪似乎并非像多数人想象的那样早已注定。我认为，主要原因在于这一地区仍然过于依赖出口及外需。去年，发展中的亚洲出口份额创下了47%的历史最高纪录——比20世纪90年代后期的普遍水平高出了整整10个百分点（见图4）。这根本谈不上是一个真正已经能够自立的强有力经济体。

　　与此同时，亚洲经济日益以中国为中心的特征已经明确无疑——这是该地区寻求增长的另一个维度。当中国繁荣时，亚洲其它国家也非常乐意搭顺风车。以中国为中心的供应链导致了日益紧密的泛区域融合，中国的工厂装配线也无拘无束地从日本、韩国、马来西亚、新加坡、印度尼西亚以及亚洲区其它地方引入投资及零部件。然而，这种依赖性也是双刃剑——这种双向因果关系使亚洲世纪的现状变得更加复杂。如上所述，中国繁荣的本身与全球贸易创纪录式的增长息息相关。但是现在，随着全球贸易经历1982年以来的首次收缩，中国的出口导向型驱动力也随之下降。

　　这极大地冲击了以中国为中心的亚洲。对于该地区其它主要经济体而言，2008年12月份的出口对比数据简直糟透了：例如，中国台湾的出口年同比下降42%，跌幅令人咋舌，其中对大陆出口下滑56%；日本出口下降35%，其中对华出口下滑35%；韩国出口下降17%，对华出口亦下滑35%。近年来，中国大陆已经成为上述三个国家（地区）最大的贸易伙伴，分别占中国台湾、韩国和日本出口的28％、23％和16％。但是，既然中国的出口机器已经在急刹车中停顿，那么亚洲其它经济体的萎靡状况就会更加严重。这正好让亚洲套上一句老话：中国打喷嚏，亚洲重感冒。

　　我坚信亚洲世纪必将到来。但是问题在于可能要比我们希望的晚很多。亚洲世纪最大的考验在于——该地区在面对任何外部冲击时的自力更生能力。20世纪90年代末的时候是一场外部融资冲击。现在则是一场外部需求冲击。这些情况应该让亚洲意识到其担任起领导地位的议程任重而道远。在出口导向型增长模式让位于来自个人消费增长模式的更多支持之前，亚洲世纪的梦想很可能止步于此。

美国：泡沫丰富而又对外依赖

　　这场全球危机始于美国，这一点几乎毫无疑问。美国经济面临空前的深度衰退，这多半是后泡沫时期大浪淘沙的自然结果。它始于房地产，而今却已经蔓延至最大的行业——美国消费行业。在2007年初的鼎盛时期，美国消费足足占实际GDP的72%——创下了美国的历史纪录，就此而论，这对于世界现代史上任何一个主要经济体而言都是一个纪录。

　　这种消费热的问题在于它并非是由美国经济潜在的创收能力支撑起来的。在现已结束的扩张中，私有部门劳动报酬增长步伐的缓慢程度非同一般——比此前四个商业周期的轨迹下挫了（按实际值计算）8000亿美元。低于平均值的就业增长加上实际工资水平的相对停滞让消费者远远缺乏赖以支撑旺盛消费的劳动收入。但是这并没有阻止美国消费者继续消费。通过从资产升值中肆无忌惮地提现——先是证券，然后是住房——消费者发现了新的购买力来源。而信贷泡沫更助长了这种购买力——让房主能够以很低的成本从空前高涨的房屋价值中抽取资本，然后利用这些收益支撑当前的消费，并为将来增加存款。2000年，净房产抵押提取现金量占可支配个人收入的3%，2006年则飙升至近9%。如此依赖泡沫的消费与储蓄策略会导致严重后果。值得注意的是，当得以支持消费的来源从收入转向资产，美国的国内储蓄率便被逼至最低点。国民净储蓄率——剔除贬值因素后的家庭、商业及政府储蓄额——在2002年至2007年期间，降至占国民收入1.8%的历史低谷，而2008年实则跌到了负值区域。这种发展趋势对全球造成的后果非常深远：由于缺少国内储蓄，美国被迫从国外引进额外的存款以支撑经济增长——为了吸引资本使得经常账户赤字变得巨大。

　　对于泡沫丰富的美国经济，储蓄不足是经济脆弱的一个主要根源。在年景好的时候，它让美国愈加依赖像中国这样的债权国为其经济增长提供资金。年景差的时候——特别是在房产及信贷泡沫破裂之后——它触发了依赖资产的美国消费行业的大幅调整。2008年最后两个季度，实际消费开支以3.6%的平均年率下降——这是二战后消费需求首次连续两个季度跌幅超过3%。

　　尽管2008年底美国消费出现前所未有的萎缩，但是仍有理由相信美国消费调整空间还很大。消费占美国GDP的比重较72%的峰值仅下滑了一个百分点——仍然比泡沫前1975年至2000年67%的普遍标准值高出整整四个百分点。在这一基础上，消费均值回归仅完成了约20%。尽管美国当局近期制定了非同寻常的货币及财政刺激措施，后泡沫时期美国消费的去杠杆化历程仍将是美国未来3至5年内宏观经济状况的主要特征。

　　其本质是大规模并且持久的全球需求冲击。美国消费者是全世界最大的消费群体（见图9）。长久以来，美国的消费增长一直远远超过其它发达国家迟缓的消费增长。泡沫后美国消费行业的调整破坏了中国及亚洲其它依赖出口的国家的外需支柱，这一点不足为奇。同时，这也不太可能很快结束。美国消费增长持续低迷所带来的多年阻力可能是未来几年塑造全球经济需求状况的最强大的力量。

与日俱增的双边紧张局势

　　当前的全球危机给美中关系构成了新的挑战——这可能是21世纪全世界最重要的双边关系。近期在美国新任财长盖特纳的参议院任命听证会上，这些挑战便已经有所展现，当时他指责中国操纵货币。此外，随着美国进入衰退，失业率高企，有充分理由担心日后还会有更多针对中国的责难，而盖特纳的评论只是一个值得引人深省的信号。

　　这是华盛顿长期盛行的相互推诿心理的一种不幸的结果。在艰难时期，美国政客们显然需要替罪羊来把注意力从制造了大麻烦的自己身上移开。华尔街被选为制造出这场金融危机的罪魁祸首——尽管监管者及央行有同谋之嫌——而与美国有着巨大的双边贸易赤字的中国正因为美国工人承受的压力而受到指责。

　　华盛顿对华贸易政策措辞严厉的“逻辑”主要基于三个因素——2007年创纪录的2560亿美元的巨额双边贸易赤字，长期以来对人民币货币操纵的指责，以及美国中产阶级工人实际工资的长期缓慢增长。搞定中国问题，争吵自然消失，而美国工人面临的不公平的压力也会随之缓解。

　　美国的问题是多边贸易失衡——而非因中国的不公平竞争引发的双边问题。

　　这个论调漏洞百出。主要原因在于，美中贸易赤字并非毫无来由。如上所述，泡沫丰富而储蓄短缺的美国经济需要从国外引入额外储蓄来保持增长。这同时意味着它必须维持巨额的经常账户赤字及贸易赤字以吸引资金。美中之间的贸易赤字以及美国与其100个贸易伙伴的贸易赤字，实际上都出自这同一个问题。美国的问题是多边贸易失衡——而非因中国的不公平竞争引发的双边问题。美国的多边贸易赤字中，对华贸易赤字是最大的一块——这并非由于其货币价值，而主要原因是美国跨国公司有意识的外包决策。

　　所谓的人民币币值被低估的证据也不像众多美国专家所认为的那样确凿。自从三年多之前中国放弃单一货币挂钩以来，人民币对美元（按实值计算）升值接近21%。此外，近期的学术研究认为人民币多边低估程度大约仅为10%——对中国而言算不上是什么重大优势（参见Yin-Wong Cheung、Menzie D. Chinn和Eiji Fujii撰写的美国国家经济研究局2009年1月的一份工作报告“中国的经常账户及汇率”）。重要的是，上述研究人员进一步证明中国的双边及多边贸易流量并不像人民币打压派所想的那样对货币波动非常敏感。

　　尽管如此，即便美中贸易通过强迫人民币重估、关税或其它方式而下降或终止，储蓄短缺的美国经济也仍将需要维持巨大的多边贸易赤字。那意味着它要把外部失衡中的中国所占的份额转嫁至另一个贸易伙伴头上。如果转嫁至一个生产成本更高的国家——很可能会是这种情况——那么对于已经陷入困境的美国中产阶级而言，其结果相当于增加他们的税赋。但还不止如此。毫无疑问，中国的货币管理者将会以降低美元资产的购买量作为回敬。所有这些都将会让全球两大力量更进一步滑向贸易保护主义。

　　如何避免这样的后果——与20世纪30年代美国臭名昭著的《斯穆特-霍利关税法》引发的贸易战有着惊人的相似——是摆在两国政府面前的重大挑战。对美国新任总统尤其如此。力争为不堪重负的美国中产阶级工人建立支持平台的奥巴马强调了他对于全球化时代实际工资滞胀的担忧。实际工资问题是一个严重的问题。然而，华盛顿面临的挑战是确定这个问题和贸易政策的联系。实际工资停滞极有可能与美国对人力资本投资不足的关联性更大——特别是，在IT主导的全球化时代，滞后的教育改革及技能再培训项目——而与跨境贸易压力的相关度更低。贸易赤字也有可能主要是不鼓励储蓄的错误政策的后果——在预算赤字高达万亿美元的时刻，问题正变得越来越糟。如何在不脱离全球化轨道的条件下摆脱这种进退两难的困境，对于奥巴马总统的领导能力是个迫在眉睫而重要的考验。

不要指望共生

　　在经济学上，长期以来存在于美国这个低储蓄的消费国以及中国这个高储蓄的生产国之间的自然共生现象已经非常明显。但是不能把这种互补想当然的认作是一种能够永远增进关系纽带的相互依赖现象。

　　实际上，美中共生只不过是一种暂时的关系——它反映出了双方利益的契合，但这种契合只能维持一段相对较短的时间。诚然，只要储蓄短缺的美国经济继续维持巨额的经常账户赤字以支撑过剩的个人消费，它就需要一个像中国这样的债权国为其提供国外资本。同时，只要储蓄过剩的中国经济需要通过出口导向型的就业增长来维持社会稳定，那么它就需要世界最大的消费国来吸收其产出。

　　共生状态被不均衡状态取代的可能性越来越大——为美中关系的紧张局势提供了新的缘由。

　　但是，如果这些条件变了，会发生什么？如果美国开始增加储蓄——对于过度消费的后泡沫时期的消费者而言，这种可能性非常大——那么要从中国借入储蓄盈余的需求就会消失。反之，如果中国开始增加支出——鉴于其对出口及投资的过度依赖，这种可能性同样也非常大——那么它借给美国的额外储蓄也会减少。如果这两方面的调整恰好精确地发生在同一时刻，那么一种不间断的共生状态就有可能发生。但是我认为，两大经济体的这种巧妙的同步再平衡的可能性非常非常低。这说明，共生状态被不均衡状态取代的可能性越来越大——为美中关系的紧张局势提供了新的缘由。

　　不幸的是，这并非中美经济紧张局势的唯一缘由。2005年至2007年期间，足足45条反华贸易法规被提交到美国国会。尽管当时没有一条获得批准，但现在却存在变数。随着经济衰退，美国失业率不断攀升，引发贸易摩擦的政见很可能会获得更多的支持。就此而论，财长盖特纳警告中国货币操纵的言论着实令人担忧。美国新近制定的经济刺激方案中纳入的“买美国货”条款也是如此。

　　同时，中国必须更加注意出口导向型增长模式对其贸易伙伴的影响。随着中国在世界贸易中的地位与日俱增，任何补助——不论是国内工资补助还是货币补助——都将是举足轻重的。作为当今世界第二大出口国，中国不能对肩负的责任掉以轻心。此外，如果中国忽视环境恶化及污染，那么世界将为跨境劳动套利付出更大的代价，这代价远比单纯的工资比较所蕴含的意味要深刻。若是说低成本的外包忽略了环保考虑，这在相对“绿化”的经济体中对实际工资形成的挤压可能更加严重。

　　对失衡的全球经济而言，解决美中经济关系的复杂问题是一项紧迫的挑战。当饱受危机肆虐的世界步入严重衰退，赌注会变得越来越大。随着美国及中国经济的演变及变化，转瞬即逝的共生状态很可能为高度紧张的局势所替代。缓解紧张的时机只在今朝——赶在为时过晚之前。

中国经济平衡的迫切性

　　饶有讽刺意味的是，中国早就看到了这些问题。两年前，温家宝总理警告说，对中国经济“不稳定、不平衡、不协调和不可持续”深表担忧。2006年颁布的“十一五规划”也提出了这些问题，强调中国经济必须开始一个重大的结构性转变，从出口主导型经济转向消费驱动的增长。

　　但是，政府缺乏相应的执行措施。特别是未能建立制度化的社保体系，从而扫除预防性储蓄的担忧、建立更有活力的消费文化提供系统支持。结果，消费在GDP中所占的份额2007年下降到创纪录的36％，体现了中国宏观失衡的弊端，这个问题在全球性危机中更加麻烦（见图10）。外部需求遭受严重冲击后，中国经济不平衡问题凸显，而中国还没有一个后备计划。

　　鼓励消费来平衡经济的办法是中国唯一可持续的出路。积极的财政刺激措施，如最近推出的4万亿元基础设施为主的投资计划会暂时有效。这种措施借鉴了20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机以及2000年至2001年全球轻度衰退期间中国所采取的反周期方案。但是随着美国消费者开始一场历时多年的消费缩减，这些行动并不足以弥补中国依赖外需的增长模式所面临的结构性漏洞。

　　中国需要大胆积极制定有利于消费的政策。它应该首先宣布社保系统的重大举措。具体来说，中国应大幅扩大全国社会保障基金的资金，目前该基金只管理着700多亿美元的资产，还不足以为老龄化的中国人口提供人均100美元的退休资金。中国也需要迅速采取行动启动一个私人养老金计划，以扩大全国范围的健康和失业保险范围。最近通过的一项8,500亿元人民币为期三年的医疗改革计划，是朝这个方向迈出的令人鼓舞的一步。

　　鼓励消费来平衡经济的办法是中国唯一可持续的出路。

　　对中国而言，最根本的是：其失衡的经济必须经历再平衡。服务了中国经济30年的出口驱动型增长模式现在必须让位于内部驱动的消费导向型经济增长模式。对中国而言，再平衡的要求从未如此迫切。对于亚洲其它经济体而言——更不用说已经失衡的全球经济了——中国在后泡沫时期的经济领导角色很大程度上取决于这个重大的再平衡历程。

政策风险

　　无须赘言，衰退的经济体往往不会欣然接受让本国货币升值的建议。对于出口导向型的中国而言尤其如此，2008年末，其环比增长的放缓程度实际上已经接近停滞。2009年初的整体经济增长依然低迷，目前远低于6%-8%这一中国借以消化多余劳动力并维持社会稳定的区间，而强化经济周期效应的紧缩货币政策只会增加经济下行风险。

　　美国财长盖特纳近期的货币操纵言论会受到北京的质疑，这一点已经不足为奇。尽管那样尖锐的言辞并不意味着会有实际行动，但是如果口舌之争直接演变成贸易制裁，那么会产生何种后果仍然值得考虑。金融市场会即刻感受到其影响。由于美国依赖中国的资金填补其对外赤字——在数万亿美元预算赤字的时代，这种依赖性有增无减——美国没有资格冒险让中国减少购入美元资产。然而，如果骄傲而受伤的中国对华盛顿因货币纷争引起的贸易制裁采取报复，那么上述情况就极有可能发生。

　　此类报复的可能形式是中国不出席将来的美国国库券拍卖。美国每个工作日需要30亿美元的资本流入方能为其经常账户赤字提供资金，对美国而言，中国的上述反应绝不是一件小事。如果中国不给美国提供外部资金，美元可能会贬值，而实际长期利率将会上调。美元危机是陷入衰退中的美国最不想要的。但如果美国把言辞变为行动，对中国施加贸易制裁，那么上述情况就有可能发生。简言之，华盛顿把美国的危机归咎于中国货币，这简直是如履薄冰。泡沫后的美国经济正经历内需萎缩，而靠责备中国是于事无补的。在当前的环境下，针锋相对不仅是个糟糕的建议，而且还很危险。

　　同样需要强调一下值得中国警惕的方面。首要一点，中国的决策者绝不能过于乐观地指望外部需求模型会再次奏效。耗时多年的美国消费低迷无异于一场全球消费冲击，将长期拖累任何一个出口导向型的经济体。因此，中国再平衡的需求从未如此迫切。中国必须把过度依赖出口的增长模型转向内需推动的增长模型，这种需求正日渐紧迫。

　　中国也不应该尝试使用货币杠杆或其他补贴来促进出口。在失业率日增且发达国家对全球化带来的利益日渐担忧的时期，这种努力可能为反华贸易制裁提供口实。正如前文所述，这些行动也可能促使中国重新考虑其作为美国最重要的海外债权国的角色。若是这样，美国就会发现20世纪30年代的一幕会重新上演。

警钟

　　长期以来，对于中文词汇中的危机一词的英文翻译一直存有争议。一种较为流行的观点是“危机”可以理解为危险和机遇共存。不幸的是，这层意思——不管是否正确——对于陷入危机的世界而言已经消失了。今天，危机和衰退中的世界需要比以往任何时候都更加团结——而不是拆散自己。通过贸易和资本流动实现的全球化及其跨境关联让我们别无选择。

　　在如今的这个环境中，推诿指责完全会产生相反结果。那些把美国难以为继的消费狂热归咎于像中国一样有储蓄盈余的经济体的人应该感到难堪。这是美国问题，也是一个应该在美国国内通过新的约束性货币政策、严厉的监管监督以及更负责任的消费者和公司行为来解决的问题。对于一个数十年以来都入不敷出而又依赖泡沫的经济体而言，现在它必须接受应该量入为出的现实——同时也不应将这种痛苦但却必要的调整归咎于他人。

　　美国需要增加储蓄并降低消费，而中国则需要降低储蓄并增加消费。

　　同样，中国需要承认出口导向型增长方式总是有极限的。全球发达经济体的同步衰退是我们闻所未闻的，由此引发的空前的外需震荡已经把这个问题暴露无遗。经济发展并非只为别人生产——特别是当那些“别人”都入不敷出的时候。最终，出口导向型增长必然会被国内消费者的内部需求所取代。中国已经做好了这种转型的准备，而且必须尽快开始这一过程。

　　简言之，现在正是失衡的世界开始挑起全球再平衡重担的时候。通过勾勒出以美国和中国为背景的这种调整，结论也就很明确了：美国需要增加储蓄并降低消费，而中国则需要降低储蓄并增加消费。

　　说起来容易做起来难。但是陷入危机的世界已经无力再延续一种不稳定的现状。全球再平衡并非一针速效剂——因此对目光短浅的政客们来说，它并不那么有吸引力。但最终，这却是能够让世界重新回到可持续增长轨道的唯一途径。如果这场危机还存有一线希望，那它一定存在于给这个失衡世界上的政客和决策者们发出的一记警钟之内。

　　注:本文由罗奇先生于2009年2月17日在华盛顿特区召开的有关“中国在全球衰退的起源及应对中的角色”的听证会上向美国国会下属美中经济与安全审查委员会呈交。

FEB-17-2009王石:反弹并不代表反转,房地产调整远未结束

昨天(17日),万科董事会主席王石在南京与媒体交流时表示,去年12月以来的楼市有所反弹,成交量有所放大,这仅仅是房产刚性需求的释放,“反弹并不代表反转,房地产调整远未结束。”

　　这表明王石仍在坚持他的观点。作为国内房地产行业的领军人物,王石于2007岁末抛出了“拐点论”,称高房价不可维持,房价必将理性回归。“拐点论”一出即激起论战巨浪,万科被指“唱衰中国楼市有阴谋”,但事实上却在行业发展中有所验证。业内人士认为,楼市在2008年所经历的“行业景气回落、企业库存高企和市场价跌量缩”等困境并没有改观,全国房价2009年可能酝酿新一轮下跌。

昨天陪同王石的是万科南京公司新任总经理朱保全。王石在南京重申,从2006年开始,万科已经看到两个指标出现了问题,一个是房地产价格的上涨和家庭收入上升的差距越来越大,已经到了一个剪刀差的比例。还有一个是前期资金进入过多,房地产库存环比增加,这说明销售不理想,去库存化是个漫长而痛苦的过程。这两个指标越来越高,市场就一定会发生变化。

　　“具体到不同地区,调整程度也不同。”王石说,珠三角地区前期调整幅度过大,今年的调整会趋于缓和;北京与长三角调整的大幕才刚刚拉开;而中西部和东北地区的调整幅度不大。他还说,“金融危机对中国实体经济的影响才开始。”

　　对于万科今年的战略,王石表示“将采取适度扩张的战略,专心致志做城市住宅,成为住宅专业提供商,成为上市公司中的地产蓝筹,成为受人尊敬的企业。

5-10 trillion needed for bailout (KENICHI OHMAE)

What is needed to make the U.S. financial bailout plan a success

By KENICHI OHMAE

Special to The Japan Times

The refusal of the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the $700 billion bailout plan Monday may turn out to have been appropriate if the Congress correctly understands the priorities at hand. The issue is not whether the situation should be left to the market or whether the government should save those who lose their house due to foreclosure. The main challenge at this moment is to provide liquidity to the market, particularly to failing financial institutions.

From the experience of Japan throughout the 1990s, and also from the experience of Nordic countries, it is clear that the U.S. financial crisis is also going through a sequence of events — almost physical and also psychological — that are very similar to what happened elsewhere in the world.

The problem is that the U.S. leadership does not seem to understand exactly what happened and what lessons to reflect on, as is clear in the impulsive and almost heroic actions that they have exhibited over the last three months.

Now that the Paulson bailout plan is temporarily suspended, it may not be too late to state what I have been talking and writing about in Japan with regard to the problems of the U.S. approach to resolving its financial crisis and a possible solution to the imminent threats of meltdown of global banking systems.

There are three principles that must be observed in resolving a major financial crisis: (1) treat it as a systemic failure and do not act on individual situations; (2) know the sequence of events, so the right problem can be solved at the right time; and (3) construct a universal system later to prevent similar problems from occurring again. The U.S. government seems to be violating every one of these principles and mixing the sequence of events, hence aggravating an already dire situation.

What the U.S. needs to do under this scenario is to get help from the rest of the world in setting up a gigantic credit line, on the order of $5 trillion, to provide the necessary liquidity that will allow troubled financial institutions to come in and work on their assets and liabilities without fear of punishment and catastrophic failure.

This is similar to the "Emergency Room" that the Swedes set up in the early 1990s during their financial crisis. But the credit line should be far, far greater this time to eliminate any doubt that the liquidity will run out.

In setting up this facility, two principles should be observed. One is that the U.S. government should not be asked to print more money. It has already printed too much. One problem with Paulson's approach is that he is trying to solve all the problems with internal resources. The U.S., even before the $700 billion bailout package, had issued a lot of promissory notes that will in effect dilute the value of the dollar, a scenario that sparks fears worldwide. The second principle is that the facility should be big enough to eliminate any doubt that the money might run out.

During the Korean crisis of 1997-1998, the International Monetary Fund came in to replace the over-extended American banks. This time there is no trace of the IMF on the horizon, other than its occasional forecast of what the bad debts would be (currently at $1.3 trillion, but escalating over time).

From the U.S. perspective the IMF is too European. Maybe, but if the IMF does not work, this would be a good time to call for the establishment of a global pumping station, a place where financial institutions could come to receive an unlimited supply of liquidity transfusion until they have worked out their problems.

I stated that this facility should have at least $5 trillion because it should be large enough so people do not think it is a shallow oasis. It would seem that $5 trillion is an enormous number and unfounded. But we know that the Japanese poured in $3 trillion either in the shape of public funds or foregone interest to help their banks survive.

My personal calculation at the beginning of Japan's property bubble bursting was on the order of $2 trillion, while the government was admitting only $130 billion in bad assets in 1994. Former Bank of Japan Gov. Toshihiko Fukui admitted 15 years later that the burden of the bailout on the public was actually $3 trillion. So, while I am not in a position to calculate the right size of the liquidity facility for the U.S., any number smaller than the amount that the Japanese required would be a source of trouble. It has to be on the order of $5 trillion to $10 trillion.

The only way to get this kind of money assembled is for the U.S. to ask for donations of mercy, not only from its taxpayers but also from those who have piled up dollar-denominated instruments around the world — who will be hurt if the value of the dollar or U.S. government securities falls.

For example, China has piled up $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves through its trade surplus, which is mostly in dollars. Japan can contribute $1 trillion, which it does not need returned in a hurry. Taiwan and Russia could come up with $500 billion each, and the oil-rich Gulf states certainly could support Uncle Sam easily with $2 trillion. We can ask the European Union to contribute collectively something like $2 trillion if we make the facility available to their financial institutions. That totals $7.5 trillion, and if the U.S. adds $2 trillion to the pool it brings it close to the maximum I am talking about $10 trillion.

We are not going to lose this money. It is money on which we can even expect to earn 3 percent interest. After this liquidity facility is dissolved in three to five years time, when good banks are healthy again, donor countries can expect to receive back the amount they loaned.

For this to happen, the Bush administration will have to rethink its diplomatic relationship with quite a few countries. U.S. foreign policy has been built upon the fight against terrorism. Now Washington has to repair its relationships with some countries to gain their cooperation in the fight against financial terrorism, which Wall Street has triggered and spread around the world.

Judging by the experience of Japan, the major financial crisis will go through three phases, each requiring a different measure.

The U.S. is now experiencing the first phase, which mainly comes from the liquidity crisis. The Federal Reserve Bank has provided a credit line close to $1.4 trillion and major institutions are now at the mercy of this facility. Japan lost Yamaichi and Sanyo Securities in the first phase of crisis because they could not pull money from interbank facilities.

The second phase of the crisis comes mainly from working out the bad assets. In this phase the write-offs far exceed the equity, and financial institutions cannot raise fresh capital from the market because their share price has fallen to a meaningless level. The Long-term Credit Bank, Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank all failed due to write-offs on loans to failing or failed companies. At this stage, it is important for the government to inject fresh capital to let the banks revive and return to normal operation.

In doing so, the government could end up owning a bank directly or through debt-equity swap. Paulson's rescue plan is appropriate for this phase as its main purpose is to buy bad assets. But I think it could be implemented much later in the game as the more urgent need is for the banks to survive without the fear of being in a "wolf pack."

The reason for this is that we are faced with a systemic problem, not a collection of individual banks. The nature of the problem at hand is a lack of liquidity. In group theory this syndrome is known as "wolf pack." While the wolves are good at attacking the victim as a team, they have a tendency to attack the weakest of the cohort should extreme hunger prevail. The banking crisis resembles this metaphor, continuing until a few mega-banks are left.

The third phase is characterized by the massive failures of operating companies. This is because the financial institutions that have survived are under severe government scrutiny and they cannot easily extend loans to businesses, their traditional customers.

This creates a problem for companies, which have traditionally relied on bank loans for their operations. All of a sudden, a banker comes to the company and says, "Sorry, we need to close the credit line and you need to return the money to us as you are no longer bankable" (a new word they will invent to pull the money from otherwise a good company).

Japan has lost hundreds of companies, such as Daiei, its largest retailer, in phase three.

We know Japan could have come out of its mess much sooner had the government proactively, not reactively and unwillingly, faced the issues straight on. I am not sure if the Americans are addressing the right issues with the right priorities and sequence, and how long it will take to get back to "business as usual." It has taken Japan 15 years, and luckily, it is OK now as it has no further room to go down.

If you recognize that the three phases are like the law of physics (indeed it seems to me that what I have described is a general theorem of major financial catastrophe), then we should expect that the U.S. package should not be hastily worked out, but rather devised utilizing the wisdom of the rest of the world.

 

Asia's next crisis: 'Made in China'

Rapid evolution of Chinese economy threatens regional status quo

By KENICHI OHMAE 2001

Two seemingly separate events occurred this month: Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 summer Olympic games, and stock prices and currency rates in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong hit their lowest weekly marks since the 1997 Asian crisis.

Together, this says a great deal about the future of Asia -- and the immense challenges that the rest of the world faces from China.

Policymakers and industrialists will be paying a great deal more attention to China in the near future, but not because of human rights, the militarism of the central Communist government, or the opening of Chinese markets. The Chinese production economy is about to explode with accelerating vitality, and the rest of the world is unprepared for it.

I saw the implications of this recently on a visit to a 3-year-old manufacturing plant in the Pearl River Delta, one of the fastest-growing regions in China. This plant had 50,000 workers -- all young women, and none wearing eyeglasses.

"Don't you have any employees with bad eyesight?" I asked the manager.

He replied: "We fire them when their eyes go bad. They can find another job -- that's not my problem. There are plenty of people who want to work for us."

From the perspective of industrialized nations, practices like this are brutally cruel and would not exist in any other nation of China's stature due to labor laws. But in Shengzhen, Shanghai, Suzhou, Dalian and many more Chinese cities, where hundreds of millions of people eagerly flock to urban jobs from the hinterlands, such practices are taken for granted.

A situation with precedent

To find a comparable precedent, you would have to go back 40 years, to Japan's postwar economic surge. There are also echoes of Dickensian England -- the dawn of the industrial revolution -- or the "robber baron" era in America, when labor was inexpressibly cheap and technology was new.

One advertisement for a factory in Dalian, offering the equivalent of $ 100 per month, drew 2,000 girls from nearby farmlands. They literally surrounded the plant, seeking interviews.

Those who are hired work round the clock and live in company dormitories. They often study electronic circuitry or other high-tech skills on their lunch hours. Those laid off (for nearsightedness or other reasons), generally don't return to the peasant life; they become urban entrepreneurs in the burgeoning freelance and service businesses of China's new cities.

By itself, China's glut of low-wage and highly educable workers gives that country a remarkable competitive advantage. But there are three other engines fueling China's economic juggernaut as well.

One system, 10 nations

First, there is the political structure. In the last few years, because of a concerted policy of economic deregulation, the People's Republic has matured from "one nation, two systems" -- an empire with communist and capitalist components -- into "one system, 10 nations" -- a commonwealth of semiautonomous, self-governing economic regions. Some of these regions, such as Shengzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, Shenyang, Quindao and Suzhou, are already growing much faster than any the "Asian Tigers," such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea.

The average population of these "region states" is 5-7 million. Although China is nominally Communist, businesses in these regions have far fewer regulations to deal with than their counterparts in Japan, France or Sweden. By comparison, China is a capitalist's paradise, so long as you remain within these regions and do not deal with the central government in Beijing.

Burning hunger to win

Second, Chinese industrialists are eager to learn and uninhibited by complacency.

I was a close adviser to several Japanese companies that cracked the U.S. market in the 1970s and 1980s. I vividly remember their executives confronting that formidable challenge by saying, "How can we do this?"

Today, their successors tend to enumerate all the reasons they can't act, and blame the economy and government for their troubles.

But Chinese companies have picked up where the Japanese left off. They are developing innovative, low-cost export businesses in apparels, vitamin supplements, foods (including shiitake mushrooms and vegetables popular in Japan), watches, consumer electronics and appliances, plywood, footwear, and precision electronic and mechanical components.

In the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas, there are more than 50,000 electronic component suppliers sophisticated enough to deliver their wares "just in time" to the local Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturers.

In Japan, apparel companies like Fast Retailing (known for the Uniqlo brand) have taken advantage of large-scale production in China and halved consumer prices of high-quality clothing. In the otherwise very depressed Japanese market, Uniqlo has been doubling its sales for three consecutive years, with an awesome operating margin of 25 percent. The direct approach, in which Japanese-designed products mass-produced in China are sold in company-owned stores, is now being called "Uniqloization."

Many companies are following suit in such industries as glasses and stationery.

In short, China is rapidly supplanting industries that took other Asian countries 15 years or more to build.

Currency system strong

The third and most influential factor behind the scenes has been the stability of China's currency. This represents either an accident of history or a supreme example of cunning foresight.

In 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China, the United Kingdom agreed to leave about $ 38 billion of reserve capital in the territory -- but only if the Chinese promised to keep the currency intact. It was stipulated that for every new Hong Kong dollar that its three central banks minted, they would hold in reserve the equivalent of about 13 U.S. cents -- a very high amount.

The Chinese not only accepted this, but pegged their mainland currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the Hong Kong dollar as well. They also prohibited exchange of renminbi outside of China, limiting speculators to the H.K. dollar. In effect, by embracing a restriction against minting money to relieve economic pain, China has made itself immune from the currency fluctuations that have bedeviled Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. As a dollar-based economy, China enjoys the same protection against inflation the United States does.

The world has never seen an economy with these qualities before. And because it is so new, the effects are just now being felt.

Already, China is doing to the rest of the Asian economy what Japan did to the West 20 years ago. The currencies of and the stock prices in Korea, Thailand and Malaysia have declined precipitously since 2000. Some countries, like Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, are being hit much harder by this new competition than they were by the economic crises in 1997.

Time to wake up

What should politicians and industrialists outside China make out of all this?

We must shake ourselves out of complacency.

For decades, economists and investors have waited for China to wake up, fearing its overwhelming population but lusting after its enormous market. Finally, the awakening has begun, and it will expand much more quickly than most of us expect. If Hong Kong's trading volume is added to the export and import volumes of China, it becomes the third largest trading nation in the world, trailing the U.S. and Germany but surpassing Japan.

There is reason to believe that China's central government will rapidly evolve into a "United States of Chunghua," with most economic decisions made at the regional or provincial level. Chunghua, which translates into English as "China," actually means "the prosperous center of the universe."

China's regional autonomy is far stronger than Japan's and Germany's. Chinese states compete against each other for foreign investment and markets. In a strange way, the federal governance structure of China is the closest, among all large nations, to that of the United States.

This regional competition will further accelerate China's economic expansion far beyond anything we have seen in Asia to date. Americans (and others) will be forced to trade with China, as consumers will demand China's inexpensive products and producers will require inexpensive components. Like the U.S. in first half of the 20th century, and Japan in the second half, Chinese industries will overcome protectionist efforts to resist. Other nations will be challenged to match China's unfair advantages with innovation and other forms of competitiveness.

And it won't be easy. Each time a Chinese industry has competed directly with a foreign industry, China has won.

That doesn't mean that China should get blanket political approval from the West. On the contrary, it has never been so dangerous.

Wither democracy?

China is not a democracy, and the human rights and totalitarian abuses of the Chinese government will continue. But they will occur in the context of one of the most highly capitalist societies on the planet.

This, in itself, will test many prevailing assumptions about economic development.

For example, Western nations have traditionally preached that democracy is a prerequisite for economic prosperity. But Democracy at this stage of China would lead the majority of its population to demand greater distribution of wealth, as they have in India. But there are still 900 million farmers in China with an average annual income of $ 500. Distribution of wealth would lead, as it has in India, to the distribution of poverty. So it will be a long time before China adopts democracy and the central government gives up its unchallenged power.

Constructing a new view

American politicians and businesspeople seem to oscillate between viewing China as a James Bond villain and a market to be exploited. Both of these views are now obsolete. Many of China's consumers, for instance, will be cunningly reserved for its own domestic industries.

China is a fierce new economic competitor, perhaps the fiercest since the U.S. itself came on the scene at the turn of the last century.

In the short run, China's emergence is triggering a second Asian economic crisis more severe than the first. But unlike the currency speculators who triggered the 1997 crisis, China won't go away.

In the long run, the ability of a company to thrive in this new world will depend on how well it can figure out how to "internalize" China's advantage to increase its own competitiveness.

Unlike what the newspaper headlines indicate, competition is not a fight between China and the U.S. or Japan, but a race in each market in which the victor will be the company that best internalizes China's competitiveness to beat its domestic competitors. The rest of us will have to temper our opposition to China with the fact that, as consumers, we will never have had it so good. People around the world will soon come to depend on the quality and price of goods that China can provide better than any other nation. When we finally meet the enemy, over in Beijing, we will find out it is us.

Kenichi Ohmae is managing director of Ohmae & Associates and author of "The Invisible Continent -- Four Strategic Imperatives of the New Economy (Harper Collins)."