Buffet on Wells Fargo, APR 2009

SAN FRANCISCO (Fortune) -- As the largest shareholder of Wells Fargo through Berkshire Hathaway (BRKB), Warren Buffett knows the San Francisco bank deeply. He first invested before Wells Fargo was bought by Norwest, where current Wells Chairman Dick Kovacevich was CEO. As part of his reporting for his feature on Wells Fargo (WFC, Fortune 500), Fortune Editor at Large Adam Lashinsky spoke at length with Buffett by telephone on March 26.

Fortune: How is Wells Fargo unique?

Warren Buffett: It's sort of hard to imagine a business that large being unique. You'd think they'd need to be like any other bank by the time they got to that size. Those guys have gone their own way. That doesn't mean that everything they've done has been right. But they've never felt compelled to do anything because other banks were doing it, and that's how banks get in trouble, when they say, "Everybody else is doing it, why shouldn't I?"

What about all the smart analysts who think no big bank can survive in its present form, including Wells Fargo?

Almost 20 years ago they were saying the same thing. In the end banking is a very good business unless you do dumb things. You get your money extraordinarily cheap and you don't have to do dumb things. But periodically banks do it, and they do it as a flock, like international loans in the 80s. You don't have to be a rocket scientist when your raw material cost is less than 1-1/2%. So I know that you can have a model that works fine and Wells has come closer to doing that right than any other big bank by some margin. They get their money cheaper than anybody else. We're the low-cost producer at Geico in auto insurance among big companies. And when you're the low-cost producer - whether it's copper, or in banking - it's huge.

Then on top of that, they're smart on the asset size. They stayed out of most of the big trouble areas. Now, even if you're getting 20% down payments on houses, if the other guy did enough dumb things, the house prices can fall to where you get hurt some. But they were not out there doing option ARMs and all these crazy things. They're going to have plenty of credit losses. But they will have, after a couple of quarters of getting Wachovia the way want it, $40 billion of pre-provision income.

And they do not have all kinds of time bombs around. Wells will lose some money. There's no question about that. And they'll lose more than the normal amount of money. Now, if they were getting their money at a percentage point higher, that would be $10 billion of difference there. But they've got the secret to both growth, low-cost deposits and a lot of ancillary income coming in from their customer base.

Insurance revenues for example, which had double-digit revenue growth in 2008.

And I would say that most of the critics of Wells don't even know they've got that business. That business alone is worth many billions of dollars. And their mortgage business, as you can imagine in this period, I mean, the volume that is poring through there, is huge. The critics have been right on other big banks, so I think they're inclined to sweep Wells in as well to some extent. And if you've been right on Citi and you've been right on BofA, it gets easy to say, well, they're all going to go.

We own stock in four banks: USB, Wells, M&T, and SunTrust. SunTrust I don't know about because South Florida is going to be the last to come back, and they've got a concentration down there. The other three, they're going to have a lousy year, but they'll come out of it with far more earnings power. The deposits are flowing in. The spreads are wide. It's a helluva good business.

Dick Kovacevich specifically told me to ask you your views on tangible common equity.

What I pay attention to is earning power. Coca-Cola has no tangible common equity. But they've got huge earning power. And Wells ... you can't take away Wells' customer base. It grows quarter by quarter. And what you make money off of is customers. And you make money on customers by having a helluva spread on assets and not doing anything really dumb. And that's what they do.

Incidentally, they won't lend Berkshire money. They're not interested in national credits or any of that stuff where the spreads are narrow. We did a big deal about six or seven years ago on Finova, which we did jointly with Leucadia. And what was then the old First National of Boston sort of headed the deal up, and people would come in for $500 million or $200 million. Wells wasn't interested. There wasn't enough money in it, basically. I got a big kick out of that because that was exactly how they should think. Everybody else wanted to be in it, and they were doing it for 20 basis points or something of the sort. And they'd make commitments for all kinds of credit for 6 or 8 basis points, and the ones that were in the underwriting business, they would do it just get the underwriting.

But back to tangible common equity...

You don't make money on tangible common equity. You make money on the funds that people give you and the difference between the cost of those funds and what you lend them out on. And that's where people get all mixed up incidentally on things like the TARP. They say, 'Well, where'd the 5 billion go or where'd the 10 billion go that was put in?' That isn't what you make money on. You make money on that deposit base of $800 billion that they've got now. And that deposit base I guarantee you will cost Wells a lot less than it cost Wachovia. And they'll put out the money differently.

They'll have to work through a lot of this stuff that they inherited from Wachovia. Those option ARMs, they explained exactly how they break them down, and in the end they may lose 3 or 4 billion more. Nobody knows exactly. But I would say that California residential real estate is not deteriorating. It hasn't moved up. But it has flattened out with good volume recently. So my guess is that the option ARMs will work out about as they guessed.

What if the Treasury imposes new capital requirements? Will it hamper their earnings power?

I don't think it'll hamper their earnings. But if you make them sell a lot of common equity it would kill the common shareholder. It wouldn't increase the earning power in the future, and it would increase the shares outstanding. Wells, if they want another $10 billion in common equity or something like that in Wells, they'll have it in a very short period of time at this dividend rate. [In March, Wells cut its dividend by 85%.] Wells will be piling up the equity while they're paying nominal dividends. They could afford to pay the old dividend. But since they won't be paying the old dividend, that's $4 billion a year or something that they'll be adding to equity.

I would have been fine if they had just said, 'Look it, we'll quit paying any common dividend until our equity has gone up by whatever it might be, 10 or 15 billion.' And they'd get there in no time. Then they could pay the regular dividend. They elected to do it this other way because everybody seems to be kind of doing it. The idea of forgoing all or most of the dividend for a year to build the common equity ratio up, if that's what the government wants, that's fine. But that isn't really the key to the future of Wells, unless the regulators make it the key to the future of Wells. The key to the future of Wells is continuing to get the money in at very low costs, selling all kinds of services to their customer and having spreads like nobody else has.

How is Wells differentiated from the banks you own and the ones you don't?

Wells just has a whole different attitude. That's why Kovacevich calls them retail stores. He doesn't even like the word banking. I mean, he is looking to have a maximum enduring relationship with many, many millions of people. Tens of millions. And at the base of it involves getting money in very cheap. When you do that that's a helluva start in the business. The difference between getting your money at 1-1/2 % and 2-1/2% on a trillion-dollar asset base is $10 billion a year. It's hard to overemphasize that. than he thinks like J.P. MorgaHe thinks more like Sam Waltonn. I'm talking about the individual there. He's a retailer. He's not trying to influence Washington or be the most important guy on the scene or anything like that. He's just trying to do business with millions of people every day and make a few bucks off of them.

Now that you mention it, Kovacevich has done a pretty good job of annoying Washington, wouldn't you say?

That's hard to tell. There's an advantage to being that way too. He's not going to cozy up or be sycophantic toward his regulator, and I would say most bankers probably are now. They need to be. But his strong point is retailing not diplomacy. I kind of like that. It's hard for a guy that knows his institution forward and backwards to have somebody come in that really may be working off a check list or something and is telling him what to do. And I'm sure that Dick gets antagonized by that sometimes. In the end, he's got the record. And he's got the business to back up what he's doing.

To the extent that his tangible common equity is low, a) nobody was even talking about that a year ago. And b) they should be talking about earning power. But it comes about in part because he saved the FDIC's bacon on Wachovia. I mean they had a deal on Citigroup (C, Fortune 500) that had big assistance involved in it, and the FDIC moved about what would have been about 5% of the deposits in the United States without a dime of expense to the taxpayer or the FDIC to Wells. And Wells took it over. And if they'd gone to Citigroup a) they would have looked like idiots, and within a very short period considering what happened to Citi. So to penalize them because they solved the FDIC's problem without cost to the FDIC would be a little crazy. And I imagine that's what gets Dick a little riled up.

So what is your metric for valuing a bank?

It's earnings on assets, as long as they're being achieved in a conservative way. But you can't say earnings on assets, because you'll get some guy who's taking all kinds of risks and will look terrific for a while. And you can have off-balance sheet stuff that contributes to earnings but doesn't show up in the assets denominator. So it has to be an intelligent view of the quality of the earnings on assets as well as the quantity of the earnings on assets. But if you're doing it in a sound way, that's what I look at.

How confident will you be in Wells when Kovacevich retires?

Well, John [Stumpf] is in charge. Dick is a terrific help to John. I play bridge with John on the Internet. He plays under the name of HTUR. His wife's name is Ruth. My bridge partner, who I probably play bridge with four times a week, developed online banking for Wells. A woman named Sharon Osberg. And she's worked with those people. And she told me about John Stumpf ten years ago. I've had some insight through her on these people. But the real insight you get about a banker is how they bank. You've got to see what they do and what they don't do. Their speeches don't make any difference. It's what they do and what they don't do. And what Wells didn't do is what defines their greatness.

How is John's bridge game?

John is a very good bridge player. But he doesn't play as much as I do. I play all the time. He's smart. He's a different personality than Dick. Dick is a real sales person. They both subscribe to the same principles of banking. They just don't think you have to do things that the other guy is doing. 

First Published: April 20, 2009: 6:13 AM ET

赵丹阳

“我比较喜欢实际的东西。我不相信任何一个纸上谈兵的故事。”一直以来，业界都将赵丹阳视为巴菲特价值投资理念最坚定的追随者之一，有着企业运作背景的他喜欢实事求是，上市公司真实的营运状况、现金流和资本回报率是他关注的三大重点。

赵丹阳是实业家出身。大学毕业后他选择了出国从事实业投资与贸易，一年之后回国开始经营电子厂。他说，当他意识到，由于中国制造业的竞争环境恶化，制造消费电子业已无利润可图时，决定转行投身基金管理业。

　　“在经营企业时，我知道赚钱是何等的艰难。”他说，“我信奉‘买者自付’这句话，从不轻信任何人。没有谁会可怜你，这是一个适者生存的市场，尤其是在香港这样一个成熟的市场，完全没有涨跌幅限制，一个投资者如果不爱惜自己的钱，盲目投资，会输得很惨。市场总是风云变幻。”

赵丹阳在阐释他的投资理念时，曾将自己比作“潜伏在草丛中的狮子在静静等待最佳出击时机”，拥有足够的耐心等待理想的价格。他说：“我们像珍惜自己的生命一样珍惜自己的本金。控制风险是一切投资的灵魂。风险的控制不在于投资目标的分散程度，而取决于投资目标的真正内在价值。”

赵丹阳说：“我们喜欢熊市，在低迷、阴冷的市场里，我们可以从容不迫地享受买入的快乐，足够低的价格是抵御一切风险的法宝。”

“房地产界的名言是地段、地段还是地段。而投资者必须记住的名言只能是风险控制、风险控制、还是风险控制。我做基金经理以来最大的体会就是一定要有一种生存训练意识，投资有时似乎也是一种赌博，但它与赌博的区别在于是不是做好了足够多的准备工作，成功概率在达到99%以上的才算真正意义上的投资。”赵丹阳说。

在2009年初的致投资者信中赵丹阳表示，“2009年中国股市将会形成重要的底部。我们今天的任务就是要寻找中国未来十到二十年能够代表中国参与全球竞争的企业。”

业界盛传，巴菲特对赵说了七句话：一，独立。如果你做事和别人一样而且只盲目追随别人，最后的收益和效果也和别人一样。二，选择收益状况较好，而且把股东利益摆在第一位的企业。三，即便这个企业业绩很出色，你也该以非常合理的价格收购这个企业。四，要进行长期投资。 五，不要过度使自己的投资多元化。 六，中国股市2009年会反弹。 七，丹阳.赵先生，你的钱包又瘪下去了。

赵的大部分时间花在调研上市公司。他说自己是用怀疑一切的眼光来研究上市公司的财务报表，希望将纸面的东西看透。上市公司真实的营运状况、现金流和资本回报率是其关注的三大重点。“具有企业运作背景的人会实事求是。我比较喜欢实际的东西。我不相信任何一个纸上谈兵的故事。”

　　喜欢实地躬行的赵丹阳在投资宁沪高速前，专门制订在其各个路段实现“数车”的计划，了解其车流量的实际情况。他认为在证券市场上选择股票总面临三种情况，一是高风险、低收益，二是风险与收益持平，三是低风险、高收益。第二种情况不宜做大的投资。而只有第三种机会才值得出手。否则还不如将现金留在手上。利用市场发生价值判断错误时出手才是最高明的投资者。

“股市何时能见底，只有上帝才知道”。在4月17日的“博鳌亚洲论坛2009年年会”上，赵的态度再次暧昧不清，一如其总是剑走偏锋的投资理念，“但如果放在更长远、更宁静地心态看未来十年、二十年中国所发生的事情，可能更有助于每个人在投资上的心态。”

----------------

问:有句投资名言说“别人恐惧的时候你要贪婪,别人贪婪的时候你要恐惧”,你怎么看？

江平:“别人恐惧的时候你要贪婪,别人贪婪的时候你要恐惧”,这句话看上去很有道理,但是错的,是做不到的。

做投资永远都不要贪婪。你要价值分析、要客观。无论别人害怕,还是贪婪你都要客观。

就拿A股市场作例子, 上证指数(行情 股吧)从6000点跌到5500点,就有人害怕了,这时候你该不该贪婪？跌到5000点也有人害怕,你该不该贪婪？4000点呢?3000点呢？2000点呢？你什么时候该贪婪,什么时候不该？

所以,这句话是做不到的。归根结底,决定你投资方向的不是别人是否贪婪,而是投资对象有没有价值。

问:那如何判断投资对象有没有价值呢？

江平:这当中有些专业常识和经验。但我觉得最基本的东西是,那些传统的分析方法不要扔掉,比如Price/Earningratio（市盈率）,Price/Bookratio（市净率）。

经常在市场涨得最高,最疯狂的时候,就有声音出来了,说那些传统的东西失效了,现在的市场是新的市场,经济是新的经济,等等。

纳斯达克涨到5000点的时候有这个说法,中国股市涨到6000点的时候,也有过这个说法。日经指数上个世纪80年代涨到40000点的时候,也是如此:“那些分析方法是老东西了,不能拿来分析现在的市场了。”

可最终呢,失效的是那些泡沫化的新说法,老的分析工具仍在发挥效力。所以,那些老的衡量标尺不要扔掉。我就一直喜欢用那些经典方法来分析这个市场,效果也很好。

MAR 6 - 666 will go up, technical&internal

asia didn't make new low, made lows in NOV

will rise to 856,870 - correction should hold up at nov low of 741 bcz money printing

Buffet on BYD

Warren Buffett takes charge
Warren Buffett hasn't just seen the car of the future, he's sitting in the driver's seat. Why he's banking on an obscure Chinese electric car company and a CEO who - no joke - drinks his own battery fluid.
By Marc Gunther
Last Updated: April 13, 2009: 9:29 AM ET
(Fortune Magazine) -- Warren Buffett is famous for his rules of investing: When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is usually the reputation of the business that remains intact. You should invest in a business that even a fool can run, because someday a fool will. And perhaps most famously, Never invest in a business you cannot understand.
So when Buffett's friend and longtime partner in Berkshire Hathaway (BRKB), Charlie Munger, suggested early last year that they invest in BYD, an obscure Chinese battery, mobile phone, and electric car company, one might have predicted Buffett would cite rule No. 3 above. He is, after all, a man who shunned the booming U.S. tech industry during the 1990s.
But Buffett, who is 78, was intrigued by Munger's description of the entrepreneur behind BYD, a man named Wang Chuan-Fu, whom he had met through a mutual friend. "This guy," Munger tells Fortune, "is a combination of Thomas Edison and Jack Welch - something like Edison in solving technical problems, and something like Welch in getting done what he needs to do. I have never seen anything like it."
Coming from Munger, that meant a lot. Munger, the 85-year-old vice chairman of Berkshire Hathaway, is a curmudgeon who frowns on most investment ideas. "When I call Charlie with an idea," Buffett tells me, "and he says, 'That is really a dumb idea,' that means we should put 100% of our net worth into it. If he says, 'That is the dumbest thing I've ever heard,' then you should put 50% of your net worth into it. Only if he says, 'I'm going to have you committed,' does it mean he really doesn't like the idea."
This time Buffett asked another trusted partner, David Sokol, chairman of a Berkshire-owned utility company called MidAmerican Energy, to travel to China and take a closer look at BYD.
Last fall Berkshire Hathaway bought 10% of BYD for $230 million. The deal, which is awaiting final approval from the Chinese government, didn't get much notice at the time. It was announced in late September, as the global financial markets teetered on the abyss. But Buffett and Munger and Sokol think it is a very big deal indeed. They think BYD has a shot at becoming the world's largest automaker, primarily by selling electric cars, as well as a leader in the fast-growing solar power industry.
Wang Chuan-Fu started BYD (the letters are the initials of the company's Chinese name) in 1995 in Shenzhen, China. A chemist and government researcher, Wang raised some $300,000 from relatives, rented about 2,000 square meters of space, and set out to manufacture rechargeable batteries to compete with imports from Sony and Sanyo. By about 2000, BYD had become one of the world's largest manufacturers of cellphone batteries. The company went on to design and manufacture mobile-phone handsets and parts for Motorola (MOT, Fortune 500), Nokia (NOK), Sony Ericsson, and Samsung.
Wang entered the automobile business in 2003 by buying a Chinese state-owned car company that was all but defunct. He knew very little about making cars but proved to be a quick study. In October a BYD sedan called the F3 became the bestselling sedan in China, topping well-known brands like the Volkswagen Jetta and Toyota (TM) Corolla.
BYD has also begun selling a plug-in electric car with a backup gasoline engine, a move putting it ahead of GM, Nissan, and Toyota. BYD's plug-in, called the F3DM (for "dual mode"), goes farther on a single charge - 62 miles - than other electric vehicles and sells for about $22,000, less than the plug-in Prius and much-hyped Chevy Volt are expected to cost when they hit the market in late 2010. Put simply, this little-known upstart has accelerated ahead of its much bigger rivals in the race to build an affordable electric car. Today BYD employs 130,000 people in 11 factories, eight in China and one each in India, Hungary, and Romania.
Its U.S. operations are small - about 20 people work in a sales and marketing outpost in Elk Grove Village, Ill., near Motorola, and another 20 or so work in San Francisco, not far from Apple. BYD makes about 80% of Motorola's RAZR handsets, as well as batteries for iPods and iPhones and low-cost computers, including the model distributed by Nicholas Negroponte's One Laptop per Child nonprofit based in Cambridge, Mass. Revenues, which have grown by about 45% annually during the past five years, reached $4 billion in 2008.
In acquiring a stake in BYD, Buffett broke a couple of his own rules. "I don't know a thing about cellphones or batteries," he admits. "And I don't know how cars work." But, he adds, "Charlie Munger and Dave Sokol are smart guys, and they do understand it. And there's no question that what's been accomplished since 1995 at BYD is extraordinary."
One more thing reassured him. Berkshire Hathaway first tried to buy 25% of BYD, but Wang turned down the offer. He wanted to be in business with Buffett - to enhance his brand and open doors in the U.S., he says - but he would not let go of more than 10% of BYD's stock. "This was a man who didn't want to sell his company," Buffett says. "That was a good sign."
***
We're lost in Shenzhen. I've flown 8,000 miles to meet Wang, and on the way to the interview, my driver pulls to the side of a dusty highway. He's yelling in Cantonese into his phone and frenetically sketching Chinese characters on the touchscreen of a GPS navigator. The PR woman beside me looks worried. "The GPS isn't working," she says. "Too many new roads."
I can't blame the driver or the GPS - which, it occurs to me, was probably made nearby, since Shenzhen is the manufacturing hub of the global electronics industry, the place your cellphone, digital camera, and laptop probably came from. Just across a river from Hong Kong, Shenzhen is the biggest and fastest-growing city in the world that most Americans cannot find on a map. It's also the Chinese city most like America, because people who live here have come from elsewhere in search of a better life.
When Deng Xiaoping designated Shenzhen as China's first "special economic zone" in 1980, inviting capitalism to take root, it was a fishing village; today, it's a sprawling megacity of 12 million to 14 million people, most of them migrant workers who toil in vast factories like those run by BYD and earn about 1,300 renminbi, or $190, per month.
When we find BYD's new headquarters - a silvery office building that would not look out of place in Silicon Valley - I'm given a tour of the company "museum," which celebrates products and milestones from the firm's brief history, and then escorted into a conference room where plates of apples, bananas, and cherry tomatoes are spread on a table. Wang takes a seat across from me - he is 43, a smallish man, with black hair and glasses - and begins, through an interpreter, to tell me his story.
He started BYD with a modest goal: to edge in on the Japanese-dominated battery business. "Importing batteries from Japan was very expensive," Wang says. "There were import duties, and delivery times were long." He studied Sony and Sanyo patents and took apart batteries to understand how they were made, a "process that involved much trial and error," he says. (Sony and Sanyo later sued BYD, unsuccessfully, for infringing on their patents.)
BYD's breakthrough came when Wang decided to substitute migrant workers for machines. In place of the robotic arms used on Japanese assembly lines, which cost $100,000 or more apiece, BYD actually cut costs by hiring hundreds, then thousands, of people.
"When I first visited the BYD factory, I was shocked," says Daniel Kim, a Merrill Lynch technology analyst based in Hong Kong, who has been to the fully automated production lines in Japan and Korea. "It's a completely different business model." To control quality, BYD broke every job down into basic tasks and applied strict testing protocols. By 2002, BYD had become one of the top four manufacturers worldwide - and the largest Chinese manufacturer - in each of the three rechargeable battery technologies (Li-Ion, NiCad, and NiMH), according to a Harvard Business School case study of the company. And Wang stresses that BYD, unlike Sony and Sanyo, has never faced a recall of its batteries.
Deploying the armies of laborers at BYD is an officer corps of managers and engineers who invent and design the products. Today the company employs about 10,000 engineers who have graduated from the company's training programs - some 40% of those who enter either drop out or are dismissed - and another 7,000 new college graduates are being trained. Wang says the engineers come from China's best schools. "They are the top of the top," he says. "They are very hard-working, and they can compete with anyone." BYD can afford to hire lots of them because their salaries are only about $600 to $700 a month; they also get subsidized housing in company-owned apartment complexes and low-cost meals in BYD canteens. "They're basically breathing, eating, thinking, and working at the company 24/7," says a U.S. executive who has studied BYD.
Wang typically works until 11 p.m. or midnight, five or six days a week. "In China, people of my generation put work first and life second," says the CEO, whose wife takes responsibility for raising their two children.
This "human resource advantage" is "the most important part" of BYD's strategy, Wang says. His engineers investigate a wide array of technologies, from automobile air-conditioning systems that can run on batteries to the design of solar-powered streetlights. Unlike most automakers, BYD manufactures nearly all its cars by itself - not just the engines and body but air conditioning, lamps, seatbelts, airbags, and electronics. "It is difficult for others to compete," Wang says. "If we put our staff in Japan or the U.S., we could not afford to do anything like this."
Wang himself grew up in extreme poverty. His parents, both farmers, died before he entered high school, and he was raised by an older brother and sister. The train ride from the village where he grew up to Central South Industrial University of Technology, where he earned his chemistry degree, took him by Yellow Mountain, a popular destination for hikers and tourists, but he has never visited there. "I didn't go then because we had no money," he says. "I don't go now because we have no time."
As for accumulating wealth? "I'm not interested in it," he claims. He certainly doesn't live a very lavish lifestyle. He was paid about $265,000 in 2008, and he lives in a BYD-owned apartment complex with other engineers. His only indulgences are a Mercedes and a Lexus, and they have a practical purpose: He takes their engines apart to see how they work. On a trip to the U.S., he once tried to disassemble the seat of a Toyota owned by Fred Ni, an executive who was driving him around. Shortly after BYD went public, Wang did something extraordinary: He took approximately 15% of his holdings in BYD and distributed the shares to about 20 other executives and engineers at the company. He still owns roughly 28% of the shares, worth about $1 billion.
The company itself is frugal. Until recently, executives always flew coach. One told me he was appalled when he learned that Ford, which lost billions last year, had staged a gala at the Hotel George V during the Paris auto show. By contrast, the last time BYD executives traveled to the Detroit auto show they rented a suburban house to save the cost of hotel rooms.
This attention to costs is one reason that BYD has made money consistently even as it has expanded into new businesses. Each of BYD's business units - batteries, mobile-phone components, and autos - was profitable in 2008, albeit on a small scale. Overall, net profits were around $187 million. BYD, which is traded on the Hong Kong exchange, has a market value of about $3.8 billion. That's less than Ford (F, Fortune 500) ($7 billion at the beginning of April), but more than General Motors (GM, Fortune 500) ($1.3 billion).
Near the end of our conversation, I ask Wang about the company name. It's been reported that BYD stands for "Build your dreams," but he says he added that as the company motto only later. Others say that as Motorola, Apple, and Berkshire Hathaway have made their way to Shenzhen, the name has taken on yet another meaning: Bring your dollars.
***
When David Sokol toured BYD's operations last summer, Wang took him to a battery factory and explained that BYD wants to make its batteries 100% recyclable. To that end, the company has developed a nontoxic electrolyte fluid. To underscore the point, Wang poured battery fluid into a glass and drank it. "Doesn't taste good," he said, making a face and offering a sip to Sokol.
Sokol declined politely. But he got the message. "His focus there was that if we're going to help solve environmental problems, we can't create new environmental problems with our technology," Sokol says.
Sokol, author of a slim volume on management principles called Pleased but Not Satisfied, sized up Wang during that visit and decided he was an unusually purposeful executive. Sokol says, "Many good entrepreneurs can go from zero to a couple of million in revenues and a couple of hundred people. He's got over 100,000 people. Few can do that." When he got back to the U.S., Sokol told Buffett, "This guy's amazing. You want to meet him."
Even before visiting BYD, Sokol believed in electric cars. His people at MidAmerican have studied clean technologies like batteries and wind power for years because of the threat of climate change. One way or another, Sokol says, energy companies will need to produce more energy while emitting less carbon dioxide.
Electric cars will be one answer. They generate fewer greenhouse gas emissions than cars that burn gasoline, and they have lower fuel costs, even when oil is cheap. That's because electric engines are more efficient than internal-combustion engines, and because generating energy on a large scale (in coal or nuclear plants) is less wasteful than doing it on a small scale (by burning gasoline in an internal-combustion engine).
The numbers look something like this: Assume you drive 12,000 miles a year, gas costs $2 a gallon, and electricity is priced at 12¢ per kilowatt, about what most Americans pay. A gasoline-powered car that gets 20 miles to the gallon - say, a Chevy Impala or a BMW X3 - will have annual fuel costs of $1,200 and generate about 6.6 tons of carbon dioxide. Equip those cars with electric motors, and fuel costs drop to $400 a year and emissions are reduced to about 1.5 tons.
The big problem is that they are expensive to make, and the single largest cost is the battery. Manufacturing a safe, reliable, long-lasting, and fast-charging battery for a car is a complex and costly undertaking. BYD claims to have achieved a breakthrough with its lithium ion ferrous phosphate technology, but no one can be sure whether it will work as promised.
Skeptics say that BYD's battery cannot be both more powerful and cheaper than those made by competitors, and the U.S. Department of Energy has purchased an F3DM to take the battery apart. Chitra Gopal, an analyst with Nomura Securities in Singapore who follows the company closely, says BYD is betting on "entirely new technology, and the ability to produce it at scale and at a low cost remains unproven." William Moore, publisher and editor-in-chief of EV World, an electric car website, says, "They need to persuade people that they are selling a reliable, durable, quality automobile."
Even BYD's admirers say the fit and finish of the company's cars leave much to be desired. "Their cars are way behind Toyota, for sure," Sokol admits. BYD currently exports gasoline-powered cars to Africa, South America, and the Middle East, but they compete on price, not quality.
BYD's first plug-in hybrid, called a dual-mode car, is designed to run primarily on electricity, with an internal- combustion engine for backup. Two all-electric cars - the E3 and the E6 - will follow later this year. Both will be sold first in China, primarily to fleet users: the government, post office, utilities, and taxi companies, all of which will build central fast-charging facilities. Europe, with its high gas prices, is the most promising export market for BYD's electric cars. Wang signed an agreement last year with Autobinck, a Dutch dealer group, to distribute its cars in the Netherlands and five Eastern European countries.
The company hasn't yet decided whether it will enter the U.S. market, where the economics of electric cars are not as compelling. Sokol, who now sits on BYD's board, says BYD could instead become a battery supplier to global automakers. Some Americans, though, are eager to do business with BYD. The day after Fortune's visit to BYD, Oregon Gov. Ted Kulongoski arrived to test-drive an electric car and urge the company to import through the port of Portland. Meanwhile, BYD researchers are on to their next big idea, a product they call a Home Clean Power Solution. It's essentially a set of rooftop solar photovoltaic panels with batteries built in to store power for use when the sun's not out, all to be designed and manufactured by BYD. "Solar is an endless source of energy," Wang says. "With better technology, we can reduce the costs."
Wang is also focused on building a stronger executive team to drive the company forward. "The good news is, he's 42 years old," Sokol says. "The bad news is that he's clearly the brains behind the organization, and the drive. He has to develop a team faster, but I think he knows that." Last winter it was Sokol's turn to lead Wang on a tour of his home country. They started in Detroit, where BYD's cars generated buzz at the North American Auto Show, and wound up on the West Coast, where Wang met for the first time with Charlie Munger. In between, they stopped in Omaha.
"How did BYD get so far ahead?" Warren Buffett asked Wang, speaking through a translator. "Our company is built on technological know-how," Wang answered. Wary as always of a technology play, Buffett asked how BYD would sustain its lead. "We'll never, never rest," Wang replied.
Buffett may not understand batteries or cars, or Mandarin for that matter. Drive, however, is something that needs no translation.

这应该是个反转,而不是反弹 - 孙明春

4月10日,中国股市几近“山河一片红”。上证指数以2.7%的涨幅,迎接一季度中国宏观经济数据的出炉。
　　向上走？向下走？反弹？反转？人们兴奋、痛苦、困惑,总在试图从任何蛛丝马迹里提前寻找到中国经济的方向。
　　“这应该是个反转,而不是反弹。”10日当天,野村证券中国区首席经济学家孙明春接受本报记者专访时,对中国经济走势给出了自己的判断。
4万亿经济刺激方案等一系列宏观政策效果逐步显现,大部分行业存货调整已近尾声,国内终端需求持续强劲,出口降幅将有所收窄——在孙明春看来,上述几大因素决定了,从二季度开始中国经济将重拾升势,转向“V”形曲线的上升轨迹,尽管现在“只是个开始”。
　　2007年10月,当中国经济一路高歌猛进之时,时为雷曼兄弟公司中国区首席经济学家的孙明春却悲观地提出,中国经济正在步入下行通道;2008年12月,当人们非常悲观地看待中国经济前景之时,孙明春反而乐观地认为,积极因素将很快显现。
　　事实证明,这两次都让孙明春说对了。而今,在春意盎然的四月,孙明春再度拿出了自己的“魔法水晶瓶”。这一次,结果会怎样？
　　是反转,不是反弹
　　《21世纪》:近两个月,中国经济的一些先行指标开始出现回暖迹象,比如发电量、房地产与汽车销售量、新开工项目计划投资等。针对中国一季度乃至年内经济走势,市场也逐步出现比较明显的乐观情绪。你怎么看待当下的形势？这些指标的回暖预示的是中国经济的反弹还是反转？
　　孙:我持相对乐观的看法,这应该是个反转,而不是反弹。
　　《21世纪》:依据何在？
　　孙:我的依据主要来自三个方面,包括4万亿经济刺激方案在内一系列宏观政策效果的逐步显现;大部分行业存货调整已近尾声;国内终端需求持续强劲。
　　《21世纪》:你怎么判断经济刺激政策对推动经济反转的效果影响？
　　孙:从2月中旬开始,我们已经开始看到经济刺激政策效果在逐渐显现。PMI数据的持续上升已经对此有所反映。
　　PMI是一种扩散指数,它反映的不是订单绝对量,而是拿到订单企业范围的扩散程度,在经济中的渗透度。这个数据的向好,相当有代表性。
　　中国的经济刺激政策从去年11月份推出,但中间经过一个冬季,很多北方的项目都没有正式开工,要等到3月中下旬、4月初才逐步开始,而珠港澳大桥项目,甚至要到今年11月份开工。这样看来,目前不过是最初的效应而已。
　　企业现阶段一般是订单先行,3月份订单已经显出效果,传导效应将会一环环传递下去的。比如铁路建设,需要列车订单的提前告知,并不是一两个月的事情,而列车制造企业将会再给上游配件之类企业下订单,配件企业向再上游直至原材料企业下订单,不断向上游传递。
　　所以,随着经济刺激政策的逐步落实,接下来刺激效果也会越来越明显。
　　《21世纪》:你又怎样看企业“去库存化”进程对宏观经济的影响？
　　孙:我们需要注意的是,这次发生在中国的存货调整,主要发生在原材料方面,而不是产成品方面。中国经济2008年四季度的继续下行,一个很重要的因素就是企业大量被动囤积原材料后的急速存货调整。
　　2007年下半年到2008年上半年,全球商品价格猛涨,导致国内原材料价格猛涨,企业不得不提前囤积很多原料,正常库存两三个月,有些企业甚至达到七八个月的库存。这导致上游原材料企业生产相当强劲,但生产出来的东西都停留在仓库里。
　　2008年8、9月份,原材料价格企稳,又有信贷紧缩,市场供需发生逆转,需求消失,价格下行,企业不但不买,而且要推迟买,因为这样越往后越省钱。
　　新的逆向预期带来的结果便是钢铁煤炭企业的被迫减产,去库存化过程中,企业产能利用率降到三分之一左右,主要发生在上游企业。
　　如今,根据我们掌握的情况,发生在2008年四季度的大规模存货调整已近尾声。存货调整结束后,产能通常会恢复到一个相对正常水平。虽然需求下落,但企业产能利用率要比存货调整期间要好。所以数据好起来应该说是在意料之中的。
　　同时,中国的最终需求这方面虽然有所减弱,但整体看仍然很强劲,强于2003、2004、2005年。消费上,2008年第四季度名义社会品零售总额增长20%,今年1、2月这一数据实际增长16%左右。投资需求也是相当强,26%,实际更高,因为投资品价格在回落。
　　这都为宏观经济实现反转提供了坚实的基础。
　　目前还只是开始
　　《21世纪》:在看到一些先行指标有回暖迹象的同时,我们也注意到了钢价短暂回升后的持续下行,钢铁生产和新订单指数继续大幅度下降。你怎么解释这种现象？如果是反转,现在处在反转的什么阶段？
　　孙:现在还早,目前还只是反转的开始。
　　实际上,企业的订单才刚刚开始链条传递。如果想传递到经济各个行业,尤其是最终的钢铁需求这个环节,是需要点时间的。而且,钢铁行业目前存货过多,包括不久前又一轮新的存货增加,再加上房地产行业的复苏尚待时日,所以这一行业不大可能这么快好起来,真正好转恐怕要等到下半年。
　　《21世纪》:需要追问的是,在国际形势仍然十分严峻的情况下,投资、消费两辆马车是否能拉住逆向行驶的另一辆——出口？
　　孙:的确,国外经济形势不会很快好起来。尽管最坏的时候可能已经过去了,但从2008年四季度开始,全球也面临着巨大的存货调整。全球经济很可能是“L”形增长,现在虽然已到“L”的拐点,经济开始企稳走平,但可能还会延续负增长。
　　我们要问的是,2月份中国出口下降26%,这一大幅下降趋势是否还会延续？我认为,不会的。26%的下滑速度,是在全球经济巨大的存货调整过程中发生的,是暂时的。一旦全球经济企稳,这一局面将会有所改观。
　　全球贸易额与全球GDP增长正相关。一个简单的事实是,假设2009年全球GDP下降3%,那么全球贸易不会下降10%这样的量级。那么中国出口会下降那么多吗？除非中国大量丢掉市场份额,而这显然是不现实的。
　　我的判断是,中国的出口6、7月份会稳定,下降幅度会回到10%以内。
　　《21世纪》:那么另外一个需要探究的问题是,中国外贸依存度这么大,怎么看外需明显疲软对中国就业、收入乃至国内消费的冲击？
　　孙:不要夸大出口行业在中国经济中所占的比重。
　　按照我们的估算,整个出口行业,包括很多与之相关行业全部加起来,占中国就业的比重也就15%,即便出口下降20%,影响到的就业人口不过3%,1700多万人,对全中国8亿人口收入来讲,影响有限。
　　从4月份开始,中国就业形势会有所好转。但中国的人口多、正在推进城镇化,即便经济增长达到10%,就业压力同样会很大。但综合来看,目前的就业压力不一定会带来收入的负增长或者不增长,对消费的影响也是有限的。
　　《21世纪》:基于你的分析,你对未来一段时期中国GDP、CPI、PPI走势作何预判？
　　孙:对于GDP,我们预判将是个V形的走势。今年一季度会比较差,和去年四季度不相上下。二季度会明显上行,这种上升势头可以至少保持到明年一季度。今年全年GDP可以达到8%,年底接近10%。
　　CPI因为去年年初冰冻灾害的基数效应,近几个月还会是负增长,而下半年随着基数效应的消失,CPI将有所回升,全年预期增长0.6%。
　　PPI我们不做太多预测。因为中国目前仍然产能过剩,成本压力很难转嫁出去,PPI的先行效果很难体现。

王石 评房价

2009-3-31一、致股东回顾2008并非易事——这一年有如此众多的事件发生，这一年与2007的反差如此强烈。无论对中国住宅行业还是万科而言，2008显然无法以辉煌载入史册。但惟其如此，它带来了更多引人深思的内容，而这或许是我们得以在2008收获的最大财富。收益与空间由“房地产”联想到“高利润”，将房价上涨视为对房地产业的利好因素，恐怕已是行业内外常见的一种习惯性思维。尽管万科在这个问题上一直持有不同的看法，在2005年就提出了“房价过快上涨无人受益，平稳发展才是行业之福”的观点。但即使对于万科，可能也直到2008年，才从事实中获得了最深刻的体验。其实从原理上看，中国住宅业根本不应该是一个高收益行业。它是一个自由准入的行业，也不存在高耸的技术壁垒；在土地交易完全市场化的背景下，部分先发企业在不可替代资源上的独占性已不复存在，随着存量土地资源的逐步消耗，这一方面的先发者优势正在迅速弱化并日渐消亡。这样一个行业，所能够期待的，只能是一个公平的收益水平。一个自由准入的行业，如果行业内外却普遍认为它是高收益的，其结果可想而知。外部资金的涌入和行业内的习惯性思维，造成了2007年土地市场的亢奋，造成了“面粉贵过面包”的异常情形。而这一故事在2008年嘎然而止——2007年高价获取的土地，至少数年之内，恐怕不要说超额收益，甚至连获得社会平均收益水平都变得艰难。是这样，2007年的繁荣盛景确实曾经发生，但就如构建在沙滩之上的七宝楼台，不可能长久存在。也不要问2007年的情景会否重现。中国崛起及其对世界经济格局的改变还远未完成，中国住宅行业也依然有待成熟，因此这一情景未来并非不可能、只是不应该再出现了——它并非一个美丽的憧憬，而是一种值得警惕的情形。而反过来说，2008或许并不辉煌，但它的存在是必要的。它是中国住宅行业一个完整周期、是中国住宅企业一个完整历程中，不可能缺少的一个环节。当2008在时光册页上定格之后，中国房地产行业运转逻辑的完整脉络，才得以全部呈现为事实。那么，打破高收益神话后，中国房地产行业的吸引力究竟何在？其实，这个行业真正的价值，从来都不在于高收益率，而在于其高成长性。它真实的魅力，也根本不在过去，而在未来。作为人口最多、迅速崛起的经济大国，最终问鼎世界经济舞台王座的中国行业，可能不止一个；而在它们当中，成长空间如此之大、目前的集中度却又如此之低的，则首推房地产。下面这段文字曾经出现在万科2007年度报告中，请允许我们在此复述一遍。因为，它并非一时的感触，而是我们对行业长期持有的信念：“类似中国正在经历的高速现代化、城市化发展进程，在每个国家的历史上恐怕都只有一次机会。身处这一特定历史阶段，又与城市化紧密相关的中国住宅行业，其足迹注定无法平凡。类似的亢奋和接踵而3来的回归，在未来仍可能再次甚至多次降临。作为这个领域的从业者，万科团队的成员将尽力守住一颗平常心。撇去表面的喧哗，真实的购买力始终在悄然生长，而住宅业迈向成熟的步伐也从未停歇。作为一个自由准入的行业，所有资源和机会对每个参与者正日益变得公平。凭借一笔先得的资源就可以坐收利润的时代已经结束，未来只有那些真正创造价值的企业才能在这个充满竞争的行业中长存；只有那些转化资源效率最高、能以最低消耗创造最高性价比产品的企业才能最终赢得胜利者的桂冠。”自由准入、充分竞争、公平收益、广阔空间——至少对于万科来说，我们认为这是值得期待的未来。预测与应变2007年第四季度，当行业中亢奋心态还颇为盛行的时候，万科一个截然不同的观点受到了社会的普遍关注，并被命名为“拐点论”。这一观点迅速引发了业内普遍的争论，并承受了尖锐的质疑。随着2008年行业调整的全面来临，在事实面前这些争论和质疑已变得不再需要。而希望万科对未来市场做出预测的声音在不断增加，其中问得最多的一个问题是——市场的底部在哪里，而它又将在何时出现？然而遗憾的是，这是一个万科无法回答的问题。在我们看来，市场的顶点和底部根本无法预测。2007年市场顶点出现和“拐点论”引发争议，这两件事情确实在2007年的第四季度同时发生，但这只是时间上的巧合。万科对市场亢奋情绪的警惕，早在2007年的中期报告中已经有明确的表述，只是并未马上引起市场的关注而已。换句话说，对2007年的市场顶点，万科从未做出过具体时间上的预测。市场的顶点与底部无法预测，这是因为，市场是一个分散决策的复杂系统。市场的每个参与者都具有各不相同的心态和判断，各自决定自己的行为，而他们的行为或多或少都影响着市场的结果。最极端的买方行为决定了市场的顶点，而最极端的卖方行为决定着市场的底部。但对不确定对象的极端行为做出准确预测，这本来就是一件不可能的事情。另一方面，房地产一直、也永远是一个与宏观经济环境紧密相关的行业。因此，宏观经济短期趋势的可预测性，很大程度上决定着房地产市场的可预测性。而当前全球经济正处于极为特殊的时刻，中国住宅市场短期内的变动可能也极其复杂，已经超出了企业的预测能力。企业难以对未来即将发生的短期波动做出精确的事先描述，这看似一个并不乐观的结论。但所幸的是，对于企业而言，更重要的并不是预测，而是应变。企业可以也应该做到的，是对行业长期的发展方向始终保持认识，对市场环境已经发生的改变及时做出判断，在此基础上对未来可能出现的各种短期变动进行分析，并分别制订应对的预案，在相关变化逐渐明朗的同时迅速采取行动。锐见与慎行外界对万科的预测能力，或许给予了过高的评价或期望。而与之相伴生的是另一个疑问：既然万科早在2007年年中，就已经对市场的过热作出了预警，那为何在2007年的下半年，万科依然购置了一些高价土4地？万科是否存在言行不一的情况，万科的执行力是否存在问题？多年以来，房地产一直备受关注，而万科始终生活在聚光灯下。这提升了万科的影响力和号召力，尤其在进入新城市的时候，它为万科业务的迅速展开提供了助益。但另一方面，万科的一举一动，其中包含的信息，却也都存在被舆论放大的可能。万科在2007年下半年的购地行为，被舆论所高度关注。但万科放弃的地块有多少，恐怕并不为外界所知。而万科在2007年销售额增长超过一倍的情况下，购置土地面积反而低于2006年，这一事实则多少被忽略了。2007年土地价格出现了远高于房价的大幅上涨，到下半年更达到了历史的顶峰。在这样的情况下，企业除非完全停止购地，否则购入的一定是高价土地。但完全停止购地，这是一个不容易作出的决定。土地不同于其他的生产原料，难以从市场上随时购得，企业如不能提前购入一定量土地，经营的持续性都会遭遇挑战，更遑论发展。而万科是全球大型住宅企业当中，土地保有年限最短的企业之一；从2004年开始，万科每年年底的土地储备量，都低于未来两年的开工量。对万科而言，完全停止购地，是一个非常极端的决定。作出极端行为，是一种大胆、但风险很高的经营风格。极端行为可能带来伟大的成功，但也可能招致致命的失误。从万科的企业性格来看，稳健经营是万科一贯坚持的风格。恐怕我们宁可放弃伟大成功的机会，也要确保不犯下致命的错误。早在2005年，当市场尚存疑虑的时候，万科做出了将未来三年设定为高速发展期的决定，事实也验证了万科的这一判断。但即便如此，万科也从没有试图超越自身的能力和资源去谋求超常规的扩张。稳健的经营风格，来自于内心深处的敬畏。在我们看来，世界充满不确定性，而我们的认知能力是有限的。市场中许多机会稍纵即逝，企业需要及时作出决定。但与此同时，我们需要对自身理性的局限有清醒的认识，尤其当我们的观点与市场普遍看法存在巨大差异的时候，对自信保持一定的克制，恐怕是应该的。锐利的观察和鲜明的观点，这是我们一直期望能够不断提升的一种能力。但如果离开谨慎行事的自制力，则这种能力给企业带来的，可能不仅仅是成功和辉煌。大道与原点2008年行业发生的调整其实并不可怕，它是必然的，甚至是必需的；它带来的也可能是机会；但与此相对应，真正值得警惕的是之前短暂的过度繁荣。某种程度上说，我们应该感谢这一次市场调整的到来。调整给我们带来的第一个机会，其实是让我们冷静下来进行反思和自我完善的机会。当行业处于牛市状态时，企业对专业能力的追求、奋发图强的斗志容易出现松懈。当看上去任何房屋都可以顺利售出的时候，当房价上升使赚钱变得越来越“容易”的时候，我们是否还孜孜以求地执着于研究客户需求，不断改善产品、服务的品质和性价比？我们是否做到了尽可能精打细算，最合理地分配成5本、控制费用，以实现股东利益的最大化？我们是否还在竭尽全力分析市场、寻找最有效率的销售渠道和方式？——对这些问题进行深入反思的动力，正是2008带给我们的珍贵礼物。无论2008有多么艰难，也无论2009有多少不确定性，行业发展的大趋势仍未发生任何根本性的动摇，而商业社会的基本逻辑更属永恒不变。这一基本逻辑就是，企业存在的最终理由，是为投资者创造价值；企业活动的最终目标，是以尽可能少的资源消耗，去尽可能多、尽可能好地满足社会需求。在2009年乃至更远的未来，我们需要回到商业逻辑的原点，需要更加尊重市场规律，更加重视客户需求。我们需要更加信守一贯主张的价值观念——简单、透明、规范与责任。无论在内部还是外部，我们需要进一步体现企业创立时的初衷——对人的尊重，需要进一步体现“健康丰盛”的生活追求。尽管市场仍然处在调整期内，但万科在产业化的道路上的探索不会松懈。这不仅是行业发展必由的方向，也是万科未来核心竞争力的重要来源之一。做到这些，我们才能持续为股东创造更多的价值。惆怅与感恩2008年市场发生的一切，基本都在预料之中，并无需惊慌或失落。但回顾2008，不能说没有遗憾。遗憾的是，在2007年，尽管在行业宏观趋势上做出了基本正确的判断，但我们在牛市的大环境中并未能完全脱俗。过于舒适的环境，使得我们在经营细节上暴露出诸多不足，我们一些专业能力表现甚至出现了下滑的迹象。这已经成为2009年万科面临的最大挑战之一。2008年，万科24周岁。24年的岁月在赋予万科强壮体格的同时，并没有改变万科年轻的内心。因为年轻，我们看到了在进入新的发展阶段后自身的不成熟；也因为年轻，所以我们并不缺乏接受批评和直面挫折的勇气。2009年万科的主题词只有两个字：“零”和“壹”。这一主题词的解读是“万象更新·美好明天”。“零”，既是原点，也是起点。万科将放下往日的成功，修正过去的不足；以永远年轻的锐气，将每一天视为新的起跑点。“壹”，象征着希望，也代表着行动。千里之行，始于足下，从现在开始，万科将一步一步，脚踏实地，与股东共同迎接美好的未来。
2008年01月30日 　住在杭州网

　　“2008年暴涨反弹的几率不大。”万科集团董事长王石日前在深圳地产大腕的私人聚会上惊爆此言。这与经济学家易宪容最新的言论异曲同工——“新的按揭贷款政策可能直接将30%的投资者排除出市场，并因此抑制市场上一半左右的需求”。
　　“2005到2006年，中央每调控一次，深圳的房价就反弹一次，但是从紧银行货币政策一出，整个市场傻眼了，所以，开发商或市场与政策博弈是没有任何意义的。”王石对于此次的宏观调控颇有信心。
　　“2008年，中央政府将在按揭贷款的审查机制上出台新的政策，审查将更严格。”易宪容以北京为例，他说北京近期已经出台政策，要求严格审批按揭贷款，贷款人必须有银行的对账单。
　　事实上，对于房地产按揭贷款的审查政策在2003年便已出台，但易宪容认为，银行在其后的相关执行过程中并未有效执行，但美国次贷危机使银行及政府意识到了按揭贷款的风险。
　　“这将直接把30%的投资者排除出市场，当前市场上一半左右的需求将被抑制。”易宪容认为，被排除出市场的主要是投资需求。
　　“按揭贷款政策主要抑制了投资需求，让投资需求不再有资格进入房地产市场。”易宪容说，“开发商定价是否高已经不重要了，因为，当自住需求占市场主导地位的时候，开发商无论将房价定多高，都要考虑市场的实际购买力。”
　　王石认为他对房价具有某种先见之明：“深圳房价也就是2006年下半年暴涨起来的，我密切注视着地产的动态，房价每月暴涨，涨得我心惊肉跳。万科东莞某高档项目，原计划卖1万元/平方米就不错了，后来，价格翻番，我立即部署该项目实行‘买房送宝马’的举措，目的是谨防政策出台，万科该项目降价的空间有50万元。”
　　“2007年12月是地产最低迷期，万科一个月销了60亿元，这个数据是可观的，万科设置了市场低迷对策。”这也是万科抗风险能力强的表现。万科的确在更多的城市开始降低房价以达到快速销售的目的。
　　“2008年市场观望仍会持续数月，房价如果要反弹，最快也要等到2008下半年，小涨是可能的，暴涨反弹的几率不大。”王石称。
　　“中国的经济形式依然良好，并没有出现日本经济泡沫、亚洲金融风暴、(中国)香港地产泡沫的征兆，中国地产的刚性需求仍然存在，2008年进入地产调整是一件好事。”王石说。
　　深圳兰江地产副总裁杨大谷的观点与王石不约而同：“2008年进入地产调整年，不会引发地产大幅度的暴跌，房价是稳中有升，但暴涨的可能性不大。”他认为，在调控时期，最难的是那些不高又不低，处于中流品质，但标价颇高的项目。
王石：房价非理性 下跌是必然　　　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------　　　　2008-1-28 9:18:21 东方早报 　　　　　　 万科集团董事长王石昨日（27日）在接受采访时表示，房价调整甚至下跌是因为房价增长已经高出消费者收入太多，理性回归是必然趋势。他还建议，青年人在40岁之前没有必要急着买房。　　　　 2007年，楼市惯有的“金九银十”没有出现，在王石看来，这是因为房价的上涨水平已经远远高于收入增长的水平，因此宏观调控加重后，疯狂上涨的房价得到了抑制。　　　　 王石认为，此轮宏观调控与以往不同，不仅局限于房地产，而且是对整个流动资金过剩、通货膨胀压力加大的经济大环境的调整，是货币政策从适度从紧到从紧的转变。　　　　 比照2004、2005年宏观调控之后房价继续上涨的情况，王石认为，当时房价继续上涨的根本原因在于市场的价格与消费者收入的增长是一种正向的关系，并非调控失效。然而，在本轮调控中，万科在广州、深圳等地的楼盘率先降价，市场反应不错，说明房价调整并非完全因为宏观调控，“房价已经跟收入增长脱钩太远，有些甚至出现地价比房价还高，"面粉比面包还贵"的非理性现象。因此，即便没有宏观调控，价高量缩，房价也会下降，最后趋于理性。”　　　　 在房价理性回归过程中，有的地方房价会下降，有的微升，有的不升不降，但是总的趋势来讲，房价还是会往上升的。王石说，现在的关键是房价的上涨速度，家庭收入增长的速度快过房价上涨的速度，这才是合理的、理性的、可持续的。　　　　 王石进一步解释道，拐点有三个意思：一是从大涨到大跌，二是从牛市到熊市，三是价格的理性回归，而万科所指的拐点是指价格的理性回归。他认为，珠三角的房价下调已经形成拐点。　　　　 王石还建议，40岁之前可以先租房。“作为我的观点来讲，(个人)属于没有最后(发展)定型，最后还有抱负有理想，在40岁之前应该还是租房为好。”他说。　　　　 对年轻人结婚即要买房的普遍情况，王石建议结婚也可以先租房：“如果从我的角度来说，我是地产开发商，肯定建议你买房，而且是买万科的房子，我们从大学生公寓到最后退休的房子都有。但是比照国外的城市统计来讲，20多岁就买房的非常少，尤其是大城市，对即将要结婚成家的年轻人来说，也是先租房为好。”
王石：房价疯涨让人心惊肉跳 房市将理性回归2007-12-26 03:30:19　来源: 第一财经日报(上海)　 进入王石贴吧 共 107 条 黑马推荐　　对于“拐点”，王石认为是出现了“转折”，这个转折不是像股票市场这样大升大跌，是从一种市转到另外一种市，在带有这种盲目地亢奋的预期的房地产增值情况下，之前盲目地带有推进性的追风，变为一种理性的回归，类似的回归，可以指广州、深圳，也可以用于全国。
2008年之后，万科绝不拿地王。这是其董事长王石日前的对外表态。在广州大幅降价激起千层浪之后，万科从房价可能回调的判断延伸开来，要对拿地的方式进行反思。
之前一年中，万科在拿地时表现出来的“亢奋”已经让外界将它看成是“靠拿地王的地来竞争”。这就意味着万科要拿高地价，维持高房价，以高地价维持高房价。在王石看来，这显然不是万科的本意。
但是的确，整个房地产市场在去年都萦绕着一种“亢奋”的气息，万科只不过是其中之一。什么叫“亢奋”？就是已经控制不了自己的往上涨这种趋势继续下去。王石坦言，这种房价的疯狂上涨让他感到一种“心惊肉跳”。他希望万科保持冷静，不能追风。
于是，从10月份开始，万科在广州市场开始大幅调价。最近，王石又多次就房地产市场明年的发展态势发表了自己的评论，其中包括2008年房地产市场拐点到来。
对于“拐点”，王石认为是出现了“转折”，这个转折不是像股票市场这样大升大跌，是从一种市转到另外一种市，在带有这种盲目地亢奋的预期的房地产增值情况下，之前盲目地带有推进性的追风，变为一种理性的回归，类似的回归，可以指广州、深圳，也可以用于全国。
王石判断的依据在于最近中央连续的加息，连续对于房地产的调控政策，再加上提高银行的准备金。更为直观的是数字所反映出的市场变动。从今年10月份和去年10月份同期的数字对比来看，深圳销售量萎缩82%，广州也萎缩了44%；北京下降了9.2%；上海下降15%。
当然，“下降”不足以来涵盖整个市场的状况。因为夹在广州和深圳之间的东莞上升了27%、北京销售量下跌的同时天津在上升；上海在下降时杭州却上涨20%多。“中国房地产市场这么大，不能一概而论。确实，市场上之前一种盲目的带有亢奋的，追求担心不买价格会更贵这样的趋势，现在已经在趋于理性。”王石说。
所谓理性，就是“当中产阶层感觉到房子买不起的时候，你就要警惕了，因为这个市场可能要出问题”。由此，王石认为：一方面，消费者已经承受不住了；第二，现在通货膨胀的压力，加之投资热钱的增加，导致一定要货币回笼，将通货膨胀压下来，这其中，房地产一定首当其冲。最终，必然导致价格调整是的必然性。
从目前看来，万科的价格调整并非在全国展开，而在广州一地的下调，给本身已经热到烫手的市场泼了一瓢冷水。虽然这些言论令业内一些企业愤慨，有业内人士针对万科的言论评价说：“降价打折这种事情，找万科吧。我们坚决不会调整价格。”
“万科价格的调整，一个是自己的反思，再一个是对宏观调控政策最直接的回应。”王石坚定自己的立场。
从房价可能调整的判断延伸开去，接下来，就是土地价格可能产生的回调。实际的情况是，10月份以来，一些一线城市的二手房交易量萎缩，一线城市的土地招标中也开始出现了流标。
“这一年多土地价格频现标王，甚至是‘面粉贵过面包’，这时候让他降价非常痛苦了，如果还是以你原来土地成本价来计算，市场对你是毫不留情的，应该进行调整。再一个应该看到，正因为带有一种盲目的投机性的购房抑制住之后，即使现在应该看到土地供应有限，土地价格的疯涨也就抑制下来了。”王石认为。
最近关于楼市拐点的问题成为各界最关注的焦点，经济半小时栏目前不久曾报道过深圳和广州房价下跌的情况，引发了楼市拐点的讨论，其中万科董事局主席王石在接受媒体采访时表示，深圳楼市确实出现拐点，万科同时下调了自己在深圳和广州的楼盘售价，降价幅度最高达到15%，那么深圳和广州所出现的这种拐点是暂时的还是代表着一种趋势？这种降价的趋势有可能在全国的其他城市比如北京上海出现吗？我们今天的节目专门采访了万科集团董事会主席王石。　　　　“中产阶级买不起房，这个房市有问题”　　　　赵赫：“王总，我知道在前不久一个会议上，你曾经表达了你的观点，说现在中国楼市已经出现拐点，你具体是指什么？”　　　　王石：“当时是在一次公益活动在回答记者提问的时候，记者问的问题很长，大意思是广州的房价下降，深圳房价下降，作为万科的董事会主席，你是不是认为现在楼市出现拐点？我指的拐点第一个是出现了一个转折，这个转折不是像股票市场这样大升大跌，是从一种市转到另外一种市，可能是带有这种盲目的亢奋的预期的房地产增值情况下，一种盲目的带有推进性的追风，已经是一种理性的回归，显然这是指理性的回归，是指广州、深圳，也是一种理性回归，这种理性回归用于全国也可以这样说，因为最近中央连续的加息，连续对于房地产的调控政策，再加上提高银行的准备金，可以预期准备金还会继续调，显然房市的需求、正常消费都有很大的影响，实际上从万科掌握的资料来讲，就深圳、广州、东莞、上海、杭州、北京、天津这么几个城市来比较，今年10月份和去年10月份同期差别是非常大的，比如说深圳和去年同期10月份相比，他楼市萎缩的82%，萎缩的是非常厉害的，这个有两个因素，一个是供应量有限，第二个需求量也受到很大的抑制，广州萎缩了44%，在广州、深圳中间的东莞却上升了27%，北京和去年相比是有所下降，按照我们掌握的资料是下降9.2%，但是旁边的天津是在上升，上海是下降15%，但是杭州上涨20%几，我们从这几个城市来看，他们在一起但是表现也不一样，所以我觉得像中国房地产市场这么大，已经是不同城市东南西北中比较大，更不要说西部和东部城市之间的差别就更大了，不能一概而论，确实现在从一种盲目的带有亢奋的，追求担心不买价格会更贵这样的趋势趋于理性。”　　　　赵赫：“确实当初大家都纷纷职责房价过高的时候，房价还在不管不顾的上涨，现在确实出现了一些新的情况，像你说的珠三角地区已经出现房价下跌的情况，还有一些城市出现了有价无市的状况，对于市场如果出现持续的调整，对开发商意味着什么？”　　　　王石：“房价这样的上涨，已经上涨到中产阶层，就是年收入在6万人民币到20万人民币这样一个阶层，他们已经感觉到买房子非常吃力的时候，这个房市快要出问题了，所以在现在疯涨的情况下，再不抑制住是一定会出问题的，而且感觉到和东南亚的泡沫经济、和日本泡沫经济某个阶段是蛮相似的，所以说这种对他抑制消费，我觉得尽管是行政手段社会上有很多不同反映，我个人认为是非常有必要的。”　　　　赵赫：“前不久万科在深圳和广州有新盘低开的现象，这是对市场的回应吗？”　　　　王石：“这个是从两个方面的回应，第一个我们应该有一个理性的思维，当中产阶层感觉到房子买不起的时候，你就要警惕了，因为这个市场可能要出问题，你要采取一些对策，这是要发展商本身自己要来反映的；第二个是现在宏观大政策形式一定要看清楚，实际上我们消费的类型是有一种二八现象，就是更多财富聚集在20%人手上，他们可能买第二套房、第三套房、第四套房，他们是投资行为，他们本身的住房已经解决了，宏观调控本身是抑制二次购房的时候，按揭准备金的提高、利率的提高会抑制他们购房的，再一个银行也受国家政策影响要开始压缩信贷规模，这个要看到，再一个要有自身风险的思考和市场的判断，就是市场第二次购房、第三次购房作为投资性的，一定是受到很大的抑制，这个时候如果没有对市场的判断，自身会有问题的，本身应该说万科价格的调整，一个是自己的反思，再一个是对宏观调控政策最直接的回应。”　　　　“我觉得这次调整不同以往”　　　　赵赫：“你刚才说的这些是对开发商的良好建议，还是对手中已经握有房子的人士的良言？”　　　　王石：“我觉得对同行更准确一些，因为同行现在还有很多不同看法，很多人认为中国大的层面需求还是非常硬性的，所谓这种调整马上会反弹，因为确实这两年国家政策有这样的情况，调整一次价格上升一次，我觉得这次是不同的，要清醒认识，这个是两方面原因，一个方面是消费者已经承受不住了，这个要清醒的看到，第二个是国家的调整不仅仅是对房地产，整个现在通货膨胀的压力，整个我们的投资热钱多，这一定要货币回笼，要把通货膨胀压下来，当然你房地产首当其冲，如果不看到这样局面的话会麻烦的，再一个应该看到正因为这个市场有这个需求，就是价格调整是非常必要的，而且不要仅仅看到你现在土地价格成本多少，这一年多土地价格累累出现标王，甚至是面粉会贵过面包，这时候让他降价非常痛苦了，如果还是以你原来土地成本价来计算，市场对你是毫不留情的，应该进行调整，再一个应该看到，正因为带有一种盲目的投机性的购房抑制住之后，即使现在应该看到土地供应有限，土地价格的疯涨也就抑制下来了，实际上10月份以来一线城市出现了流标，不是说面粉贵过面包你买不到，而是最后没有人买了，所以土地即使是稀有的也会调整，万科是基于这样的判断进行价格调整。”　　　　“目前性价比不高，三四年后再买房吧”　　　　赵赫：“对于现在已经具备了一些能力，准备要买房子还是处在一种持币观望阶段的时候，这样的人士你有什么具体的建议。”　　　　王石：“我的建议是这样，就我个人来讲，很多人都问我说现在该不该买房子？我说你三四年之后再买吧，三年到四年，为什么，什么意思呢，我不是从价格角度来看，我而是从性能价格比上来讲，因为我认为，性能价格比上来讲，中国和发达工业国家相比，我们这个房子是相当相当不值的，因为你要买房子，长期自己拥有，我建议来讲，因为我相信在三四年之后，因为这几年中国住宅质量一直在改善，你如果和10年前，和20年前相比，有很大的提高，但是和工业发达国家相比，质量上还有很大的缺口，我觉得三四年之后会有比较大的改善，在那个时候去买，不要更多的从价格去买，因为如果是价格，你三四年之后你是一个中产阶层，你存这么多年钱还买不起房子的话，我觉得市场是有问题的，市场一定会被惩罚的，不是惩罚消费者，是惩罚房地产发展商，惩罚社会，当然惩罚当中，高价买了房子的也跟着会贬值。”　　　　赵赫：“应该说这几年社会各界对房地产行业指责还是比较多的。”　　　　王石：“发展商社会形象不好，甚至很多负面的，这也是一种事实，我想首先第一个是它的产品，刚才讲为什么我建议现在不要买房子，就是等两三年之后，很多海归回来，来了说要买房子，我担心价格高，我都给的建议你等个三四年也不晚，它的质量还是有点问题，比如说和家电、汽车制造业相比，和我们的国产品牌和他们质量相比，确实房地产质量还有待大的提高，那你的质量直接决定了你的形象，所以在相当一段时间，在消协那里，投诉量最大的第一就是对房子，差不多是百分之三十几，所以房地产商必须要致力提高自己的质量，不仅仅是建造质量，还有售后服务质量；第二个就是房价，你就是质量改善了，你房价这么高，当然直接利益得主就是你房地产商，把价格抬高了，你得赚大钱，所以这个形象就很不好，一个买不起房，再一个就是，你赚大钱的前提是我买不起房子，当然这个就更恶劣了。”　　　　“我在此声明：2008年之后万科绝不拿地王”　　　　赵赫：“还有说到房价过高，也有很多的开发商会谈到因为土地稀缺，地价在涨，像年内我们土地价格也是屡创新高，有些地方甚至出现了面粉要贵过面包，也就是说，我们的土地要贵过房子，这样的一个现象，这个原因是什么？”　　　　王石：“这个原因简单来说，当然一个是市场大家都看好，对未来的预期，当然对预期极端的看好，所以只能用亢奋这种词来进行形容，但是显然面粉贵过面包的局面不可能持续下去，因为到头来讲，面包吃不起的时候，因为你面粉还要做面包，你不可能亏损卖，当然消费者买不起面包的时候，你卖面包不能说我面粉贵的理由，我一定要卖高价，那你价格还要下来的，所以这样对投资者来讲风险是非常非常大的，之所以日本泡沫经济，我想就是透支未来透支的太厉害，当市场撑不住的时候它就下来了，所以在2007年出现一些地王，出现面粉贵过面包的时候，显然带行政色彩的宏观调控压缩，抑制，带有投机性的投资，显然是非常有必要的，所以我说深圳、广州的价格回落，是从疯狂的上涨到理性的回归，是用这样的字眼来判断现在是什么样的形式，显然这种上涨是不可能持续下去的，如果不一致，可能大家还津津乐道地说，你看我地价拿的贵，你到明年看，房价上涨的更贵，因为他拿的贵，本身他的预期就是房价会更贵，到现在已经涨到中产阶层感觉购买压力很大的时候，显然面粉贵过面包的现象不可能持续，当然土地供应量少，价格上涨这是一个原因，但是构不成这样一个上涨的充分理由，确实需求旺盛，土地供应不足这是现在市场如何来改变现在市场健康发展要面对的问题，但是绝对不构成我土地要贵过房价的理由，个别现象只能是个案，作为普通来讲，这一定会出现问题的，对这个问题，我有一个认识过程，确实在2007年，我们在10个城市地王的地上有两块是万科拿的，一块是在东莞，一块在福州，所以现在造成社会上形象，就是你们这些上市公司寡头垄断、圈钱、高价拿地，反过来再维持高价，为什么有这样的印象，我们要检讨的，所以我借着在中央电视台《经济半小时》这样的栏目上来声明：2008年之后，万科绝不拿地王，也就是说，万科这样的规模来讲，也完全没有必要计较一城一池的得失，完全没有必要靠拿地王的地来竞争，简单来讲，为什么造成这样的印象，我们是有责任的，我们进行检讨，我做个检讨，我们这样拿地来讲，我们显得是我们也多少有点亢奋，对于拿的地价来讲，但确实不是我们的本意，我们要这样来拿高地价，维持高房价，再来我们圈钱，再来高地价维持高房价，这绝对不是我们的意思，但是造成这种印象，我们应该检讨，而且非常明确，我们借此声明，也非常愿意全国的观众消费者来监督万科的行为。”　　　　赵赫：“像香港、日本都曾经出现过楼市泡沫破灭以后，危及到金融领域，进而危及到整个国民经济，在中国我们会不会出现这样的情况？”　　　　王石：“如果不进行抑制，还是疯狂上涨的话，你比如说，从去年到现在，这样的价格上涨，上涨到我感觉是心惊肉跳，实际上万科是上市公司，它每个季度都发表季报的，你从万科今年以来的第一季度、第二季度、第三季度季报上可以看到，季报上都有这样的字眼，就是市场充满激情和亢奋，已经用亢奋这样的字眼了，万科要保持冷静，我们不能追风，我们一定要务实的，坚定不移的走一条比较稳当的开发路线，什么意思，什么叫亢奋，就是已经控制不了自己的往上涨这种趋势继续下去，一定会有问题的。”　　　　赵赫：“非常感谢你今天百忙之中来到我们的演播室和我们一起就当前中国楼市的一些变化作出的一些有意的探讨。”

本港樓市再有20%下跌空間,整個下跌周期相對較慢

星展銀行高級經濟師梁兆基表示，受到環球經濟影響，預期年中本港的失業率將會升上6%，明年更有可能上升至7%或8%。他預計，未來的失業率回落速度相對較慢，原因是職位流失大多數是銀行業。此外，他相信，本港樓市再有20%下跌空間，但由於香港的儲蓄率偏高，因此整個下跌周期相對較慢。對於有評論指美國國庫債券是一個泡沫，他認為，美債最終都會物極必反，而預計美國失業持續攀升，美元的大方向都是持續弱勢。他又稱，未來人民幣、香港物業及黃金前景仍可看高一線，其中黃金可受惠於預期內地增加黃金儲備。至於中國擬將上海發展成國際金融中心，他認為對香港的打擊不大，原因是內地市場足以容納香港及內地的人才，並相信中央的政策將會是雙贏的局面。

星展銀行高級經濟師梁兆基表示，內地2月份人民幣貸款按年增長24.2%，預期第二季貸款增長放慢至20%，雖然貸款增長放緩，但由於市場有大量的資金因向銀行借款後，投向基礎建設投資，因此預計今年內地的經濟增長可以接近8%，約7.5%水平。不過，由於預期貸款增長放緩，將不利A股市場發展，預計A股將會調整；內地的一、二線城市的樓價亦會持續調整。此外，他認為，人民幣貶值的空間不大，主要是內地未有迫切性減息，料內地今年最多減息1厘，其中銀行貸款利率下調幅度則會相對較大。他亦指，內地4萬億刺激經濟方案的重點是興建2條鐵路，令武漢成為內地的運輸中心；雖然短時間未能帶來太大的經濟效益，但當2條鐵路於2011年啟用後，對內需的刺激長遠有很大的作用。他稱，人民幣於亞洲區內日漸重要，並認為現時美元、歐元、日元及人民幣已經開始形成四分天下的局面，預計未來人民幣將會進入深化過程，而深化過程可能則要再多10年時間。

万科：房价见底时间延迟至2012年

万科：房价见底时间延迟至2012年

1月5日，万科2008年的成绩出炉，虽然离调整后的计划还差一点，不过好于市场的预期。万科虽稳坐第一把交椅，但还是感觉压力很大。 
市场证明，万科对于楼市的预测向来很准，对于何时见底，众说纷纭，而万科把原来预测2009年见底的时间延长至2012年。
高层年终奖不保

1月5日晚间，万科公布2008年最后一个月的销售业绩。12月份万科实现销售面积66.1万平方米，销售金额53.4亿元。受年底购房高峰以及宏观政策的影响，12月增长明显，环比分别增加57.0%和49.6%。

至此，万科2008年累计实现销售面积557万平方米，销售金额478.7亿元，分别比2007年减少9.2%和8.6%。

尽管业绩有所缩减，但万科依然是行业的领跑者，并且与队友们的距离拉得更大了，目前，万科市场份额由2008年年初的2%增长到了2.6%左右。即便如此，万科还是感到压力很大。

平安证券房地产分析师刘细辉对记者说，这一结果与万科全年计划基本相符，12月的销售情况甚至要好于预期，回笼一部分资金后，万科的现金流也比以前更稳健。在财务上万科不断缩减开支，尽量减少成本。

据记者了解，占员工工资大头的2008年年终奖也将从上至下缩减，即高层没有，中层一半，低层照单全发。万科管理层主动降薪，这一举措倒是颇得民心。

以往万科总会在年底对来年销售目标做出计划，但今非昔比，如今万科显得很保守。

万科内部一高层对记者表示，这次经济危机从局部到全球，从金融到宏观，范围在不断扩大，俗称百年一遇，市场已很难准确预测，只有做好最坏的打算和准备。“万科没有对2009年做出销售目标预测，只能跟着市场走，不会给自己设定一个套，没有必要也没有意义。”

万科东莞一营销经理告诉记者，现在他们压力很大，2009年市场很艰难.记者从万科内部员工了解到，万科原来预测房价见底时间在2009年底，但是现在调整为2012年。显然，万科对市场已做了最坏的预测和准备。

“从一般的经济周期来看，需要五年时间走出低谷，但日本以及其他国家的房地产泡沫经验都不能拿来做比照，因为城市化进程和经济水平不同。”房地产专家吴其轮说。

刘细辉认为，目前的房价依然徘徊在高位，在经济危机来临的情况下，收入与房价相比，实际的房价不低，就深圳来说，关内房价普遍在一万以上，楼市下行的空间还很大。

2009年的市场走向很难企稳，而房价走势主要还是看收入，政策能在短期内给市场带来回暖，楼市走势可能就同股市一样，在小幅反弹后继续下行。“但直线下行很难，多半是缓慢向下走。”刘细辉表示。

对于2009年，万科认为下好三步棋，应该足够应付市场最坏的情况。首先是从资金财务上确保公司安全;其次是在调整周期中抓住扩大市场份额的机会;三是尽可能提升专业能力。

要保证资金安全，除了缩减日常支出，少占用资金去拿地，最重要的就是通过降价来带动销售回笼资金。“具体降价幅度会达到多少，会根据市场来定。”万科东莞一销售经理说。

市场证明，王石在2007年底提出的拐点论是对的，率先降价，也让万科继续稳坐行业老大交椅。不能不承认，万科对市场的把握很准，因此万科的一言一行，一举一动，都会令外界格外敏感。

“宁可过于悲观，也不要盲目乐观。”万科高层对记者说。

在拐点论提出一年后，王石又发表“买房不必等三四年后”的言论，表示拐点是针对买不起房的人而言，有能力的人想买房现在可以入市。业内人士分析认为，除了企业管理本身需要他做出最准确的判断外，王石还是个讲政治的人，为了扩大内需，国家希望通过政策和开发商降价联合带动房地产市场回暖，王石当然会见机行事。

罗奇：美国和中国的共生关系

图1

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图9

图10

　　自本世纪开始以来，没有哪两个国家比美国和中国对于推动全球经济更加重要。美国消费者一直是全球经济需求端的主力，而中国生产商向来是供应端的主力。很少有人会对其益处持有异议。在2007年中期之前的4年半里，世界GDP增长率平均值接近5%——这是自20世纪70年代初以来全球经济最强盛并且持续最久的繁荣期。

强烈推荐

 

　　但是现在，两台引擎正开始减速，适逢20世纪30年代以来最严重的危机，世界经济大势不妙。这对任何一方乃至双边关系都构成了巨大的挑战。希望仍然存在，但有一个重要的“前提条件”——中国和美国齐心协力寻找共同的解决方案。然而，如果两国陷入不和，那么它们将两败俱伤——并对饱受危机肆虐的全球其它经济体造成严重后果。赌注是巨大的。没有犯错的余地。

危机中的世界

　　没有一个国家从这场痛苦的金融危机及衰退所带来的影响中幸免。尽管美国所谓的次贷危机可能是引发这场危机的始作俑者，但是在一个全球化的世界里，每个地区现在都像锁住了脚步一样停滞不前。这也包括中国——长期以来一直是最具活力的经济体，如果没有它，世界经济早已低迷。这还包括日益以中国为中心的亚洲其它经济体，它们要么径直步入衰退，要么经济急剧放缓。十年前的那场亚洲金融危机过后，现在新的危机又迫在眉睫。亚洲远未与世界其它地区脱钩，亚洲的问题——特别是中国的问题——与这场始于美国而随后又像野火般蔓延至发达国家的危机及衰退紧密相连。

　　这些问题之所以出现，部分原因在于两个经济体均处于失衡状态。美国的过剩消费模式因长期以来的资产泡沫支柱——房产和信贷——双双破灭而陷入极大的困境。中国的出口导向型增长模式因为受到巨大的外需冲击的负面影响而陷入困境，而这样的外需冲击很可能是美国后泡沫时期消费需求紧缩的结果。亚洲其它经济体——已经紧密融入以中国为中心的供应链的出口导向型经济体——现已无处可躲。1997-1998年那场令人痛心的金融震荡过去十年之后，亚洲正面临另一场危机。

　　重要的是，这些失衡的发生并非彼此孤立。美国的消费泡沫实际上也源自同样不稳定的亚洲出口泡沫。现在，两个泡沫均已破裂——全球经济的消费端和供应端。不可避免的情况发生了：在后泡沫世界里，长期沸腾的全球失衡终于来到危机关头（见图1）。

中国：不平衡并且不稳定

　　在经济繁荣时期，中国的失衡实际上是有利于己的。2001年至2007年间，中国出口在GDP中的比重几乎翻了一番，从20％提高到36％，同时全球出口占世界GDP的比例从24％上升至31％。换言之，中国的时机选择恰到好处。正当全球贸易经历其最辉煌的增长时，中国抬高了其出口依存度。这让中国有效地从20世纪70年代初以来最旺盛的全球繁荣中获益，截至2007年的7年中，其GDP平均以10.4%的速度增长。

　　时过境迁，现在美日欧罕见的同步衰退证明，世界贸易的繁荣时期已经颓败。中国的出口直到2008年中期以前还保持高达25％的同比增幅，后来局势急转直下，年末完全是负增长，2009年1月则下降了17.5％。

　　中国经济中出口占如此大的份额，而其飞速增长态势不复，无怪乎经济活跃程度的指标也同样大幅放慢。12月的工业产出仅增加了5.7％，而此前五年的平均增长速度是16.5％，是以前水平的三分之一。当年的实际GDP增长率为6.8％，与过去三年12%的平均增速形成了鲜明对比。

　　中国的经济增长同比放缓的数据还掩盖了近期经济形势走弱的严重性。用这些数据推算下个季度的变化，即美国目前使用的算法，会发现中国GDP和工业产值增长到2008年结束的时候会持平或负增长。这种突然的减速意味着中国要实现政府制定的2009年GDP增长8%的目标是困难的，很可能最后的增速是接近6％，甚至更低。在一个危机肆虐的世界里，中国并非一片繁荣的绿洲。

　　对于一个长期注重社会稳定的国家而言，这种增长落差令人担忧。它已经对中国的就业造成了严重伤害。政府现在已经确认沿海出口制造业丧失了超过15%的工作岗位——考虑到中国有约1.2亿人的流动就业大军，这相当于2000万名工人。如果出口及GDP下滑持续下去，中国劳动力市场的不景气就会加深——加大长期以来令人担忧的劳动力方面不稳定局面的风险。我依然相信中国领导人会尽全力来避免这样的情况。但是在这场全球衰退中，至少可以这样说，挑战令人生畏。

亚洲：以中国为中心并且身处险境

　　21世纪将是亚洲的世纪，这已经是传统看法。中国奇迹般的发展故事是这一观点的中心——很多人相信，这种转变将不可避免地把全球力量的钟摆从西方拨向东方。说这种结构转变将会把世界翻个里朝外几乎一点都不夸张。亚洲梦是一个强大而又令人兴奋的故事——就像一块磁石，将世界各地的金融及人力资本都吸引过来。

　　我想，现在就开香槟酒庆祝还为时过早。亚洲世纪似乎并非像多数人想象的那样早已注定。我认为，主要原因在于这一地区仍然过于依赖出口及外需。去年，发展中的亚洲出口份额创下了47%的历史最高纪录——比20世纪90年代后期的普遍水平高出了整整10个百分点（见图4）。这根本谈不上是一个真正已经能够自立的强有力经济体。

　　与此同时，亚洲经济日益以中国为中心的特征已经明确无疑——这是该地区寻求增长的另一个维度。当中国繁荣时，亚洲其它国家也非常乐意搭顺风车。以中国为中心的供应链导致了日益紧密的泛区域融合，中国的工厂装配线也无拘无束地从日本、韩国、马来西亚、新加坡、印度尼西亚以及亚洲区其它地方引入投资及零部件。然而，这种依赖性也是双刃剑——这种双向因果关系使亚洲世纪的现状变得更加复杂。如上所述，中国繁荣的本身与全球贸易创纪录式的增长息息相关。但是现在，随着全球贸易经历1982年以来的首次收缩，中国的出口导向型驱动力也随之下降。

　　这极大地冲击了以中国为中心的亚洲。对于该地区其它主要经济体而言，2008年12月份的出口对比数据简直糟透了：例如，中国台湾的出口年同比下降42%，跌幅令人咋舌，其中对大陆出口下滑56%；日本出口下降35%，其中对华出口下滑35%；韩国出口下降17%，对华出口亦下滑35%。近年来，中国大陆已经成为上述三个国家（地区）最大的贸易伙伴，分别占中国台湾、韩国和日本出口的28％、23％和16％。但是，既然中国的出口机器已经在急刹车中停顿，那么亚洲其它经济体的萎靡状况就会更加严重。这正好让亚洲套上一句老话：中国打喷嚏，亚洲重感冒。

　　我坚信亚洲世纪必将到来。但是问题在于可能要比我们希望的晚很多。亚洲世纪最大的考验在于——该地区在面对任何外部冲击时的自力更生能力。20世纪90年代末的时候是一场外部融资冲击。现在则是一场外部需求冲击。这些情况应该让亚洲意识到其担任起领导地位的议程任重而道远。在出口导向型增长模式让位于来自个人消费增长模式的更多支持之前，亚洲世纪的梦想很可能止步于此。

美国：泡沫丰富而又对外依赖

　　这场全球危机始于美国，这一点几乎毫无疑问。美国经济面临空前的深度衰退，这多半是后泡沫时期大浪淘沙的自然结果。它始于房地产，而今却已经蔓延至最大的行业——美国消费行业。在2007年初的鼎盛时期，美国消费足足占实际GDP的72%——创下了美国的历史纪录，就此而论，这对于世界现代史上任何一个主要经济体而言都是一个纪录。

　　这种消费热的问题在于它并非是由美国经济潜在的创收能力支撑起来的。在现已结束的扩张中，私有部门劳动报酬增长步伐的缓慢程度非同一般——比此前四个商业周期的轨迹下挫了（按实际值计算）8000亿美元。低于平均值的就业增长加上实际工资水平的相对停滞让消费者远远缺乏赖以支撑旺盛消费的劳动收入。但是这并没有阻止美国消费者继续消费。通过从资产升值中肆无忌惮地提现——先是证券，然后是住房——消费者发现了新的购买力来源。而信贷泡沫更助长了这种购买力——让房主能够以很低的成本从空前高涨的房屋价值中抽取资本，然后利用这些收益支撑当前的消费，并为将来增加存款。2000年，净房产抵押提取现金量占可支配个人收入的3%，2006年则飙升至近9%。如此依赖泡沫的消费与储蓄策略会导致严重后果。值得注意的是，当得以支持消费的来源从收入转向资产，美国的国内储蓄率便被逼至最低点。国民净储蓄率——剔除贬值因素后的家庭、商业及政府储蓄额——在2002年至2007年期间，降至占国民收入1.8%的历史低谷，而2008年实则跌到了负值区域。这种发展趋势对全球造成的后果非常深远：由于缺少国内储蓄，美国被迫从国外引进额外的存款以支撑经济增长——为了吸引资本使得经常账户赤字变得巨大。

　　对于泡沫丰富的美国经济，储蓄不足是经济脆弱的一个主要根源。在年景好的时候，它让美国愈加依赖像中国这样的债权国为其经济增长提供资金。年景差的时候——特别是在房产及信贷泡沫破裂之后——它触发了依赖资产的美国消费行业的大幅调整。2008年最后两个季度，实际消费开支以3.6%的平均年率下降——这是二战后消费需求首次连续两个季度跌幅超过3%。

　　尽管2008年底美国消费出现前所未有的萎缩，但是仍有理由相信美国消费调整空间还很大。消费占美国GDP的比重较72%的峰值仅下滑了一个百分点——仍然比泡沫前1975年至2000年67%的普遍标准值高出整整四个百分点。在这一基础上，消费均值回归仅完成了约20%。尽管美国当局近期制定了非同寻常的货币及财政刺激措施，后泡沫时期美国消费的去杠杆化历程仍将是美国未来3至5年内宏观经济状况的主要特征。

　　其本质是大规模并且持久的全球需求冲击。美国消费者是全世界最大的消费群体（见图9）。长久以来，美国的消费增长一直远远超过其它发达国家迟缓的消费增长。泡沫后美国消费行业的调整破坏了中国及亚洲其它依赖出口的国家的外需支柱，这一点不足为奇。同时，这也不太可能很快结束。美国消费增长持续低迷所带来的多年阻力可能是未来几年塑造全球经济需求状况的最强大的力量。

与日俱增的双边紧张局势

　　当前的全球危机给美中关系构成了新的挑战——这可能是21世纪全世界最重要的双边关系。近期在美国新任财长盖特纳的参议院任命听证会上，这些挑战便已经有所展现，当时他指责中国操纵货币。此外，随着美国进入衰退，失业率高企，有充分理由担心日后还会有更多针对中国的责难，而盖特纳的评论只是一个值得引人深省的信号。

　　这是华盛顿长期盛行的相互推诿心理的一种不幸的结果。在艰难时期，美国政客们显然需要替罪羊来把注意力从制造了大麻烦的自己身上移开。华尔街被选为制造出这场金融危机的罪魁祸首——尽管监管者及央行有同谋之嫌——而与美国有着巨大的双边贸易赤字的中国正因为美国工人承受的压力而受到指责。

　　华盛顿对华贸易政策措辞严厉的“逻辑”主要基于三个因素——2007年创纪录的2560亿美元的巨额双边贸易赤字，长期以来对人民币货币操纵的指责，以及美国中产阶级工人实际工资的长期缓慢增长。搞定中国问题，争吵自然消失，而美国工人面临的不公平的压力也会随之缓解。

　　美国的问题是多边贸易失衡——而非因中国的不公平竞争引发的双边问题。

　　这个论调漏洞百出。主要原因在于，美中贸易赤字并非毫无来由。如上所述，泡沫丰富而储蓄短缺的美国经济需要从国外引入额外储蓄来保持增长。这同时意味着它必须维持巨额的经常账户赤字及贸易赤字以吸引资金。美中之间的贸易赤字以及美国与其100个贸易伙伴的贸易赤字，实际上都出自这同一个问题。美国的问题是多边贸易失衡——而非因中国的不公平竞争引发的双边问题。美国的多边贸易赤字中，对华贸易赤字是最大的一块——这并非由于其货币价值，而主要原因是美国跨国公司有意识的外包决策。

　　所谓的人民币币值被低估的证据也不像众多美国专家所认为的那样确凿。自从三年多之前中国放弃单一货币挂钩以来，人民币对美元（按实值计算）升值接近21%。此外，近期的学术研究认为人民币多边低估程度大约仅为10%——对中国而言算不上是什么重大优势（参见Yin-Wong Cheung、Menzie D. Chinn和Eiji Fujii撰写的美国国家经济研究局2009年1月的一份工作报告“中国的经常账户及汇率”）。重要的是，上述研究人员进一步证明中国的双边及多边贸易流量并不像人民币打压派所想的那样对货币波动非常敏感。

　　尽管如此，即便美中贸易通过强迫人民币重估、关税或其它方式而下降或终止，储蓄短缺的美国经济也仍将需要维持巨大的多边贸易赤字。那意味着它要把外部失衡中的中国所占的份额转嫁至另一个贸易伙伴头上。如果转嫁至一个生产成本更高的国家——很可能会是这种情况——那么对于已经陷入困境的美国中产阶级而言，其结果相当于增加他们的税赋。但还不止如此。毫无疑问，中国的货币管理者将会以降低美元资产的购买量作为回敬。所有这些都将会让全球两大力量更进一步滑向贸易保护主义。

　　如何避免这样的后果——与20世纪30年代美国臭名昭著的《斯穆特-霍利关税法》引发的贸易战有着惊人的相似——是摆在两国政府面前的重大挑战。对美国新任总统尤其如此。力争为不堪重负的美国中产阶级工人建立支持平台的奥巴马强调了他对于全球化时代实际工资滞胀的担忧。实际工资问题是一个严重的问题。然而，华盛顿面临的挑战是确定这个问题和贸易政策的联系。实际工资停滞极有可能与美国对人力资本投资不足的关联性更大——特别是，在IT主导的全球化时代，滞后的教育改革及技能再培训项目——而与跨境贸易压力的相关度更低。贸易赤字也有可能主要是不鼓励储蓄的错误政策的后果——在预算赤字高达万亿美元的时刻，问题正变得越来越糟。如何在不脱离全球化轨道的条件下摆脱这种进退两难的困境，对于奥巴马总统的领导能力是个迫在眉睫而重要的考验。

不要指望共生

　　在经济学上，长期以来存在于美国这个低储蓄的消费国以及中国这个高储蓄的生产国之间的自然共生现象已经非常明显。但是不能把这种互补想当然的认作是一种能够永远增进关系纽带的相互依赖现象。

　　实际上，美中共生只不过是一种暂时的关系——它反映出了双方利益的契合，但这种契合只能维持一段相对较短的时间。诚然，只要储蓄短缺的美国经济继续维持巨额的经常账户赤字以支撑过剩的个人消费，它就需要一个像中国这样的债权国为其提供国外资本。同时，只要储蓄过剩的中国经济需要通过出口导向型的就业增长来维持社会稳定，那么它就需要世界最大的消费国来吸收其产出。

　　共生状态被不均衡状态取代的可能性越来越大——为美中关系的紧张局势提供了新的缘由。

　　但是，如果这些条件变了，会发生什么？如果美国开始增加储蓄——对于过度消费的后泡沫时期的消费者而言，这种可能性非常大——那么要从中国借入储蓄盈余的需求就会消失。反之，如果中国开始增加支出——鉴于其对出口及投资的过度依赖，这种可能性同样也非常大——那么它借给美国的额外储蓄也会减少。如果这两方面的调整恰好精确地发生在同一时刻，那么一种不间断的共生状态就有可能发生。但是我认为，两大经济体的这种巧妙的同步再平衡的可能性非常非常低。这说明，共生状态被不均衡状态取代的可能性越来越大——为美中关系的紧张局势提供了新的缘由。

　　不幸的是，这并非中美经济紧张局势的唯一缘由。2005年至2007年期间，足足45条反华贸易法规被提交到美国国会。尽管当时没有一条获得批准，但现在却存在变数。随着经济衰退，美国失业率不断攀升，引发贸易摩擦的政见很可能会获得更多的支持。就此而论，财长盖特纳警告中国货币操纵的言论着实令人担忧。美国新近制定的经济刺激方案中纳入的“买美国货”条款也是如此。

　　同时，中国必须更加注意出口导向型增长模式对其贸易伙伴的影响。随着中国在世界贸易中的地位与日俱增，任何补助——不论是国内工资补助还是货币补助——都将是举足轻重的。作为当今世界第二大出口国，中国不能对肩负的责任掉以轻心。此外，如果中国忽视环境恶化及污染，那么世界将为跨境劳动套利付出更大的代价，这代价远比单纯的工资比较所蕴含的意味要深刻。若是说低成本的外包忽略了环保考虑，这在相对“绿化”的经济体中对实际工资形成的挤压可能更加严重。

　　对失衡的全球经济而言，解决美中经济关系的复杂问题是一项紧迫的挑战。当饱受危机肆虐的世界步入严重衰退，赌注会变得越来越大。随着美国及中国经济的演变及变化，转瞬即逝的共生状态很可能为高度紧张的局势所替代。缓解紧张的时机只在今朝——赶在为时过晚之前。

中国经济平衡的迫切性

　　饶有讽刺意味的是，中国早就看到了这些问题。两年前，温家宝总理警告说，对中国经济“不稳定、不平衡、不协调和不可持续”深表担忧。2006年颁布的“十一五规划”也提出了这些问题，强调中国经济必须开始一个重大的结构性转变，从出口主导型经济转向消费驱动的增长。

　　但是，政府缺乏相应的执行措施。特别是未能建立制度化的社保体系，从而扫除预防性储蓄的担忧、建立更有活力的消费文化提供系统支持。结果，消费在GDP中所占的份额2007年下降到创纪录的36％，体现了中国宏观失衡的弊端，这个问题在全球性危机中更加麻烦（见图10）。外部需求遭受严重冲击后，中国经济不平衡问题凸显，而中国还没有一个后备计划。

　　鼓励消费来平衡经济的办法是中国唯一可持续的出路。积极的财政刺激措施，如最近推出的4万亿元基础设施为主的投资计划会暂时有效。这种措施借鉴了20世纪90年代末亚洲金融危机以及2000年至2001年全球轻度衰退期间中国所采取的反周期方案。但是随着美国消费者开始一场历时多年的消费缩减，这些行动并不足以弥补中国依赖外需的增长模式所面临的结构性漏洞。

　　中国需要大胆积极制定有利于消费的政策。它应该首先宣布社保系统的重大举措。具体来说，中国应大幅扩大全国社会保障基金的资金，目前该基金只管理着700多亿美元的资产，还不足以为老龄化的中国人口提供人均100美元的退休资金。中国也需要迅速采取行动启动一个私人养老金计划，以扩大全国范围的健康和失业保险范围。最近通过的一项8,500亿元人民币为期三年的医疗改革计划，是朝这个方向迈出的令人鼓舞的一步。

　　鼓励消费来平衡经济的办法是中国唯一可持续的出路。

　　对中国而言，最根本的是：其失衡的经济必须经历再平衡。服务了中国经济30年的出口驱动型增长模式现在必须让位于内部驱动的消费导向型经济增长模式。对中国而言，再平衡的要求从未如此迫切。对于亚洲其它经济体而言——更不用说已经失衡的全球经济了——中国在后泡沫时期的经济领导角色很大程度上取决于这个重大的再平衡历程。

政策风险

　　无须赘言，衰退的经济体往往不会欣然接受让本国货币升值的建议。对于出口导向型的中国而言尤其如此，2008年末，其环比增长的放缓程度实际上已经接近停滞。2009年初的整体经济增长依然低迷，目前远低于6%-8%这一中国借以消化多余劳动力并维持社会稳定的区间，而强化经济周期效应的紧缩货币政策只会增加经济下行风险。

　　美国财长盖特纳近期的货币操纵言论会受到北京的质疑，这一点已经不足为奇。尽管那样尖锐的言辞并不意味着会有实际行动，但是如果口舌之争直接演变成贸易制裁，那么会产生何种后果仍然值得考虑。金融市场会即刻感受到其影响。由于美国依赖中国的资金填补其对外赤字——在数万亿美元预算赤字的时代，这种依赖性有增无减——美国没有资格冒险让中国减少购入美元资产。然而，如果骄傲而受伤的中国对华盛顿因货币纷争引起的贸易制裁采取报复，那么上述情况就极有可能发生。

　　此类报复的可能形式是中国不出席将来的美国国库券拍卖。美国每个工作日需要30亿美元的资本流入方能为其经常账户赤字提供资金，对美国而言，中国的上述反应绝不是一件小事。如果中国不给美国提供外部资金，美元可能会贬值，而实际长期利率将会上调。美元危机是陷入衰退中的美国最不想要的。但如果美国把言辞变为行动，对中国施加贸易制裁，那么上述情况就有可能发生。简言之，华盛顿把美国的危机归咎于中国货币，这简直是如履薄冰。泡沫后的美国经济正经历内需萎缩，而靠责备中国是于事无补的。在当前的环境下，针锋相对不仅是个糟糕的建议，而且还很危险。

　　同样需要强调一下值得中国警惕的方面。首要一点，中国的决策者绝不能过于乐观地指望外部需求模型会再次奏效。耗时多年的美国消费低迷无异于一场全球消费冲击，将长期拖累任何一个出口导向型的经济体。因此，中国再平衡的需求从未如此迫切。中国必须把过度依赖出口的增长模型转向内需推动的增长模型，这种需求正日渐紧迫。

　　中国也不应该尝试使用货币杠杆或其他补贴来促进出口。在失业率日增且发达国家对全球化带来的利益日渐担忧的时期，这种努力可能为反华贸易制裁提供口实。正如前文所述，这些行动也可能促使中国重新考虑其作为美国最重要的海外债权国的角色。若是这样，美国就会发现20世纪30年代的一幕会重新上演。

警钟

　　长期以来，对于中文词汇中的危机一词的英文翻译一直存有争议。一种较为流行的观点是“危机”可以理解为危险和机遇共存。不幸的是，这层意思——不管是否正确——对于陷入危机的世界而言已经消失了。今天，危机和衰退中的世界需要比以往任何时候都更加团结——而不是拆散自己。通过贸易和资本流动实现的全球化及其跨境关联让我们别无选择。

　　在如今的这个环境中，推诿指责完全会产生相反结果。那些把美国难以为继的消费狂热归咎于像中国一样有储蓄盈余的经济体的人应该感到难堪。这是美国问题，也是一个应该在美国国内通过新的约束性货币政策、严厉的监管监督以及更负责任的消费者和公司行为来解决的问题。对于一个数十年以来都入不敷出而又依赖泡沫的经济体而言，现在它必须接受应该量入为出的现实——同时也不应将这种痛苦但却必要的调整归咎于他人。

　　美国需要增加储蓄并降低消费，而中国则需要降低储蓄并增加消费。

　　同样，中国需要承认出口导向型增长方式总是有极限的。全球发达经济体的同步衰退是我们闻所未闻的，由此引发的空前的外需震荡已经把这个问题暴露无遗。经济发展并非只为别人生产——特别是当那些“别人”都入不敷出的时候。最终，出口导向型增长必然会被国内消费者的内部需求所取代。中国已经做好了这种转型的准备，而且必须尽快开始这一过程。

　　简言之，现在正是失衡的世界开始挑起全球再平衡重担的时候。通过勾勒出以美国和中国为背景的这种调整，结论也就很明确了：美国需要增加储蓄并降低消费，而中国则需要降低储蓄并增加消费。

　　说起来容易做起来难。但是陷入危机的世界已经无力再延续一种不稳定的现状。全球再平衡并非一针速效剂——因此对目光短浅的政客们来说，它并不那么有吸引力。但最终，这却是能够让世界重新回到可持续增长轨道的唯一途径。如果这场危机还存有一线希望，那它一定存在于给这个失衡世界上的政客和决策者们发出的一记警钟之内。

　　注:本文由罗奇先生于2009年2月17日在华盛顿特区召开的有关“中国在全球衰退的起源及应对中的角色”的听证会上向美国国会下属美中经济与安全审查委员会呈交。

FEB-17-2009王石:反弹并不代表反转,房地产调整远未结束

昨天(17日),万科董事会主席王石在南京与媒体交流时表示,去年12月以来的楼市有所反弹,成交量有所放大,这仅仅是房产刚性需求的释放,“反弹并不代表反转,房地产调整远未结束。”

　　这表明王石仍在坚持他的观点。作为国内房地产行业的领军人物,王石于2007岁末抛出了“拐点论”,称高房价不可维持,房价必将理性回归。“拐点论”一出即激起论战巨浪,万科被指“唱衰中国楼市有阴谋”,但事实上却在行业发展中有所验证。业内人士认为,楼市在2008年所经历的“行业景气回落、企业库存高企和市场价跌量缩”等困境并没有改观,全国房价2009年可能酝酿新一轮下跌。

昨天陪同王石的是万科南京公司新任总经理朱保全。王石在南京重申,从2006年开始,万科已经看到两个指标出现了问题,一个是房地产价格的上涨和家庭收入上升的差距越来越大,已经到了一个剪刀差的比例。还有一个是前期资金进入过多,房地产库存环比增加,这说明销售不理想,去库存化是个漫长而痛苦的过程。这两个指标越来越高,市场就一定会发生变化。

　　“具体到不同地区,调整程度也不同。”王石说,珠三角地区前期调整幅度过大,今年的调整会趋于缓和;北京与长三角调整的大幕才刚刚拉开;而中西部和东北地区的调整幅度不大。他还说,“金融危机对中国实体经济的影响才开始。”

　　对于万科今年的战略,王石表示“将采取适度扩张的战略,专心致志做城市住宅,成为住宅专业提供商,成为上市公司中的地产蓝筹,成为受人尊敬的企业。

5-10 trillion needed for bailout (KENICHI OHMAE)

What is needed to make the U.S. financial bailout plan a success

By KENICHI OHMAE

Special to The Japan Times

The refusal of the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the $700 billion bailout plan Monday may turn out to have been appropriate if the Congress correctly understands the priorities at hand. The issue is not whether the situation should be left to the market or whether the government should save those who lose their house due to foreclosure. The main challenge at this moment is to provide liquidity to the market, particularly to failing financial institutions.

From the experience of Japan throughout the 1990s, and also from the experience of Nordic countries, it is clear that the U.S. financial crisis is also going through a sequence of events — almost physical and also psychological — that are very similar to what happened elsewhere in the world.

The problem is that the U.S. leadership does not seem to understand exactly what happened and what lessons to reflect on, as is clear in the impulsive and almost heroic actions that they have exhibited over the last three months.

Now that the Paulson bailout plan is temporarily suspended, it may not be too late to state what I have been talking and writing about in Japan with regard to the problems of the U.S. approach to resolving its financial crisis and a possible solution to the imminent threats of meltdown of global banking systems.

There are three principles that must be observed in resolving a major financial crisis: (1) treat it as a systemic failure and do not act on individual situations; (2) know the sequence of events, so the right problem can be solved at the right time; and (3) construct a universal system later to prevent similar problems from occurring again. The U.S. government seems to be violating every one of these principles and mixing the sequence of events, hence aggravating an already dire situation.

What the U.S. needs to do under this scenario is to get help from the rest of the world in setting up a gigantic credit line, on the order of $5 trillion, to provide the necessary liquidity that will allow troubled financial institutions to come in and work on their assets and liabilities without fear of punishment and catastrophic failure.

This is similar to the "Emergency Room" that the Swedes set up in the early 1990s during their financial crisis. But the credit line should be far, far greater this time to eliminate any doubt that the liquidity will run out.

In setting up this facility, two principles should be observed. One is that the U.S. government should not be asked to print more money. It has already printed too much. One problem with Paulson's approach is that he is trying to solve all the problems with internal resources. The U.S., even before the $700 billion bailout package, had issued a lot of promissory notes that will in effect dilute the value of the dollar, a scenario that sparks fears worldwide. The second principle is that the facility should be big enough to eliminate any doubt that the money might run out.

During the Korean crisis of 1997-1998, the International Monetary Fund came in to replace the over-extended American banks. This time there is no trace of the IMF on the horizon, other than its occasional forecast of what the bad debts would be (currently at $1.3 trillion, but escalating over time).

From the U.S. perspective the IMF is too European. Maybe, but if the IMF does not work, this would be a good time to call for the establishment of a global pumping station, a place where financial institutions could come to receive an unlimited supply of liquidity transfusion until they have worked out their problems.

I stated that this facility should have at least $5 trillion because it should be large enough so people do not think it is a shallow oasis. It would seem that $5 trillion is an enormous number and unfounded. But we know that the Japanese poured in $3 trillion either in the shape of public funds or foregone interest to help their banks survive.

My personal calculation at the beginning of Japan's property bubble bursting was on the order of $2 trillion, while the government was admitting only $130 billion in bad assets in 1994. Former Bank of Japan Gov. Toshihiko Fukui admitted 15 years later that the burden of the bailout on the public was actually $3 trillion. So, while I am not in a position to calculate the right size of the liquidity facility for the U.S., any number smaller than the amount that the Japanese required would be a source of trouble. It has to be on the order of $5 trillion to $10 trillion.

The only way to get this kind of money assembled is for the U.S. to ask for donations of mercy, not only from its taxpayers but also from those who have piled up dollar-denominated instruments around the world — who will be hurt if the value of the dollar or U.S. government securities falls.

For example, China has piled up $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves through its trade surplus, which is mostly in dollars. Japan can contribute $1 trillion, which it does not need returned in a hurry. Taiwan and Russia could come up with $500 billion each, and the oil-rich Gulf states certainly could support Uncle Sam easily with $2 trillion. We can ask the European Union to contribute collectively something like $2 trillion if we make the facility available to their financial institutions. That totals $7.5 trillion, and if the U.S. adds $2 trillion to the pool it brings it close to the maximum I am talking about $10 trillion.

We are not going to lose this money. It is money on which we can even expect to earn 3 percent interest. After this liquidity facility is dissolved in three to five years time, when good banks are healthy again, donor countries can expect to receive back the amount they loaned.

For this to happen, the Bush administration will have to rethink its diplomatic relationship with quite a few countries. U.S. foreign policy has been built upon the fight against terrorism. Now Washington has to repair its relationships with some countries to gain their cooperation in the fight against financial terrorism, which Wall Street has triggered and spread around the world.

Judging by the experience of Japan, the major financial crisis will go through three phases, each requiring a different measure.

The U.S. is now experiencing the first phase, which mainly comes from the liquidity crisis. The Federal Reserve Bank has provided a credit line close to $1.4 trillion and major institutions are now at the mercy of this facility. Japan lost Yamaichi and Sanyo Securities in the first phase of crisis because they could not pull money from interbank facilities.

The second phase of the crisis comes mainly from working out the bad assets. In this phase the write-offs far exceed the equity, and financial institutions cannot raise fresh capital from the market because their share price has fallen to a meaningless level. The Long-term Credit Bank, Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank all failed due to write-offs on loans to failing or failed companies. At this stage, it is important for the government to inject fresh capital to let the banks revive and return to normal operation.

In doing so, the government could end up owning a bank directly or through debt-equity swap. Paulson's rescue plan is appropriate for this phase as its main purpose is to buy bad assets. But I think it could be implemented much later in the game as the more urgent need is for the banks to survive without the fear of being in a "wolf pack."

The reason for this is that we are faced with a systemic problem, not a collection of individual banks. The nature of the problem at hand is a lack of liquidity. In group theory this syndrome is known as "wolf pack." While the wolves are good at attacking the victim as a team, they have a tendency to attack the weakest of the cohort should extreme hunger prevail. The banking crisis resembles this metaphor, continuing until a few mega-banks are left.

The third phase is characterized by the massive failures of operating companies. This is because the financial institutions that have survived are under severe government scrutiny and they cannot easily extend loans to businesses, their traditional customers.

This creates a problem for companies, which have traditionally relied on bank loans for their operations. All of a sudden, a banker comes to the company and says, "Sorry, we need to close the credit line and you need to return the money to us as you are no longer bankable" (a new word they will invent to pull the money from otherwise a good company).

Japan has lost hundreds of companies, such as Daiei, its largest retailer, in phase three.

We know Japan could have come out of its mess much sooner had the government proactively, not reactively and unwillingly, faced the issues straight on. I am not sure if the Americans are addressing the right issues with the right priorities and sequence, and how long it will take to get back to "business as usual." It has taken Japan 15 years, and luckily, it is OK now as it has no further room to go down.

If you recognize that the three phases are like the law of physics (indeed it seems to me that what I have described is a general theorem of major financial catastrophe), then we should expect that the U.S. package should not be hastily worked out, but rather devised utilizing the wisdom of the rest of the world.

 

Asia's next crisis: 'Made in China'

Rapid evolution of Chinese economy threatens regional status quo

By KENICHI OHMAE 2001

Two seemingly separate events occurred this month: Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 summer Olympic games, and stock prices and currency rates in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong hit their lowest weekly marks since the 1997 Asian crisis.

Together, this says a great deal about the future of Asia -- and the immense challenges that the rest of the world faces from China.

Policymakers and industrialists will be paying a great deal more attention to China in the near future, but not because of human rights, the militarism of the central Communist government, or the opening of Chinese markets. The Chinese production economy is about to explode with accelerating vitality, and the rest of the world is unprepared for it.

I saw the implications of this recently on a visit to a 3-year-old manufacturing plant in the Pearl River Delta, one of the fastest-growing regions in China. This plant had 50,000 workers -- all young women, and none wearing eyeglasses.

"Don't you have any employees with bad eyesight?" I asked the manager.

He replied: "We fire them when their eyes go bad. They can find another job -- that's not my problem. There are plenty of people who want to work for us."

From the perspective of industrialized nations, practices like this are brutally cruel and would not exist in any other nation of China's stature due to labor laws. But in Shengzhen, Shanghai, Suzhou, Dalian and many more Chinese cities, where hundreds of millions of people eagerly flock to urban jobs from the hinterlands, such practices are taken for granted.

A situation with precedent

To find a comparable precedent, you would have to go back 40 years, to Japan's postwar economic surge. There are also echoes of Dickensian England -- the dawn of the industrial revolution -- or the "robber baron" era in America, when labor was inexpressibly cheap and technology was new.

One advertisement for a factory in Dalian, offering the equivalent of $ 100 per month, drew 2,000 girls from nearby farmlands. They literally surrounded the plant, seeking interviews.

Those who are hired work round the clock and live in company dormitories. They often study electronic circuitry or other high-tech skills on their lunch hours. Those laid off (for nearsightedness or other reasons), generally don't return to the peasant life; they become urban entrepreneurs in the burgeoning freelance and service businesses of China's new cities.

By itself, China's glut of low-wage and highly educable workers gives that country a remarkable competitive advantage. But there are three other engines fueling China's economic juggernaut as well.

One system, 10 nations

First, there is the political structure. In the last few years, because of a concerted policy of economic deregulation, the People's Republic has matured from "one nation, two systems" -- an empire with communist and capitalist components -- into "one system, 10 nations" -- a commonwealth of semiautonomous, self-governing economic regions. Some of these regions, such as Shengzhen, Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin, Shenyang, Quindao and Suzhou, are already growing much faster than any the "Asian Tigers," such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea.

The average population of these "region states" is 5-7 million. Although China is nominally Communist, businesses in these regions have far fewer regulations to deal with than their counterparts in Japan, France or Sweden. By comparison, China is a capitalist's paradise, so long as you remain within these regions and do not deal with the central government in Beijing.

Burning hunger to win

Second, Chinese industrialists are eager to learn and uninhibited by complacency.

I was a close adviser to several Japanese companies that cracked the U.S. market in the 1970s and 1980s. I vividly remember their executives confronting that formidable challenge by saying, "How can we do this?"

Today, their successors tend to enumerate all the reasons they can't act, and blame the economy and government for their troubles.

But Chinese companies have picked up where the Japanese left off. They are developing innovative, low-cost export businesses in apparels, vitamin supplements, foods (including shiitake mushrooms and vegetables popular in Japan), watches, consumer electronics and appliances, plywood, footwear, and precision electronic and mechanical components.

In the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas, there are more than 50,000 electronic component suppliers sophisticated enough to deliver their wares "just in time" to the local Japanese and Taiwanese manufacturers.

In Japan, apparel companies like Fast Retailing (known for the Uniqlo brand) have taken advantage of large-scale production in China and halved consumer prices of high-quality clothing. In the otherwise very depressed Japanese market, Uniqlo has been doubling its sales for three consecutive years, with an awesome operating margin of 25 percent. The direct approach, in which Japanese-designed products mass-produced in China are sold in company-owned stores, is now being called "Uniqloization."

Many companies are following suit in such industries as glasses and stationery.

In short, China is rapidly supplanting industries that took other Asian countries 15 years or more to build.

Currency system strong

The third and most influential factor behind the scenes has been the stability of China's currency. This represents either an accident of history or a supreme example of cunning foresight.

In 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China, the United Kingdom agreed to leave about $ 38 billion of reserve capital in the territory -- but only if the Chinese promised to keep the currency intact. It was stipulated that for every new Hong Kong dollar that its three central banks minted, they would hold in reserve the equivalent of about 13 U.S. cents -- a very high amount.

The Chinese not only accepted this, but pegged their mainland currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the Hong Kong dollar as well. They also prohibited exchange of renminbi outside of China, limiting speculators to the H.K. dollar. In effect, by embracing a restriction against minting money to relieve economic pain, China has made itself immune from the currency fluctuations that have bedeviled Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil and Argentina. As a dollar-based economy, China enjoys the same protection against inflation the United States does.

The world has never seen an economy with these qualities before. And because it is so new, the effects are just now being felt.

Already, China is doing to the rest of the Asian economy what Japan did to the West 20 years ago. The currencies of and the stock prices in Korea, Thailand and Malaysia have declined precipitously since 2000. Some countries, like Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, are being hit much harder by this new competition than they were by the economic crises in 1997.

Time to wake up

What should politicians and industrialists outside China make out of all this?

We must shake ourselves out of complacency.

For decades, economists and investors have waited for China to wake up, fearing its overwhelming population but lusting after its enormous market. Finally, the awakening has begun, and it will expand much more quickly than most of us expect. If Hong Kong's trading volume is added to the export and import volumes of China, it becomes the third largest trading nation in the world, trailing the U.S. and Germany but surpassing Japan.

There is reason to believe that China's central government will rapidly evolve into a "United States of Chunghua," with most economic decisions made at the regional or provincial level. Chunghua, which translates into English as "China," actually means "the prosperous center of the universe."

China's regional autonomy is far stronger than Japan's and Germany's. Chinese states compete against each other for foreign investment and markets. In a strange way, the federal governance structure of China is the closest, among all large nations, to that of the United States.

This regional competition will further accelerate China's economic expansion far beyond anything we have seen in Asia to date. Americans (and others) will be forced to trade with China, as consumers will demand China's inexpensive products and producers will require inexpensive components. Like the U.S. in first half of the 20th century, and Japan in the second half, Chinese industries will overcome protectionist efforts to resist. Other nations will be challenged to match China's unfair advantages with innovation and other forms of competitiveness.

And it won't be easy. Each time a Chinese industry has competed directly with a foreign industry, China has won.

That doesn't mean that China should get blanket political approval from the West. On the contrary, it has never been so dangerous.

Wither democracy?

China is not a democracy, and the human rights and totalitarian abuses of the Chinese government will continue. But they will occur in the context of one of the most highly capitalist societies on the planet.

This, in itself, will test many prevailing assumptions about economic development.

For example, Western nations have traditionally preached that democracy is a prerequisite for economic prosperity. But Democracy at this stage of China would lead the majority of its population to demand greater distribution of wealth, as they have in India. But there are still 900 million farmers in China with an average annual income of $ 500. Distribution of wealth would lead, as it has in India, to the distribution of poverty. So it will be a long time before China adopts democracy and the central government gives up its unchallenged power.

Constructing a new view

American politicians and businesspeople seem to oscillate between viewing China as a James Bond villain and a market to be exploited. Both of these views are now obsolete. Many of China's consumers, for instance, will be cunningly reserved for its own domestic industries.

China is a fierce new economic competitor, perhaps the fiercest since the U.S. itself came on the scene at the turn of the last century.

In the short run, China's emergence is triggering a second Asian economic crisis more severe than the first. But unlike the currency speculators who triggered the 1997 crisis, China won't go away.

In the long run, the ability of a company to thrive in this new world will depend on how well it can figure out how to "internalize" China's advantage to increase its own competitiveness.

Unlike what the newspaper headlines indicate, competition is not a fight between China and the U.S. or Japan, but a race in each market in which the victor will be the company that best internalizes China's competitiveness to beat its domestic competitors. The rest of us will have to temper our opposition to China with the fact that, as consumers, we will never have had it so good. People around the world will soon come to depend on the quality and price of goods that China can provide better than any other nation. When we finally meet the enemy, over in Beijing, we will find out it is us.

Kenichi Ohmae is managing director of Ohmae & Associates and author of "The Invisible Continent -- Four Strategic Imperatives of the New Economy (Harper Collins)."